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Abstract
This thesis endeavours to achieve two things: first, it exposits a version of presentism, the 
doctrine that only present concrete entities exist, that is enriched with haecceities, the non-
qualitative, essential properties of entities that characterise their essences. I argue that 
haecceity presentism provides strong responses to problematics traditionally faced by 
presentism (providing ontology for singular propositions, truthmaking, and cross-temporal 
relations and causation) without violating any of presentism’s strictures. I also distinguish my  
version of haecceity presentism from other versions, and argue my version is the strongest.
Second, I deploy haecceities to mount novel lines of attack on critical elements of the B-
theory: eternalism, perdurance, and stage theory. These attacks say that each of these 
tenseless theories of time and persistence cannot adequately rationalise and vindicate the 
importance of emotions in our lives, and how they contribute to crucially important projects 
such as rehabilitation. Further, these tenseless theories generate critical problems with some 
of our moral practices, such as blame, as well as generating radically alienating 
consequences for it. Consequently, tenseless theorists should either acknowledge the 
importance of emotions and reject their theories, or be honest and transparent in accepting 
that they cannot rationalise or vindicate emotions.
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INTRODUCTION
My thesis consists of two thematic halves. The first half is devoted to the exposition, defence 
and demonstration of the philosophical utility of a particular version of presentism. 
Presentism is the thesis that only present concrete entities exist. Unless we qualify or modify  
this basic thesis, however, familiar problems creep in: for example, how can singular 
reference to past concrete entities occur if there are no such entities? I argue that by 
enriching the classic presentist ontology of present concrete objects with haecceities, such 
problems can be answered. This is because haecceities can function as surrogates for past 
entities without violating presentism’s strict ontological constraints. 
A haecceity, within the context of this version of presentism, is a non-qualitative, 
uniquely instantiated property of an entity that characterises its essence: the being Bertrand 
Russell unique to Bertrand Russell. My haecceity presentism shares its foundation and 
motivation with the thisness presentism of David Ingram, though it differs in certain 
fundamental respects. 
Why defend haecceity presentism? In short, and recalling the title of this thesis, I 
think it provides a compelling temporal metaphysics of affective attitudes: in other words, I 
think haecceity presentism allows us to justify and vindicate, in a very deep sense, various 
critical strands of our emotional experiences – such as grief, regret, and hope – by 
connecting them to something metaphysically robust rather than ‘merely’ psychological. 
The first half begins with a chapter concerning technical matters about the nature of 
a haecceity, and includes arguments for two aspects of a haecceity’s nature that may seem 
controversial: that there are haecceities of past and present but not future entities, and that 
they can exist uninstantiated.
I go on to deploy haecceity presentism to see how it fares against traditional 
presentist problematics: singular reference, truthmaking, and cross-temporal relations. I also 
argue that haecceity presentists should understand causation as counterfactual 
dependence, as this understanding sits very well with their ontology. 
Throughout, I consider and argue against objections about the suitability of 
haecceities for such work, and offer significant differences between my haecceity presentism 
and David Ingram’s in the section on truthmaking. I also argue that my version of haecceity 
presentism avoids some problems that Ingram’s faces, so it is stronger.
The second half is concerned with our emotions, our relationship to ourselves and 
our prior immoral or imprudent actions, and some ethical dilemmas generated by believing in 
past concrete entities, or those parts of ourselves which have temporal extent in the past. 
I argue that for our emotions to enjoy the deep vindication we take them to have, for 
them to be rational and intelligible, we must deny the existence of the past and invoke 
haecceities which survive the demise of the past entities that they characterise. The 
emotional attitudes I am mainly concerned with are: grief, repentance and rehabilitation, 
horror, and hope. 
First, I argue against the intelligibility of grieving a deceased entity when the entity 
itself is still real with respect to all times. I consider, next, what a metaphysic of temporal 
parts or person stages might mean for our conception of action and responsibility, certain 
elements of our moral practice and attributions (such as blame), and how repentance and 
rehabilitation could occur when our prior immoral or imprudent actions are also real with 
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respect to all times. Again, I argue that haecceity presentism permits space for genuine 
overcoming of past immoral or imprudent actions. 
Next, I discuss the implications of events being real with respect to all times and what 
this means for greatly disvalued events that are part of our own history and history more 
generally. The eternality of these events generates what I call chronal horrors. I argue that 
the existence of chronal horrors gives eternalism a radically alienating character.
Finally, I consider hope in relation to the open future, epistemology, and the 
experience of change. I argue that for hopes to be genuinely satisfied, reality must be 
confined to the present. 
The thesis offers two major conclusions. The first, noted above, is that my version of 
haecceity presentism offers good responses to problems traditionally faced by presentism, 
and that it is also the strongest version of haecceity presentism. Secondly, that haecceity 
presentism permits a novel line of attack against tenseless theories of time and persistence 
that generates potent problems for them that have not been answered. Either the tenseless 
theorists relent and accept the truth of presentism, or accept that their theories have no 
place for the rationalisation of the emotional lives (and, to a degree, moral lives) of persons, 
and that as a result, they are profoundly alienating.
Ultimately, though, I endeavour to give a clear, positive reason for one to be a 
haecceity presentist: it does something (rationalise and vindicate our emotions, personally 
and ethically) that a tenseless theory cannot. Thus, the presentist, often stuck in the rut of 
defending her theory, can launch an attack: she need only embrace haecceity presentism.
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PART I – THE PROSPECTS FOR HAECCEITY PRESENTISM
SUMMARY
This is the first thematic half of my thesis. In this, I exposit a particular version of presentism 
– haecceity presentism – which, perhaps obviously, is a version of presentism with the 
addition of haecceities. I understand haecceities to be non-qualitative, uniquely instantiated 
properties that serve to characterise the essence of their unique object. In other words, my 
haecceity characterises my essence as being Kyle Buckle-Hodgson.
" Chapter 1 is concerned with articulating what a haecceity is and defending two of its 
characteristics: first, that there are only haecceities of past and present entities, and second, 
that haecceities continue to exist uninstantiated when the objects of which they are 
haecceities cease to exist (e.g. my haecceity continues after my death). The argument for 
the former concerns the contingency of future objects, whilst the argument for the latter 
concerns a non-standard, temporal notion of ontological dependence.
With haecceity presentism defined, I turn to the task of using it to provide responses 
to well established problems for presentism. This is to vindicate haecceities as posits by 
demonstrating their ability to undertake philosophical labour.
The first problem, dealt with in chapter 2, is the problem of singular propositions. The 
problem of singular propositions for presentists, simply put, is that propositions depend for 
their existence on the existence of the proposition’s constituents. So, the proposition 
<Bertrand Russell was wise> depends for its existence on Russell himself. But Russell 
doesn’t exist for presentists. Of course, the haecceity presentist says the proposition 
depends, rather, on Russell’s haecceity (and, for me, it always depended on his haecceity, 
even when Russell was alive – here Ingram and I diverge). For this chapter, I am largely 
concerned with a battery of arguments from Ned Markosian (2004) and the objection that 
singular propositions are really about their concrete constituents – about Russell, in this 
case – and not about haecceities. 
The second problem, truthmaking, is the subject matter of chapter 3. The problem for 
presentists is this: truth seems to depend substantively on ontology. That is, the truth of a 
proposition like <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> depends, partly, on Caesar. But this is a 
proposition about the past, so a presentist does not have Caesar around for that 
dependence. How does the presentist account for this proposition’s truth, then? I argue that 
haecceities, as bearers of tensed properties, indirectly characterise the properties of their 
objects such that true propositions about the past are made true by haecceities. I defend this 
particular relationship between haecceities and their objects, as well as the philosophical 
value of tensed properties. Here, I also express disagreement with Ingram about the role 
haecceities play in truthmaking, and with how he handles the objection that, as with singular 
propositions, truths are about what makes them true, and thus not about haecceities. I also 
argue that haecceity presentism respects the intuition that the past has explanatory priority 
over the present with respect to truths about the past.
 Chapter 4 concerns the third problem of cross-temporal relations. Presentists 
believe in only one time, the present. But causal relations occur across more than one time. 
Thus, presentists cannot account for cross-temporal relations. As with truthmaking, I argue 
that haecceities are the bearers of tensed properties, though in this instance they 
characterise an object’s former causal powers such that they can offer an account of cross-
temporal relations. I go on in Chapter 5, following some remarks by Craig Bourne (2006), to 
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say haecceity presentists should adopt a counterfactual account of causation, as it sits 
particularly well with their commitments.
Finally, there is a short appendix in which I attempt to address some concerns that 
haecceities are suspicious or an instance of cheating.
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Chapter 1 – The Theory of Haecceity Presentism
1.1 - Sketching Haecceity Presentism
Haecceity presentism is committed to haecceities; it is haecceities that distinguish it from 
other formulations of presentism and it is haecceities that take on a good deal of the 
metaphysical labour. A haecceity is a property of an entity and it is the property of being that 
particular entity – it characterises its primitive identity. So, for any particular entity, that 
entity’s haecceity is the property of being identical with itself. So, for example, my haecceity, 
of Kyle Buckle-Hodgson, is the property being Kyle Buckle-Hodgson. It is primitive, insofar 
as it is not reducible to any more fundamental properties, and it is uniquely mine, as in 
constituting my primitive identity it cannot be instantiated by anyone else. I do not 
discriminate on whether only certain kinds of entities have haecceities. Indeed, I am very 
permissive with haecceities, as I believe they can do, and shall argue they can do, lots of 
significant work. I also do not think there are different kinds of haecceity that correspond to 
different kinds of entities. For example, there is no difference in what a haecceity is between 
the natural and artefactual, as haecceities are merely the properties of being this particular 
table, or being this particular woman (e.g. being Keshet Buckle-Hodgson). If one believes in 
haecceities, there are certainly a good deal of them, but there are not different kinds of 
haecceities.
" Haecceity presentism has been alluded to here and there in the philosophy of time 
literature. Simon Keller calls it ‘Haecceitist Presentism’ (2004). Markosian attacks an 
analogue of it (2004). The view is sometimes attributed to Timothy Williamson (1998), 
though his articulation of it is formulated outside the typical contours of the debate in the 
philosophy of time, and thus such a classification feels procrustean (and, for my money, 
Williamson’s remarks fit better with the moving spotlight theory). Recently, David Ingram 
(2016, 2018) has made a sustained effort to rehabilitate it as a respectable position by 
demonstrating the work haecceities can do for any presentist. Ingram has put his version of 
haecceity presentism (which he calls ‘Thisness Presentism’) to task on the problems of 
singular reference for presentists, truthmaking, temporal passage, and the open future. Mine 
and Ingram’s haecceity presentism share a common core, as all versions of a haecceity 
enriched presentism should, but there are also significant differences in our analyses of 
singular reference (and, thus, truthmaking) and how we express the properties of 
haecceities. But my ultimate contribution to the debate, really, is to demonstrate that 
haecceity presentism is essential if one wants to find certain kinds of emotional attitudes 
rational or capable of rationalising actions: that is, if one desires the depth and substantivity 
of our emotions to be thoroughly vindicated. And by essential, I really do mean that certain 
kinds of emotions – grief, remorse – cannot be rationalised at all on not only a non-
presentist, non-endurantist metaphysic, but a non-haecceity presentist one too. 
Furthermore, I shall argue that belief in the past and future and belief in persons being some 
kind of temporally extended entity – that is, having ‘bits’ in the past or future1 – generates 
very problematic results ethically also. 
1.2 - Getting Clearer on Haecceities
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1 I phrase views of persistence that involve some portion of the temporal extent of a person being 
‘locatedʼ in the past  or future neutrally, though inelegantly, to insulate my criticisms against the charge 
that I am only attacking perdurantism . I am arguing that any view of persistence that involves the 
existence of the past and future generates very serious problems.
Let us be as precise about what a haecceity is as one can. As mentioned, a haecceity is a 
property. It is a property that is particular to an entity, primitive and non-qualitative. My 
haecceity, then, being Kyle Buckle-Hodgson, can only be instantiated by me, and the same 
is true for your haecceity and you, and for the particular haecceity of any particular entity. 
Following this, it is an essential property, as my haecceity is only ever instantiated by me 
and, as such, is my individual essence. Further, though my haecceity involves me, I do not 
constitute it, for, as mentioned, it is primitive.
" What is important for haecceities is that they can exist uninstantiated. Imagine 
Robert. Robert is born on 1st January 1931 and dies on the 1st January 2001. Robert’s 
haecceity comes into existence when he comes into existence on 1st January 19312. But his 
haecceity does not cease to exist on the 1st January 2001. Rather, it continues to exist 
uninstantiated. Thus, for haecceity presentism, there are haecceities for past and present 
objects in existence but not future entities, for those entities do not exist such that their 
haecceity does too (they have not yet begun to exist). There is no tension between the 
existence of the haecceities of past entities for presentists, for the haecceities do not require 
the existence of past entities to exist presently and it is the haecceities of past entities that 
function as the present surrogates for past entities in matters of singular reference, truth 
making, cross-temporal relations etc.
" So far, then, we have two important aspects of haecceities that seem advantageous 
to presentists. The first important aspect is that the haecceities of past and present entities 
exist, but not future ones. The second important aspect is that haecceities can exist 
uninstantiated. It is time to examine these aspects closer.
1.3 - Haecceities: Past, Present, but Not Future.
This particular argument is built from an argument by Robert Adams (1981) about the 
haecceities of non-actual entities. Adams’ argument can be summarised as follows: 
actualism is the thesis that only actual entities exist. Adams contends that since: a) 
actualism is inconsistent with the existence of the haecceities of non-actual entities and b) 
actualism is true, we should reject the haecceities of non-actual entities. Why is actualism 
inconsistent with the existence of non-actual entities? It is because a property of the form 
being (that is to say, identical with) x cannot exist if there is no x that has never existed, for 
something is required to exist such that it can instantiate being (that is to say, identical with) 
x. And if x is not actual, then x has never existed. Or, as Adams puts the point:
" To be the property of being identical with a particular individual is to stand, primitively, in a unique 
" relation with that individual. This relation between an individual and its thisness is the crux of the 
" argument. It would be absurd to suppose that being the property of being identical with me could be a 
" purely internal feature of my thisness, not implying any relation to me. The relation between an i
" ndividual and its thisness is essential to both of them. My thisness is a property that I would have in 
" every possible world in which I would exist – but equally, my thisness could not exist without being mine. 
" It could not exist without being the thisness of Robert Merrihew Adams. So if there were a thisness of a 
" non-actual individual, it would stand, primitively, in a relation to that individual. But according to 
" actualism non-actual individuals cannot enter primitively into any relation. It seems to follow that 
" according to actualism there cannot be a thisness of a non-actual individual. (1981: 11)
Adams, then, is asserting that the existence of a haecceity for a particular concrete entity, x, 
suggests a relation with x that could not obtain if x was non-actual and, thus, did not exist. In 
6
2 If you do not think human persons come to exist at their birth (perhaps you think they come to 
exist earlier or later), adjust the date accordingly. 
effect, Adams is saying that: 1), x’s haecceity could not exist without being x’s haecceity and 
2), x’s haecceity could not exist without the actual existence of x. In short: it is impossible for 
x’s haecceity to exist without the initial existence of x.
" That is the purely modal dimension of the argument. What of the argument when 
made with an additional temporal dimension, pertaining to the non-existence of haecceities 
of future entities?  Again, Adams confronts this:
" I was born in 1937. Among the many metaphysically possible continuations of the actual history of the 
" world up until, say, 1935, there are surely some in which I would never have existed. It is plausible to 
" conclude that I could have failed to exist even given everything that existed in 1935, or that had existed 
" before then, or that exists timelessly—and, conversely, that all of those things could have existed even if 
" I had never existed. But, as I have argued, neither my thisness nor any singular propositions about me 
" exists in any metaphysically possible world in which I never exist; they are not among the things that 
" could have existed even if I had never existed. It follows that they are not among the things that existed 
" in 1935, or before, or that exist timelessly. My thisness, and singular propositions about me, cannot 
" have pre-existed me because if they had, it would have been possible for them to have existed even if I 
" had never existed, and that is not possible. (1986: 316-7)
Ingram (2016: 2871) glosses the argument thus: suppose that x is a contingent existent. 
Prior to x’s existence, it is metaphysically possible that x fails to exist. So, accordingly, we 
can suppose there is some world, w, according to which it is possible, at time t0, that x will 
exist at time t1, and it is also possible that x, at t0, will not exist at t1. According to Adams, 
then, the existence of x’s haecceity implies a relation with x that could not obtain if x were 
non-actual (so: x’s haecceity could not exist without the existence of x). Given, however, that 
at w at t0 it is indeterminate whether x will actually exist, x’s haecceity cannot exist at w prior 
to x’s existence at t1. Furthermore, given the character of haecceities, x cannot exist and fail 
to instantiate its haecceity. Thus, x’s haecceity comes into existence with x.
" Adam’s argument, however, does rest on a thesis about the contingent existence of 
future entities:
" For any two entities, x and y, and for any time t, if x existed before t (or if x exists timelessly), and y 
" exists contingently and comes into existence at t, then it would be metaphysically possible for x to have 
" existed even if y had never existed (1986: 317)
And such a principle should sit very well indeed with presentists, for it respects the intuition 
that the existence of future entities is a contingent matter. Were it not a contingent matter, 
were the existence of future entities somehow fixed, then the future would fail to be open; 
there would be a fact of the matter about what would be, for what would be already is. But 
such a thought is unacceptable for presentists, for they do not believe in the existence of the 
future. Adams’ argument comports well with one motivation for presentism.
" So here are the central claims about haecceities endorsed by haecceity presentism 
(and, more generally, by most ontologies that endorse haecceities in some fashion: Ingram 
(2016, 2018) shares them, for example): one, x’s haecceity comes into existence with x 
(thus, no future haecceities). Two, x’s haecceity is uniquely instantiated by x throughout x’s 
existence. 
A further important claim, noted earlier, is that x’s haecceity continues to exist, 
without being instantiated after x ceases to exist. The defence of this is the next task.
1.4 - Existing Without Instantiation
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Ingram (2016: 2872) identifies a concern with the argument for the nonexistence of 
haecceities of future entities: can it be utilised in some fashion to undermine the relationship 
between haecceities and the past entities of which they were haecceities? In other words, 
the argument against the haecceities of future entities is based on the fact that it is in the 
very nature of haecceities that they bear a relation between the haecceity and the entity that 
exemplifies it. Such a relation cannot obtain if that entity is future for, as a presentist position, 
haecceity presentism denies the existence of future entities. Is this relationship, however, 
problematic for the haecceities of past entities? For they do not exist either for the presentist. 
Or, in short: if haecceities require a relationship between themselves and their object, and 
past objects do not exist as future ones do not, then what permits the existence of past 
haecceities beyond the ceasing of their object? That is, how can they exist uninstantiated?
The obvious retort is that past and future entities are distinguished by the former 
having existed, whereas the latter have not. But that still leaves the relationship between a 
haecceity and its object obscure, since one of the relata does not exist by the presentist’s 
lights and for a relation to be genuine, or real, both of the relata need to exist. Something 
needs to be said of this relation between a haecceity and the (past) entity that exemplified it.
" Ingram attempts to distinguish between two kinds of ontological dependence and 
which one is at work in the relation between a haecceity and its entity. I will articulate his 
view of dependence before sharing some concerns. A claim common to any version of 
haecceity presentism, then, is that an entity’s haecceity depends on that entity having 
existed. For example, the existence of Robert’s haecceity implies a relation with Robert that 
could not obtain if Robert had never existed. Of course, this is not to say that Robert’s 
haecceity cannot exist without Robert; it is important for haecceity presentism that this is not 
so, for it would deprive haecceities of their ability to function as present surrogates for past 
entities. So, the kind of dependence at work between Robert and his haecceity is going to be 
an atypical one. One might say that Robert’s haecceity depends on Robert inasmuch as 
Robert’s haecceity could not exist without the initial existence of Robert. Such a formulation 
of the dependence at issue, however, does not imply that Robert’s haecceity ceases to exist 
when Robert ceases to exist, as Ingram notes (2016: 2873). The initial existence of any 
concrete entity is sufficient for the existence of its haecceity, but the ceasing to exist of that 
entity does not take its haecceity with it.
" This is all well and good but anyone sceptical of such an explanation will likely levy 
the following (particularly well-worn against presentism) objection: relations, genuine ones, 
only obtain between relata that exist. One of the relatum in your putative relation does not 
exist. So it is not a genuine relation and thus there is no genuine relation between a 
haecceity and an entity that has ceased to exist; haecceities cannot exist uninstantiated.
" Ingram’s solution to this worry is to distinguish between two kinds of ontological 
dependence: rigid and non-rigid. Rigid, Ingram contends, is the typical construal of 
ontological dependence in metaphysics. He offers the following characterisation of rigid 
ontological dependence from Lowe:
" x rigidly ontologically depends on y =df (i) necessarily, x exists only if y exists; and, (ii) it’s not the case 
" that, necessarily, y exists only if x exists. (2010: 1)
Ingram presents an example to illustrate this (2016: 2873): consider an individual, Colbert, 
and the set whose only member is Colbert, {Colbert} (Colbert’s singleton). {Colbert} rigidly 
ontologically depends on Colbert, as {Colbert} exists only if Colbert exists, and it is certainly 
not the case that Colbert exists only if {Colbert} exists; of course, if {Colbert} exists, then 
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Colbert must exist, but this does little to impeach the ontological asymmetry between sets 
and their members, for sets exist in virtue of their members but not vice versa. All this is to 
the effect that if one object rigidly ontologically depends on another for its existence, then the 
former object cannot exist without the latter object: for example, if x rigidly ontologically 
depends on y for its existence, then x cannot exist without y (Ingram, 2016: 2873).
" Ingram then attempts to articulate the notion of non-rigid ontological dependence. 
For this, he borrows from Diekemper (2015). The basic idea is that x’s haecceity non-rigidly 
ontologically depends on x. Non-rigidity is to be understood as a temporal, rather than 
modal, notion. The existence of x’s haecceity ontologically depends on x’s initial existence, 
but x’s haecceity does not continue to depend on x; rather, x’s haecceity has depended on x 
(2015: 65-66). In short, x’s haecceity depended on the initial existence of x. X’s haecceity 
does not always non-rigidly ontologically depend on the existence of x, however; the 
relationship does not hold, for example, when x does not exist. But, Ingram says, this is no 
problem when one buys into Diekemper’s notion of non-rigid ontological dependence: there 
was some time at which a haecceity ontologically depends on an entity and that is the initial 
existence of that entity. With that in view, Ingram offers his definition of asymmetric temporal 
non-rigid ontological dependence: 
" x non-rigidly ontologically depends on y =df (i) necessarily, x exists only if y has existed; and, (ii) it’s not 
" the case that, necessarily, y exists only if x has existed. (2016: 2874)
This is supposed to capture the thought that if x non-rigidly ontologically depends on y for its 
existence, then x cannot exist without the initial existence of y. And that is supposed to be 
the way in which a haecceity non-rigidly ontologically depends on its entity for its existence.
" I think the notion of non-rigid ontological dependence is likely to be met with some 
measure of scepticism, largely because it seems, at first blush, conveniently contrived to 
produce a form of ontological dependence suited to presentists. If non-rigid ontological 
dependence is innocent, then what is to stop a presentist trying out analogous moves, such 
as tensing the truthmaking or grounding relation, such that historical truths, for example, 
supervene on what was the case, where what was the case carries no commitment to past 
entities. That way, the truth of propositions about the past depend for their truth on the initial 
existence of past entities, but do not require the continued existence of such entities. That 
seems to be one way to have a kind of grounding for truths about the past for presentists 
without contravening any ontological strictures. It also has an air of cheating to it, as though 
someone who subscribed to such a move is invoking ontological resources to which they are 
not properly entitled.
" The situation with non-rigid ontogical dependence is, I think, not the same. There are 
some disanalogies between the tensed truthmaking and haecceity presentist approach. 
First, it is very difficult to understand what role, exactly, the past plays in the tensed 
truthmaking approach. There is both an affirmation and disavowal of past entities: truth 
supervenes on what existed, but what existed does not exist now – but, nevertheless, truth 
still does supervene on it. But! Past entities do not exist (and so on). So, the past lies, 
presumably, in the same shadowy regions of the ontological atlas as Meinong’s jungle, 
troubled by existing but not existing, playing a role in a truthmaking relation but not playing a 
role in any such relation. But a haecceity presentist invokes no past entities at all. There is 
just the presently existing haecceity – and that is not a past concrete entity.
Secondly, on reflection, I think non-rigid ontological dependence captures something 
of a fairly intuitive understanding of one kind of dependence. All the instances of a species, 
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for example, may die out, but the species itself does not perish with its instances – the kind 
‘dodo’ has persisted without any of its members, and so on. But the initial existence of that 
kind, plausibly, depended upon their being some first member of that kind. Analogously, one 
might say that the relationship between artworks and their instances is another example of 
non-rigid ontological dependence – ‘Hamlet’, for example, did not exist prior to Shakespeare 
writing it but it does not depend for its existence thereafter on any particular instance of the 
play. The situation is complicated if every instance of Hamlet is destroyed simultaneously. 
But I do not think it is obviously wrong to suggest that, if the world suffered some great 
literary catastrophe where all of Shakespeare’s plays were eradicated in print and memory, 
any subsequent writing of an exact duplicate of ‘Hamlet’, unbeknownst to the author, is a 
rediscovery rather than a new play.  
" This section has covered two potential lines of attack for any version of presentism 
with an ontology enriched by haecceities. The first was the defence of the claim that there 
are no haecceities of future entities. It was argued that a haecceity only comes into 
existence concomitantly with the entity whose haecceity it is. Given that there are no future 
entities that are in existence, there are no future haecceities. The second was concerned 
with the relationship between a haecceity and the entity whose haecceity it is. It was argued, 
following Ingram and Diekemper, that there are two kinds of ontological dependence, and 
that haecceities and their objects exhibit non-rigid ontological dependence, which is 
acceptable to a presentist. Further, I argued that non-rigid ontological dependence is far 
from a metaphysican’s ad hoc contrivance and reflects an intuitive understanding of 
dependence in our everyday understanding, as well as cohering with one view of the 
relationship between kinds and their members. 
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Chapter Two – Singular Propositions
The following chapters are concerned with the application of haecceity presentism to some 
problems that have, traditionally, been considered difficult for presentists. The solutions to 
such problems turn on the haecceities invoked by haecceity presentism. Thus, in providing 
solutions to these problems, I hope to vindicate the inclusion of haecceities in the haecceity 
presentist ontology.
In what follows, I shall cover the problem of singular reference, the problem of 
truthmaking, and the problem of cross-temporal relations. This can be considered the 
defensive portion of my thesis, intended to demonstrate the usefulness of haecceities in 
dissolving some typical presentist problematics. 
2.1 - Singular Propositions and the Haecceity Presentist Solution
Take any past concrete entity. I shall use Bertrand Russell. I shall assume, not 
unfairly, that Bertrand Russell was clever. So, the following sentence, ‘Bertrand Russell was 
clever’, is true and expresses a true proposition, <Bertrand Russell was clever>. This is a 
singular proposition. The expression of the proposition by a sentence uses a name, 
‘Bertrand Russell’, and is about the direct referent of the very name used in that sentence, 
Bertrand Russell, the man. So, if you think that singular propositions are structured by their 
constituents, and their constituents determine what the proposition is about, then you would 
need the relevant ontology to function as constituents – in this example, you would need 
Bertrand Russell. Presentists, of course, do not believe in any past entities. This presents a 
difficulty: if singular propositions are dependent on their constituents, and the constituents 
themselves constitute what the proposition is about, then what possible constituents can a 
presentist provide for singular propositions about past entities? Not Bertrand Russell, as he 
no longer exists.
" But the situation is not so bad for haecceity presentism. This is because it is not 
immediately obvious that a singular proposition cannot be about haecceities. And this is 
what Adams is getting at here:
" …a singular proposition about an individual x is a proposition that involves or refers to x directly, 
" perhaps by having x or the thisness of x as a constituent, and not merely by way of x’s qualitative 
" properties or relations to other individuals (1986: 315)
The crux, then, is that singular propositions can have an entity’s haecceity as a constituent 
rather than the entity itself; so singular propositions about the past are constituted by the 
relevant entity’s haecceity, and so does not invoke any past entities, and is thus consistent 
with presentism. To return to the previous example, <Bertrand Russell was clever>, the 
proposition is constituted by Russell’s haecceity, being Bertrand Russell, and not Russell 
himself. The proposition, then, is about Bertrand Russell in virtue of Russell’s haecceity 
being a constituent in the proposition. This solution is intended to generalise to all singular 
propositions concerning past entities: such propositions are constituted by the presently 
existing haecceities of past entities.
" Such a solution is not novel: it has been toyed with by Adams, as seen above, and 
William Lane Craig (2002). It has, in outline, been argued strongly against by Markosian 
(2004). But it has not been thoroughly explored until late, with only David Ingram (2016, 
2018), again, interested in resuscitating it. I follow, in part, Ingram’s articulation of the 
fundamentals of the view, but introduce very significant points of disagreement in how we 
individually understand haecceity presentism in the next chapter on truthmaking.
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In summary, though, I think that a haecceity presentist response to the problem of 
singular propositions is plausible. In order to support that claim, I will now examine some 
criticisms levied against the use of haecceities in singular propositions.
2.2 - Asymmetry
This problem of asymmetry is from Markosian (2004). The gist of it is that the haecceity 
presentist solution fails to account for singular propositions about the future (there are no 
haecceities of future entities to function in such an account, for a haecceity comes into being 
concomitantly with the entity whose haecceity it is). Markosian thinks this is unacceptable as 
it produces an asymmetry between the past and the future – there are singular propositions 
about the former, but not the latter. This is unacceptable, Markosian thinks, as any presentist 
solution to the problem of singular propositions should treat the past and future as perfectly 
analogous (2004: 55).
" Like Ingram, however, (2016: 2876), I am not entirely sure why any presentist would 
seek to keep the past and future perfectly analogous. There is no inconsistency in believing 
in the present haecceities of past entities and being a presentist. Granted, a presentist 
should indeed endorse a symmetry of ontology – there are no past and future entities. And 
that is true for the haecceity presentist as well as any other. But endorsing an ontological 
symmetry does not entail other kinds of symmetry, principally temporal symmetry. Indeed, I 
think that temporal asymmetry is an important part of being a presentist in the first place and 
figures importantly in our explanation of our emotional attitudes to the past and future: for 
example, the past is that which has ceased to exist and the object of certain kinds of 
attitudes (remorse, grief). Regardless of whether one buys into that kind of support for 
temporal asymmetry, other intuitions about temporal asymmetry are common: for example, 
the past is fixed, the future is open and the metaphors dealing with the past and future (the 
past ‘recedes’, the future ‘approaches’). I see no good reasons for a presentist to reject this 
disanalogy between past and future. In fact, it seems important.
" As for Markosian’s claim that symmetry in ontology mandates symmetry in true 
singular propositions, so I must believe in true past and future singular propositions, I simply 
deny, again, that ontological symmetry places any demand on what true singular 
propositions there are, for the same reasons. That which is past was once present – thus, 
we have the haecceities of those once present entities, and that is one reason why 
haecceity presentists can say there are true singular propositions about the past. But that is 
not the case for future entities, so that is one reason why haecceity presentists can say there 
are no true singular propositions about the future.
" Markosian could go on to simply insist that there are true singular propositions about 
future entities. This would spell trouble if it worked out, for haecceity presentism does not 
have the resources for the constituents of such propositions. What might be an example of 
such a proposition? Ingram introduces a familiar one (2016: 2877): suppose I have a lump of 
clay that I am going to carve into a statue, Goliath. I can, it would seem, entertain various 
beliefs about Goliath in which he figures as a constituent, e.g. ‘Goliath will be 80 pounds’, 
‘Goliath will stand in the town square’ etc. So, there are singular propositions about future 
entities, like <Goliath will be 80 pounds>, that are true, which is a problem for haecceity 
presentism as it denies there are such propositions.
" What is best, I think, is for the haecceity presentist to dig in her heels. Haecceity 
presentists are committed to understanding singular reference in terms of haecceities. But 
there are no haecceities about future entities and there are no future entities. So though one 
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seems to be able to think and believe and assert things about Goliath, there are no true, 
future singular propositions about Goliath prior to Goliath’s existence. This is all down to the 
fact that there can be no singular propositions about entities that do not exist, and so there 
cannot be such propositions about entities that have never existed. This is Adams’ own 
solution:
" Goliath’s thisness, and singular propositions about Goliath, cannot have pre-existed Goliath because if 
" they had it would have been possible for them to have existed even if Goliath had never existed, and 
" that is not possible (1986: 317)
So even though it may seem there can be true singular propositions about future entities, it 
is a mistake to think there are: there are ways in which Goliath’s creation can fail to be prior 
to his actual carving, so there cannot be singular propositions about Goliath until he actually 
exists.
" Still, this does not seem to be right. There is a powerful intuition that one can, 
reasonably, hold attitudes towards future entities in which they figure as constituents in 
singular propositions. Surely it is fair that I can believe that Goliath will be 80 pounds? Does 
this view of singular propositions dealing with future entities or future states of affairs render 
such beliefs unintelligible?
" Not as such. I follow Ingram and Adams in believing that such propositions do not 
have singular content. I also deny that, on inspection, it is really such a curious thought to 
hold. Here are two reasons: firstly, there is a complete lack of causal contact between myself 
and Goliath, such that they could not have had any impact on my thinking about them (there 
is no causal chain leading from Goliath to myself such that Goliath itself could have force on 
my thinking, for Goliath does not exist yet). So, it does not seem entirely unreasonable that 
there could not be any singular propositions about them. Secondly, to bring a previous point 
to bear on the argument, it is possible, up to the very moment Goliath emerges into 
existence that Goliath fails to exist. Perhaps my clay is stolen moments before I begin, 
perhaps my hands fail me such that sculpture becomes impossible. If Goliath may never 
exist, then there is, I think, no fact of the matter over whether Goliath will come to exist. 
There is, as Ingram says, ‘no settled fact of the matter as to what that singular thing 
is’ (2016: 2878). It seems fair to me to say that there are no singular propositions about 
Goliath. 
 Haecceity presentists, then, should reject singular propositions about future entities.
2.3 - Is Haecceity Presentism Actually Presentism?
Here is a quick detour to touch upon a problem Markosian brings up for friends of 
haecceities. This problem is related, in part, to the problem of singular propositions, but is 
more general in shape. The problem has been raised by Ned Markosian against any form of 
haecceity presentism and is as follows: presentism is the thesis that only present concrete 
entities exist. A haecceity of a past entity cannot exist without a past entity: the existence of 
haecceities of past entities requires commitment to past entities. This is because a haecceity  
is the property of being (identical with) x e.g. being identical with Bertrand Russell is 
Russell’s haecceity. But Bertrand Russell must exist in order to constitute that property. 
Thus, we are committed to past entities if we want to have the haecceities of past entities.
" There is one obvious response, and that is to deny that ‘Bertrand Russell (i.e., past 
entities) must exist in order to constitute that property (their haecceity)’: a past entities 
13
haecceity does not suggest the existence of the entity whose haecceity it is. Markosian 
replies to such a response thus:
" I have a hard time understanding how Socrates could fail to be a constituent of Socraticity [i.e. 
" Socrates’s thisness], although, admittedly, what we say about this matter depends partly on what we say 
" about the tricky subject of the nature of constituency. In any case … it seems clear to me that this 
" principle will be true: The property of being identical with x exists only if x itself exists. For it seems to 
" me that, for any relation and for any object, the property of standing in that relation to that object will 
" exist only if the object exists. (2004: 56, fn. 15)
In short, a relation must hold between Socrates and his haecceity. The property being 
Socrates only exists if Socrates exists. This is because ‘for any relation and for any object, 
the property of standing in that relation to that object will exist only if the object exists’.
" We have, however, already gone over a version this problem in sketching the 
fundamental account of haecceities that should be shared by any form of haecceity 
presentism: these were the key claims of Adams, Diekemper and Ingram. I shall reiterate. 
Haecceities can exist, uninstantiated, without the existence of the entities whose haecceities 
they were. The present existence of a haecceity of a past entity, further, does not suggest, or 
entail, the existence of a past entity: a haecceity is dependent on the entity of whose 
haecceity it is to come into existence (it comes into existence concomitantly with that entity) 
but does not depend on it thereafter. This is the relation of non-rigid ontological dependence 
articulated and defended earlier. Though it is true to say that Socrates’ haecceity initially 
depended on Socrates for its existence (its coming to be), it does not do so after it has come 
to be. So haecceity presentism does not depend on the existence of past entities in the 
robust fashion Markosian imagines. Rather, it is the weaker relation of non-rigid ontological 
dependence, which does not violate any presentist scruples. 
2.4 - Back to Singular Propositions: Do Haecceities Really Do the Job?
This is Markosian’s final objection against haecceity presentism’s approach to singular 
propositions. The objection is that haecceities are insufficient for genuinely singular 
reference: they cannot provide genuine singular propositions about the past and past entities 
in virtue of the fact they do not invoke past entities but, rather, their haecceities. Or, as 
Markosian puts it, ‘it is not at all clear that the proposition that there was a unique x that 
exemplified Socraticity and that was a philosopher is really a singular proposition about 
Socrates’ (2004: 56).
" Now, I stand, again, with Ingram in thinking that there is a sense in which Markosian 
is correct: <There was a unique x that exemplified Socraticity and that was a philosopher> is 
not a proposition about Socrates. It is a proposition about Socrates’ haecceity. (2016: 2880). 
But that in itself is no objection to the haecceity presentist solution, for the haecceity 
presentist understanding of singular propositions takes a singular proposition, such as 
<Socrates was a philosopher>, to be constituted by Socrates’ haecceity and is about 
Socrates, and thus singular, in virtue of having his haecceity as a constituent. Haecceity 
presentism, then, does not replace the proposition <Socrates was a philosopher> with 
<There was a unique x that exemplified Socraticity and that was a philosopher>; rather, it 
understands singular propositions as constituted by the relevant haecceity and thus singular 
in virtue of that constitution.
" That may fend off one reading of Markosian’s objection. There is another reading, 
however. This reading is not that haecceity presentism replaces one proposition with 
another, unrelated one. Rather, haecceity presentism fails because a singular proposition is 
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about the very entity that constitutes it. It is about Socrates, the man, not his haecceity. It is 
not singular as singular propositions about Socrates are constituted by Socrates and not 
constituted by Socrates’ haecceity.
" As interesting as this, Markosian falls afoul of inconsistency on this point, as his own 
proffered definition of a singular proposition permits a haecceity as a constituent in a 
singular proposition: a singular proposition is ‘a proposition that involves or refers to x 
directly, perhaps by having x or the thisness of x as a constituent’ (2004: 49, fn. 4). And that 
is no trouble at all for a haecceity presentist, for singular propositions refer directly to x 
precisely in virtue of having x’s haecceity as a constituent! Indeed, that is its entire 
advantage over its presentist peers – it permits an understanding of singular reference to 
past entities in virtue of their presently existing haecceities. Such an understanding is, 
admittedly, unorthodox; that a singular proposition about x is to be understood in terms of x’s 
haecceity is non-standard, but that is no genuine criticism.
Ingram provides a more charitable interpretation of Markosian’s criticism (2016: 
2880), which Markosian himself develops in turn: if <Socrates was a philosopher> is 
constituted by Socrates’ haecceity, then it is not really about Socrates. Markosian presses 
this point further (2004: 56). Take two propositions: <Socrates was a philosopher> and 
<Plato’s best teacher was a philosopher>. Though both are about Socrates, it is only the 
former that is directly about Socrates, the latter being indirectly about Socrates, and thus not 
a singular proposition. The reason why it is not a singular proposition about Socrates is that, 
rather than being constituted by Socrates himself, it is constituted by a property of Socrates 
– being Plato’s best teacher. If that is the case, the objection runs, then, analogously, we 
should not accept Socrates’ haecceity as constituting a singular proposition about Socrates, 
for it is in exactly the same situation as the property being Plato’s best teacher. Or, as 
Markosian himself puts it: 
…what is the difference between Socraticity and the property of being Plato’s best teacher in virtue of 
which a proposition containing the former property is a singular proposition about Socrates while a 
proposition containing the latter is not? (2004: 56)
But there is one very obvious respect in which the properties are disanalogous, and 
so one very obvious way in which the properties may be individuated such that the former 
constitutes an instance of singular reference but the latter does not: Socrates’ haecceity, 
being (identical with) Socrates, is essential to Socrates. Indeed, it exhibits his very essence, 
that which characterises Socrates’ primitive identity and individuates him from all other 
entities. The other property, being Plato’s best teacher, is not essential to Socrates. Socrates 
haecceity is essential to him, it is a necessary property of Socrates, whereas being Plato’s 
best teacher is contingent: <Plato’s best teacher was a philosopher> is constituted only by a 
contingent property of Socrates and it is this, as Ingram also notes (2016: 2881), that allows 
us to say that such a proposition is only indirectly about Socrates and thus not a genuine 
instance of a singular proposition. Conversely, the very fact that <Socrates was a 
philosopher> is constituted by Socrates’ haecceity, something absolutely essential to 
Socrates, permits us to say that the proposition is directly about Socrates, and so a singular 
proposition.
There is one related, and increasingly prevalent, objection that can be teased out of 
this one. This objection concerns the nature of ‘aboutness’. The objection asserts that 
propositions, intuitively, are ‘about’ the very entities to which they refer. So, any instance of 
the name ‘Socrates’ is about the man, any instance of the name ‘Caesar’ about Caesar, 
‘dinosaurs’ refer to dinosaurs and so on. They are not ‘about’ haecceities, or any other kind 
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of surrogates postulated by presentists. Another, different, presentation of this objection is 
that propositions cannot be ‘about’ things that do not exist. Given that Socrates does not 
exist in a presentist ontology, no proposition can be ‘about’ him. Though such an objection is 
indeed very common, I find it increasingly difficult to deduce its purported force. Indeed, for 
all its appeal to ‘intuitiveness’, I believe it faintly obscure and close to question begging.
Firstly, it seems unfair to press presentists to construe any putative relation of 
‘aboutness’ in such a fashion that they are expected to, in some sense, invoke past entities, 
with a failure to do so being considered objectionable. No presentist who takes their 
metaphysic seriously will make such a concession, for it requires surrendering the very 
foundation on which their metaphysic stands. Indeed, in assuming that any such relation of 
‘aboutness’ must pertain to past entities, I worry that the question is being begged against 
the presentist, for the very nature of the ‘aboutness’ relation is up for dispute; naturally, the 
haecceity presentist is going to say that ‘aboutness’, in her sense, is adequately captured by  
a haecceity. 
" Alternatively, presentists may just reject the demand for ‘aboutness’. Consider the 
following proposition: <There used to be dinosaurs>. Markosian proposes that one can 
analyse the proposition thus: ‘It has been the case that there is an x such that x is a 
dinosaur’ (Markosian, 2012: 137). Markosian suggests that in his paraphrase, the referent of 
‘it’ need not be any collection of past dinosaurs. He does not suggest what the referent of ‘it’, 
in this instance, might be, and I confess it is obscure whether ‘it’ ever really refers to 
anything. Perhaps he is getting at something like Prior’s suggestion of what facts concerning 
past entities are about:
On this view, the fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 
"about," a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything-it is a general fact. Or if it is 
about anything, what it is about is not Queen Anne-it is about the earth, maybe, which has rolled around 
the sun so many times since there was a person who was called "Anne", reigned over England, etc. 
(1968: 13)
Maybe, then, the ‘it’ is general or refers to the world, and we could understand Markosian’s 
paraphrase as something like ‘It [the world] has been the case [such] that there is an x such 
that x is a dinosaur’. But this reading, though clearing up what Marokosian might mean, is 
not rejecting the aboutness requirement – rather, it is asserting that past facts are about 
whatever ‘it’ refers to. 
Markosian goes on, though, to draw an analogy that is more explicit in rejecting the 
aboutness requirement. It is an analogy that is quite typical amongst presentists: the analogy  
between presentism and modal actualism. Take the following proposition: ‘It’s possible there 
is a purple cow’. This seems true. If one is a modal actualist then, very roughly, one believes 
that only actual objects exist, and talk of possibilia is to be understood in terms of abstract 
objects like possible worlds, which are understood as maximal, consistent propositions, or 
suchlike. If one is an actualist, the subject of propositions like the purple cow one are the 
actual world and its contents and the truthmakers for such propositions are various actual 
objects, but no non-actual objects. 
Now, one could be a modal realist, and believe that non-actual objects are just as 
real as actual objects. If one is a modal realist, the subject of the purple cow proposition is 
the domain of all possible worlds, and the truthmakers for the proposition are all the real, but 
non-actual, purple cows.
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The modal actualist would seem to violate the thought that the truthmakers for 
propositions should be ‘about’ what the proposition is about, for her truthmakers do not 
contain any purple cows. Does it seem like she is any worse off for this? I do not think so. 
Unless modal realism is correct, it seems fine to say that the ‘It’ in <It is possible there are 
purple cows> refers to the (actual) world, and it is the actual world and its contents that 
make that proposition true. Further, presentism and actualism are analogous, so it seems 
quite natural for a presentist to say that truths about the past are made true by the present 
state of the world and its contents.
Finally, one may object, specifically to the haecceity presentist, that it is obscure how 
something can be ‘about’ something that does not exist. How can <Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon> be about Caesar, whether by means of himself or his haecceity, when Caesar 
does not exist? This, I think, is to take the notion of ‘aboutness’ as much too metaphysically 
heavyweight, as it assumes there must be a very robust relation between propositions, say, 
and individuals; between <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> and the individual Caesar. But 
there is a familiar and benign way to construe ‘aboutness’ that is to the presentist’s 
advantage. Certainly, there is indeed a sense in which <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is 
about Caesar. But this no more forces my commitment to the existence of Caesar than 
reading a bedtime story about a hematophagous, phengophobic, caped individual commits 
myself and my child to vampires – certainly, I do not query her ontology after any such story. 
I think this is the reading of ‘aboutness’ a haecceity presentist should urge.
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Chapter 3 – Truthmaking
" 3.1 – Truthmaking and the Haecceity Presentist Solution
Presentism’s difficulty with truthmaking is well documented. The difficulty is this: there is a 
strong intuition that truth substantively depends on ontology. That is, truth depends on being. 
There are truths that concern the past e.g. <Caesar crossed the Rubicon>. If truth depends 
on ontology, then the truth of this proposition depends on Caesar, the Rubicon and a relation 
between them. But Caesar is past; there is no Caesar temporally located in the present3. So, 
if you are a presentist, you have no ontology to support the truth of <Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon>, and that is a very bad result.
" The haecceity presentist does have ontology to support the truth of such 
propositions, however. Haecceity presentist metaphysics (Keller, 2004. Ingram, 2018) offer, 
broadly, the same resources to address truthmaking concerns. These resources are 
haecceities and second order tensed properties instantiated by haecceities. That is to say, 
presently existing haecceities, functioning as surrogates for the past entities which once 
instantiated them as haecceities, presently instantiate second order, tensed properties, 
which characterise, indirectly, the object of the haecceity (Keller, 2004: 5. Ingram, 2018: 
453.). 
Take the proposition in the previous paragraph: <Caesar crossed the Rubicon>. The 
haecceity presentist understanding for the truthmakers of this proposition are, partly, 
Caesar’s haecceity instantiating being the haecceity of a man that crossed the Rubicon. 
What is utterly crucial for haecceity presentism, and in need of sustained defence, is that 
objects and haecceities instantiate past tensed properties like having crossed the Rubicon 
for the former, and being the haecceity of a man that crossed the Rubicon for the latter.
" Tensed properties are by no means unusual in presentist responses to the 
truthmaking problem. They are, however, treated with caution. The reasons propounded 
focus on them being, in some sense, metaphysically suspect, or, in pointing beyond their 
instances, being objectionably hypothetical, or derivative, pale shadows or echoes of more 
‘real’ or fundamental properties, suffering explanatory inadequacy. Haecceity presentists 
should not be dissuaded by such suspicions and vindicating tensed properties is part of the 
project of this section, though the vindication of such properties is restricted to their utility for 
haecceity based presentist ontologies. Indeed, I shall argue that such suspicions at tensed 
properties are not entirely unwarranted for non-haecceity presentist solutions, bolstering the 
case that if one is a presentist invoking tensed properties, one ought to be of the haecceity 
presentist camp. That aside, Ingram, quoting Karen Bennett on the issue of tensed 
properties, introduces a parallel project to vindicate tensed properties:
It is not the job of a truthmaking principle to, say, deem irreducible Lucretian properties suspicious … 
The only real question is whether there are any (2011: 190-91).
And one important way to lend credence to the thought that there are such properties is to 
demonstrate the work they can do for the theory in which they are deployed. There are, I 
think, three such ways one can demonstrate that tensed properties do substantive work: 
truthmaking, cross-temporal relations, and, most importantly, their role in rationalising certain 
of our emotional attitudes. Indeed, in the last case, I shall argue that the work tensed 
properties do cannot be adequately captured by any tenseless property or tenseless 
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3 Interestingly, there is some dispute over whether the Rubicon Caesar crossed is the same Rubicon that 
lies near Ravenna today, so I have avoided commenting on whether the Rubicon is present today or not.
analysis of tensed properties. If I am right, tensed properties are not only vindicated, but 
indispensable. For now, however, attention will be restricted to the role past-tensed 
properties play in truthmaking for the haecceity presentist.
" The haecceity presentist solution to the truthmaker problem is both articulated by 
Keller (2004) and Ingram (2018). Ingram has the most worked out version of the solution, 
though it requires further elaboration on both the relation of haecceities and their properties 
to their bearers and their properties, and also on the nature of past-tensed properties. It is 
here, also, that some of the most substantial differences between myself and Keller and 
Ingram’s versions of haecceity enriched presentisms come to the fore.
" The solution, then, is as follows: haecceities instantiate higher-order properties, 
tensed properties, that serve to characterise, indirectly, the object of the haecceity and, 
further, such higher-order properties correspond to, and depend upon, the lower-order 
properties of the object (Ingram, 2018: 453-454). What is crucial to this as a solution to the 
truthmaker problem, as mentioned earlier, is that entities and haecceities can instantiate 
past-tensed properties. So, an entity instantiates first-order tensed properties and its 
haecceity instantiates second-order tensed properties (this is because a haecceity is itself a 
property). The second-order properties correspond to, and depend for their initial 
instantiation upon, the first-order properties. For example, the first-order past-tensed 
property of Obama, having been president, has a corresponding second-order property 
instantiated by his haecceity, being the haecceity of man who was president.
" The tensed properties acquired by a haecceity serve to indirectly characterise the 
entity of which it is a haecceity. These properties are acquired by a haecceity as a 
consequence of the nature of the relation between a haecceity and its entity. Ingram makes 
a distinction with properties here that I think may seem obscure, if not outright otiose, so I 
think it deserves much closer examination. Ingram says that on the death of Obama, his 
haecceity ceases to instantiate being the haecceity of a man who was president but, rather, 
comes to instantiate having been the haecceity of a man who was president. This is 
because, Ingram says, that upon Obama’s death, he loses the property of having been 
president, for he no longer exists, and thus the corresponding second-order property, being 
the haecceity of a man who was president, is gone, too, for the first-order property has 
vanished.
" The rationale of Ingram’s amendment is, I believe, as follows; it stems from the 
desire to prevent past objects presently instantiating properties, and that is why he is 
insistent that the haecceity switches from being the haecceity to having been the haecceity. 
Ingram wants to prevent this as past objects do not exist, so are incapable of instantiating 
properties. 
His amendment, however, is confusing, and can generate unpleasant consequences 
for haecceity presentism. It is to this I now turn.
! 3.2 Haecceities and Tensed Properties: Diverging from Ingram
First, the haecceity has not ceased being Obama’s haecceity, which makes the phrasing of 
having been the haecceity of a man who was president puzzling, for it still, of course, is the 
haecceity of a man who was president. Perhaps what Ingram is gesturing at is that the 
haecceity is of a former man, given that he has ceased, who was once president. And the 
who was once president is not a property of the erstwhile Obama but the haecceity. But all 
that seems to me to be consistent with the haecceity simply being the haecceity of a man 
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who was president. I see no reason why it must lose this second-order property simply 
because the entity of which it is a haecceity loses a first-order tensed property in virtue of the 
entity itself ceasing. Indeed, I would expect the relationship between first and second order 
properties to mimic the relationship between haecceities and their objects; that is, the 
second-order properties non-rigidly ontologically depend on the instantiation of 
corresponding first-order properties to begin being instantiated but do not depend on the 
continued instantiation of a corresponding first-order property to continue being instantiated 
as second-order properties. 
In fact, should they require a corresponding first-order property, there would be no 
second-order tensed properties of haecceities, because objects, bearing the first-order 
properties, obviously eventually cease to exist on a presentist metaphysic. So haecceities 
would eventually have no properties if this dependence were a feature of the relationship 
between properties of objects and properties of haecceities. So, I think we should reject 
Ingram’s insistence on Obama’s haecceity switching from being the haecceity... to having 
been the haecceity... as it carries bad results for haecceity presentism and the simple being 
the haecceity version of second-order properties seems to me perfectly consistent with the 
corresponding first-order properties, and the object of those properties, ceasing to exist.
Perhaps what Ingram means is that a haecceity does not ‘lose’ its being the 
haecceity of  property but that the property itself becomes past tensed on the ceasing of the 
object. But I struggle with this, too, as properties do not change in their tense along a single 
timeline, as it were – there is not a temporally distributed compound property, like being the 
haecceity of a man who was president then having been the haecceity of a man who was 
president, with the temporal timeline of the haecceity corresponding to the temporal timeline 
of Obama (that is, it is not as if the previous property is a single property along which a 
haecceity ‘moves’ in response to the corresponding property of Obama, moving from the 
being portion to having been portion upon his death). Properties do not change tense – 
rather, they are lost and a new property comes to be instantiated. So this will not do either.
To dig deeper, I think what Ingram is ultimately maintaining is that haecceities cannot 
lose past-tensed properties but are capable of losing present-tensed properties without 
inconsistency. In the context of truthmaking, this is important as the inability to lose certain 
kinds of tensed properties makes haecceities good candidates to avoid the following 
problem as described by Ross Cameron:
One constraint on any acceptable theory ... is that if it is now true that it was the case that p at some 
past time t then, for every time t* later than t but before the present, it is now true that it was the case at 
t* that it was the case at t that p. Whilst not logically inconsistent, it would be bad if it could now be true 
that ten years ago there was a sea battle, but that five years ago it wasn’t true that five years before that 
there was a sea battle (2011: 76)
Avoiding the problem Cameron discusses is obviously crucial but I think Ingram’s 
solution muddies the waters. Presumably, at the very moment of the object ceasing to exist, 
all the being the properties of the haecceity stop being instantiated and are replaced with 
having been the properties. But then Ingram’s solution becomes guilty of a version of the 
problem in which, though the truth values of a proposition do not change, what does the 
truthmaking work changes, for when Obama is alive, his haecceity only has its present-
tensed second-order properties. Or, if you want Obama himself to do the truthmaking work 
for <Obama was president>, then the truthmakers will switch from the man to the haecceity. 
What makes this especially pressing is that Ingram is at pains to avoid this problem, as I 
shall discuss later, so having it trouble his account at this point is not to his advantage, 
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particularly as permitting property switching or replacement with haecceities will infect 
haecceities in every role they play – for example, there will be a version of this problem for 
singular reference, cross-temporal relations, emotions and so on. So, though I understand 
what motivates Ingram in making this distinction, I think we should reject it, and not be 
troubled by the simpler being the haecceity property type. Besides, the being the haecceity 
still achieves the desired effect of characterising the object of the haecceity indirectly while 
making it obvious the haecceity still is, presently, the haecceity of its object.
One may think, however, that the inability of haecceities to lose the past-tensed 
properties they acquire is problematic, as it can generate conflicts. Take certain tensed, 
metrical properties: being the haecceity of an event that finished 26, 917 days ago. This is a 
property of the haecceity of the Battle of the Bulge, and it is true as of 06/10/2018. As of 
07/10/2018, however, it will be 26, 918 days, and the tensed, metrical property of the 
haecceity will be being the haecceity of an event that finished 26, 918 days ago and it will be 
true as of 07/10/2018. If haecceities do not lose their past-tensed properties, however, the 
haecceity will instantiate both second-order tensed properties. Given they are inconsistent, 
that is bad news. 
These properties, however, indicate the relationship of the haecceity of an event, 
presently, to the date of the occurrence of that event, and thus are incomplete in omitting 
one element of that relation, the date. In omitting the date, the properties appear 
inconsistent, but are consistent if the date is appended. For example, it is consistent that a 
haecceity can instantiate being the haecceity of an event that finished 26, 917 days ago as 
of 07/10/2018 and being the haecceity of an event that finished 26, 918 days ago as of 
08/10/2018. 
Of course, haecceities being unable to lose tensed properties is a welcome result for 
the haecceity presentist, for it avoids Cameron’s problem of truth-values about the past 
changing.
To recap, the haecceity presentist solution to the truthmaking problem is thus: 
truthmakers about the past are states of affairs consisting of tensed properties instantiated 
by haecceities of past entities. <Caesar crossed the Rubicon>, then, is the state of affairs 
involving Caesar’s haecceity instantiating being the haecceity of a man who crossed the 
Rubicon. Ingram is silent on what else the state of affairs consists in, for it seems obvious 
that it cannot consist in that haecceity and that property alone. Perhaps one reason why 
Ingram does not discuss such haecceities (those of rivers and so on) and their past-tensed 
properties is that the properties seem, in some sense, more bizarre, or that it also seems 
bizarre to say that a river has a haecceity. I see no reason to think either. A haecceity is 
merely a primitive, non-qualitative property that yields the individual essence of a particular, 
making it this entity. And entities outside of human beings are just as entitled to such an 
essence and means of individuation as anything else. 
Further, the properties, though superficially more complicated, are no different in 
kind; a haecceity presentist should not endorse tensed properties for the haecceities of 
former humans but not other former objects. And this is precisely because tensed properties 
should be vindicated on the work they do for a theory, as it is this that gives us reason to 
believe they exist. So, the more work they do for a theory, the more respectable they are. 
Permitting such haecceities and properties is in the haecceity presentist’s best interests, 
then, as they are invaluable in their truthmaking solution. It is difficult to say whether this 
constitutes a revision to the different formulations of haecceity presentism, as the issue of 
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what entities have haecceities is ignored, but, nonetheless, I think it should be a standard 
commitment of the theory, and one mine is explicit about.
" I now turn to ‘aboutness’. I have previously offered one response to concerns of 
‘aboutness’ for presentists keen to try and dissolve the force of the objection, or construe the 
relation as metaphysically thinner than proponents of ‘aboutness’ understand their purported 
relation. I shall now attempt a different response, taking the notion of ‘aboutness’ at face 
value. The reason for this is simple: criticisms of presentist metaphysics failing the 
‘aboutness’ condition of truthmakers and their truths are ubiquitous in the literature, to the 
point where the dialectic would have it that a satisfactory response is a deciding factor. So I 
want to demonstrate that haecceity presentism does have a satisfactory response to the 
‘aboutness’ condition, even though I reserve some scepticism for the condition in anything 
but a fairly thin understanding of it. Regardless, satisfying the condition leaves haecceity 
presentism in an even stronger position amongst its peers and critics.
3.3 - ‘Aboutness’: Diverging from Ingram
Recall the haecceity presentist’s understanding of singular propositions about past entities: 
<Bertrand Russell was clever> is constituted by the presently existing haecceity of a past 
object, Bertrand Russell. So, a singular proposition is about a past entity in virtue of being 
constituted by the haecceity of that past entity. Ingram also adds the following addition: the 
singular proposition is also about Bertrand Russell’s haecceity in virtue of having that 
haecceity as a constituent (2018: 454). 
This relates to the following general analysis of singular propositions and the 
aboutness relation: a singular proposition, P, is about x, if i) it has x as a constituent, or ii) it 
has x’s haecceity as a constituent. Importantly, these two conditions are not exclusive, or so 
Ingram says: <Bertrand Russell was clever> is both about Bertrand Russell and his 
haecceity, he says, as it is ‘partly constituted by [Russell’s] thisness’ (2018: 450).
" I am slightly puzzled by the disjunctive analysis of the aboutness relation and 
singular propositions, just as I was puzzled by Ingram’s discussion about past-tensed 
properties when discussing a haecceity presentist solution to truthmaking. There is a way in 
which it seems inconsistent. Firstly, it takes the ‘aboutness’ relation at face value by granting 
it substantive force as a criticism and by placing it as a constraint on any adequate response 
to the truthmaker problem. But it undermines this seriousness by offering a deflationist 
response to the following question, noted earlier: how can a singular proposition be about 
something that does not exist? The answer to this was to distinguish between a thick and 
thin sense of about. A proposition about vampires, say, may be intuitively about Dracula, but 
that does not commit us to the existence of Dracula, and that is all aboutness amounts to. 
But Ingram seems to be pursuing both the thick and thin senses, however: there is an 
aboutness constraint on propositions, certainly, and it is an important constraint on a theory 
to satisfy (otherwise, truthmaking for presentists would be quite simple, as any surrogate 
would do the job – the cosmos instantiating tensed properties, for example). On the other 
hand, the constraint is interpreted as quite thin, with commitment to entities being construed 
quite loosely. Further, the believer in thick aboutness will say that there seems to be a real 
disanalogy between Caesar and Dracula. The latter is an intentional object, the former is 
not! To suppose that the thin aboutness relation is equally in good standing across entities 
fictitious and (formerly) real is perhaps hasty. 
The worry, really, is as such: is the aboutness constraint thick or thin? If construed as 
thin, it is easy to satisfy, which makes the truthmaking problem not much of a problem at all. 
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But that fails to make haecceity presentism an interesting improvement over other presentist 
solutions to the truthmaking problem that purportedly fail by failing to satisfy the aboutness 
constraint. If it is construed as thick, the haecceity presentist response to worries about 
propositions about entities that do not exist does not seem to work, for the aboutness 
constraint is then taken as easy to satisfy in virtue of the relation being ontologically 
noncommitting, and thus shirking the challenge of a properly thick understanding of the 
relation in the first place (propositions are about past entities but do not command 
commitment to them, like propositions about e.g. ghosts are about ghosts but do not 
command commitment to them).
 There is one obvious response: drop the disjunctive analysis and say that singular 
propositions get to be singular in virtue of having a haecceity as a constituent – and that is 
what gives them genuinely singular content. In short, only haecceities ever constitute 
singular propositions. The disjunctive approach, in being permissive, is weak, which I think 
diminishes the merit of it as an approach. 
" One problem that may emerge from this was alluded to in the previous paragraph. If 
a haecceity presentist is entitled to understand the aboutness relation as properly being 
directed towards haecceities, as they are all that constitute singular propositions, what is to 
stop someone in a rival presentist position, say Lucretianism, understanding the aboutness 
relation as properly directed towards Lucretian properties? In short, what precludes their 
entitlement to such a construal of the relation? If they are permitted such a construal, then 
haecceity presentism, and any other presentist position that understands truthmaking, 
singular propositions etc. in terms of presently existing surrogates for past entities, simply 
collapse into one another, each being mere notational variants of entities bearing tensed 
properties, with the aboutness relation construed as pertaining to the entities that bear those 
tensed properties (heacceities for the haecceity presentist, the cosmos for the Lucretian, and 
so on).
" A haecceity presentist need not be phased by such an objection, however, as there 
are very obvious disanalogies between it and Lucretianism. For example, haecceity 
presentism has haecceities instantiate second-order tensed properties that correspond to, 
and are initially dependent upon, first-order tensed properties instantiated by its entity. These 
second-order properties serve to characterise its entity indirectly. The acquisition of these 
properties is intimately tied to the relationship between a haecceity and its entity; a haecceity  
is an essential property of an entity, it discloses its individual essence. The properties of a 
haecceity are importantly about its former entity. There are no such ties between an entity 
and the cosmos. That the properties of my haecceity characterise me is no mystery, as my 
haecceity is mine essentially, but the cosmos is not mine essentially; indeed, I can find no 
intelligible understanding of this. Neither does the cosmos instantiating tensed properties 
serve to characterise me, indirectly or otherwise, in any meaningful sense, for the cosmos 
has no unique relation to me. The cosmos may have such tensed properties as being such 
that it contains Kyle Buckle-Hodgson, being such that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and so 
on, but that relation to me (or to Caesar) is entirely contrived. This is not true of a haecceity 
and its properties – a haecceity has the properties it does as a consequence of its relation to 
its entity, a relation that is essential. But there is no such relation between the cosmos and 
me. So, an understanding of aboutness in terms of haecceities does not permit any 
construal of the aboutness relation – there are understandings of the relation that are on 
much better ground than others. Haecceity presentism’s understanding is on, I think, very 
good ground, for the reasons I have just articulated.
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" 3.4 – Explanatory Priority
This also provides the resources to respond to a particular worry concerning explanatory 
priority. Sanson and Caplan have frequently made objections in this mould (2010, 2011) in a 
bid to undermine presentist solutions to truthmaking. I shall argue that haecceity presentism 
not only answers their challenge but sits well with it.
" Sanson and Caplan are keen to demonstrate the explanatory asymmetry between 
past-tensed properties presently instantiated and the having of a property in the past. Here 
is an example: John is pale and, suffering from a niggling vanity, heads to the beach in order 
to achieve a tan. So, he was pale, but is no longer. Now, consider the proposition <John was 
pale>. This seems true. Plausibly, this is true in virtue of a certain fact concerning John and 
the relations and properties he instantiates. However, if you are a presentist, the only 
properties John instantiates are those he presently instantiates. So, we need to identify a 
property such that presently having it suffices to make <John was pale> true. The natural 
candidate is the property having been pale.
" So that is the presentist friendly truthmaker. The other truthmaker is John, in the past, 
instantiating being pale. The two solutions, then, are as so:
PAST- The proposition that <John was pale> is true because John once had the property 
being pale. 
PRESENT - The proposition that <John was pale> is true because John now has the 
property having been pale.
Sanson and Caplan contend that PAST is the correct truthmaker, insofar as it provides the 
correct kind of explanation for <John was pale>. Furthermore, they think that PRESENT 
crucially depend on PAST. This is also, I believe, the source of the intuitions behind the 
dubiousness of tensed properties: it is not merely that they point beyond their instances in 
looking towards the past, it is that they violate the direction of dependence, for the fact that 
an entity instantiates a property now depends on how an entity was.
None of this, however, is in conflict with haecceity presentism. Recall that haecceities 
instantiate tensed second-order properties that indirectly characterise their entity. Further, 
the acquisition of these properties corresponds to, and is dependent upon, the first-order 
properties of its entity. So the way an entity was does depend on the way an entity was – 
indeed, a haecceity has the very character it has in virtue of the way its entity was, for it 
cannot instantiate such second-order properties without its entity, at some point, instantiating 
the relevant first-order properties. There is no violation of the direction of dependence here 
and intuitions are maintained: the properties a haecceity has now do depend on how its 
entity was. Indeed, it must depend on how its entity was.
" Perhaps that answers a certain kind of ontological worry, it might be responded, but it 
does not answer the principle worry in Sanson and Caplan’s example, that it is PAST that 
gives a superior kind of explanation of <John was pale>, and that PRESENT is merely 
derivative. I do not see this as a worry, however, for Sanson and Caplan seek to explain the 
explanatory superiority of PAST in terms of the ontological asymmetry between PAST and 
PRESENT, with the latter depending on the former. But there is no difficulty for haecceity 
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presentism, as it acknowledges and respects this dependence. The truthmaker is a state of 
affairs with a haecceity instantiating second-order tensed properties as a constituent, 
certainly, but all this is perfectly in line with Sanson and Caplan’s desideratum for any 
adequate presentist response to the truthmaker problem. The haecceity presentist has a 
good response to worries of this ilk.
3.5 – Rejecting the Disjunctive Approach"
Back to the worry at hand: the disjunctive analysis versus my strictly haecceity analysis of 
singular proposition. Here is one count on which the strictly haecceity analysis is superior. It 
is the same type of argument I used against Ingram’s having been the haecceity property 
type: the problem of shifts, though here it is first reference, and thus constitution of singular 
propositions, that shifts, which also precipitates a shift in truthmakers too, as the haecceity 
presentist response to the truthmaking problem relies on its analysis of singular propositions.
Suppose I am some kind of hermit that receives global news once a year. I believe 
<Obama was President> and Obama is alive and well. At that point, I believe a singular 
proposition in which, presumably, Obama is a constituent, and he has the property having 
been President, which serves as the truthmaker. Suppose Obama then dies, and I am yet to 
receive that particular piece of news for another 350 days. In those 350 days, the object of 
my belief is no longer Obama instantiating having been President, but the haecceity of 
Obama instantiating the second-order property being the haecceity of a man who was 
president. But absolutely nothing has happened in my environment such that my belief could 
change its content in such a radical fashion, which is a bad result. The trouble does not stop 
with this epistemic problem either, of course – it has a metaphysical counterpart, as noted 
earlier, which goes hand in hand with it as the manner in which haecceities function is tightly 
linked between singular reference and truthmaking. Not only does what I believe change, the 
truthmaker for the proposition <Obama was President> changes too, for it changes from a 
first-order property instantiated by Obama himself to a second-order property instantiated by  
a haecceity. Changes in truthmakers are a bad result too. Both problems are avoided if one 
takes the strict haecceity approach.
" Another problem: the disjunctive approach seems committed to a peculiar 
truthmaking asymmetry that undermines haecceities. What explains that singular 
propositions about present objects are constituted by present entities instantiating tensed 
properties, but singular propositions about past objects are constituted by presently existing 
haecceities of past objects instantiating second-order tensed properties? Whence the 
asymmetry? Of course, there is an obvious way to explain the asymmetry, and that is to 
admit that we should privilege concrete truthmakers when we have them because they are 
explanatorily superior. But that would not be a good admission for a haecceity presentist. Of 
course, Ingram never considers an emotion based defence of haecceity presentism, where I 
argue that haecceities are not only explanatorily superior but essential to understanding the 
content of certain emotions, but giving haecceities a silver medal in matters of explanation is 
not a move that encourages faith in haecceities anyway.
" Indeed, at times it seems like Ingram actually endorses the strict haecceity approach, 
but his final analysis of singular propositions is professedly disjunctive in its sufficient 
conditions. Why is this? It seems, at least, that Ingram is bothered by the following point:
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Here is an objection. There is no intuitive sense of ‘about’ according to which singular propositions about 
past objects are about thisnesses of past objects. For instance, one might challenge that is about 
Caesar and nothing else. As such, the apparently plausible sufficient condition for aboutness, stipulated 
above, fails. To reply, I concede that is intuitively about Caesar. But, on my picture, the proposition is 
also about Caesar’s thisness in virtue of being constituted by it. This follows from the solution to the 
constituent problem and the (rough) analysis of aboutness, proposed above, i.e. a proposition P is about 
x if: (i) P is partly constituted by x, or (ii) P is partly constituted by x’s thisness. <Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon> is about Caesar’s thisness in virtue of being partly constituted by Caesar’s thisness (2018: 
456)
The issue, then, seems to be that singular propositions about past objects ‘are 
intuitively about [past objects]’, so Ingram seems to permit some sense in which past objects 
partly constitute singular propositions. This sense is presented earlier: it is about past 
objects in the way that stories are about, e.g., ghosts – there is no ontological commitment 
there. And it is this understanding of aboutness I have been arguing against, for it 
simultaneously respects a serious stricture placed on ontology – that singular propositions 
about the past must, in some way, have a past object to constitute that singular content – but 
answers it in what is, to me, a thoroughly deflationary fashion – that past objects do partly 
constitute the singular content of a proposition, but not in a way that is ontologically 
committing and, further, that such singular content is about a past object in virtue of its 
haecceity partly constituting the singular content. In short: Ingram seems to believe that 
because singular propositions are intuitively about past objects, they have to figure in an 
analysis of them somehow. But I have already presented several difficulties that such a 
condition brings, urging that we adhere to the strict haecceity approach. 
Further, I do not think that Ingram’s extra condition on aboutness meshing well with 
intuitions is a good reason to maintain it, for Ingram is already committed to an unorthodox 
and non-standard notion of aboutness that involves past objects and haecceities. Fully 
respecting the intuition that singular propositions are constituted by past objects would, I 
think, involve actually having the past objects as constituents – that is the source of the 
intuition. And if one is already committed to a non-standard understanding of the aboutness 
relation, I think one should opt for the one that is unproblematic – and that is the one found 
in my strict haecceity approach. It accomplishes all of the desiderata of truthmaking without 
troubles such as shifting truthmakers, shifting contents of belief, ontological asymmetry etc.
" Finally, it might be said that all that Ingram is really saying in his analysis is that 
propositions are about entities in virtue of their haecceities partly constituting the content of 
those propositions: <Obama was President> is about Obama in virtue of Obama’s haecceity 
constituting it, and that is all there is to the notion of aboutness. If that is Ingram’s analysis, 
then I agree with it. To reiterate, what I demure from is the inconsistency of his treatment of 
‘aboutness’ and the haphazard introduction of a non-ontologically committing ‘aboutness’ 
relation. I have argued against such a construal of the relation and presented reasons as to 
why one should adhere to a strict haecceity approach (if you want to take aboutness 
seriously). So it is, I think, difficult to discern exactly what formulation of the relation Ingram 
is endorsing, as his endorsement changes. Regardless, anyone who does endorse the 
relation of ‘aboutness’ I attribute to him, and the disjunctive analysis, should reject it and opt 
for the strict haecceity approach. This is no loss for a presentist; rather, it is a substantial 
gain, and offers a novel account of truthmaking that satisfies the desiderata placed upon 
presentist theories by their critics. I conclude, then, that haecceity presentism adequately 
solves the truthmaking problem for presentists, and, further, if one is a haecceity presentist, 
then one should be a strict haecceity presentist.
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Chapter 4 - Cross-Temporal Relations
" 4.1 - Cross-Temporal Relations and the Haecceity Presentist Solution
Here is a problem: I strike a match, light a candle, and extinguish the match. The lit match 
caused the candle to light. But if you are a presentist, the present properties of an object are 
its properties simpliciter – the match was lit but it is no longer. So there is a genuine causal 
relation here, between a lit match and a candle, that a presentist cannot account for, as the 
match no longer instantiates the property of being lit. This is one example of a difficulty for 
any stripe of presentist, as it invokes relations that occur at different times, and the 
presentist will always struggle with such relations as she believes in only one time, the 
present.
The haecceity presentist response, I submit, should be exactly that of its response to 
the truthmaking dilemma; that is, one should posit a tensed property of a haecceity to 
account for cross-temporal relations. Recall that the haecceity presentist response to the 
truthmaking dilemma made use of second-order tensed properties instantiated by 
haecceities. These properties served to characterise, indirectly, the way an entity was, that 
entity being the one uniquely related to its haecceity. Furthermore, these second-order 
properties correspond to, and depend for their initial instantiation on, the first-order 
properties of the entity. Finally, though entities may cease to instantiate tensed properties by 
ceasing themselves, haecceities do not cease to instantiate tensed properties, for 
haecceities never cease to exist. Truths concerning the past, then, were made true by the 
haecceities of the relevant past entities presently instantiating second-order tensed 
properties; for example, what makes <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> true is the haecceity of 
Caesar instantiating the property being the haecceity of a man who crossed the Rubicon.
The haecceity presentist response to the problem of cross-temporal relations, then, 
should be modelled along the same lines. What makes it true that <The match lit the 
candle>?  At the object level: it is the haecceity of the match instantiating the property being 
the haecceity of a match that was lit, and the haecceity of the candle instantiating the 
property being the haecceity of a candle that was lit (by the match).
These properties serve to characterize the way their entity was with respect to their 
entering into some kind of cross-temporal relation. And so it is with other such relations, like 
that of the billiard ball sending the black ball into the pocket, or the firing of the bullet causing 
the Emperor’s death, and so on. As with the truthmaking solution, no presentist scruple is 
being flouted; the ontological resources the presentist helps herself to are present entities 
and the present instantiation of properties. And as with the truthmaking solution again, it is 
haecceities and tensed properties that do the metaphysical labour.
I expect there will be many that find such a solution difficult to swallow, and I imagine 
some will say it is unintuitive. But I do not think it is entirely unintuitive or altogether strange; I 
think it is quite commonsensical. This is because it is natural to assume that causes come 
into and out of existence frequently: the match is struck, applied to the wick of a candle, and 
then blown out. The candle remains lit, but the match is not. That the match was lit (but is no 
longer) and applied to the candle (but is not now being so applied) seems a reasonable 
explanation of the presently lit status of the candle, as does the event of the candle being lit 
seem reasonably explained by the event of the match touching it, despite that event having 
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ceased. If anything, I think it is an eternalist analysis of the relata of cross-temporal relations 
that is unintuitive: that my striking a billiard ball, for example, is real with respect to all times 
and is such that the eight ball entered the pocket (and this too is real with respect to all 
times) seems more unintuitive, more still when the balls are all packed away and I am 
putting another pound coin to play again (that some temporal part of me is still tenselessly 
enjoying billiards would not dissuade me from putting the coin in, I wager).
An eternalist is likely to respond with the usual: that my ball example suggests 
nothing other than the irreducibly perspectival nature of human psychology, or that my notion 
of causes ‘going into’ and ‘coming out of’ existence begs the question against an eternalist 
metaphysic, or my understanding of the coming to exist and ceasing to exist of causes is 
mere conceptual analysis, yielding nothing of the actual metaphysics of cross-temporal 
relations. But that would miss the mark of my response, for my response is directed towards 
a criticism of the haecceity presentist analysis of cross-temporal relations being, in some 
sense, ‘unintuitive’. But I have tried to demonstrate that, on one understanding of what a 
cause is, the haecceity presentist is consonant with pre-philosophical intuition, and does 
justice to the thought that a cause can, and indeed does, cease to be, while still providing 
the relata in a cross-temporal relation. And if accord with intuition is taken to be a theoretical 
virtue, which it would seem to be if being unintuitive is taken to have any force as a criticism, 
then I argue that the haecceity presentist view actually fares better with intuition. So, the 
criticism is misguided. Of course, an objector can say that concordance with intuition is not a 
theoretical virtue, but if they opt for this route, I say that their contention that my analysis is 
unintuitive has no sway as a point, for they have admitted that being intuitive or unintuitive 
counts for nothing (unless, perhaps, they say that while being intuitive does not count as a 
pro for a theory, being unintuitive does count as a con. I would respond that such an 
asymmetry seems arbitrary).
Perhaps a more subtle version of this criticism can be teased out. The lack of 
intuitiveness, the objector may press, is better expressed by the thought that the haecceity 
presentist analyses cross-temporal relations not in terms of objects and their powers but in 
terms of the second-order tensed properties of an abstract property of an object  – or, in 
other words, the tensed properties of non-qualitative, abstract properties of objects. And that 
is every bit as unintuitive as an eternalist analysis of cross-temporal relations. They may 
even go further, admitting that although the tenseless occurrence of events is indeed no part 
of intuitions about causes, objects being part of cross-temporal relations certainly is; indeed, 
reducing cross-temporal relations to the properties of non-qualitative properties of objects is 
so radically removed from any conception of cause and effect that it is absurd to present it 
as any analysis of cross-temporal relations.
This objection, ultimately, is a variant of the ‘aboutness’ objection the haecceity 
presentist faced earlier, where the accusation was that singular propositions must be 
appropriately about their content by the denotations of singular terms being concrete 
objects. To this I respond that what the relata ought to be is an open question. A 
mereological nihilist, for example, would flout such a prohibition, for they do not think there 
are any (composite) objects. They would analyse the relata, I imagine, in terms of 
mereological simples instantiating properties. I do not think this is any less coherent than the 
responses of a haecceity presentist, or an idealist, or a holist, and so on. What the relata 
must be cannot be stipulated, for it rules out a number of theories by fiat, none of which are 
obviously incoherent or false. 
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And for the truthmaking variant of the aboutness objection, which is that a proposition 
must be about the entities to which its truth pertains, we can also duplicate the earlier 
response: propositions are about the entities to which their truth pertains in virtue of partly 
constitutively depending on the haecceities of those entities, which are the objects of 
singular reference and truthmaking in propositions. For example, <Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon> has singular content in virtue of the haecceity of Caesar, and the same proposition 
is true in virtue of the haecceity of Caesar instantiating a tensed property, being the 
haecceity of a man who crossed the Rubicon. 
4.2 - Rival Presentist Accounts of Cross-Temporal Relations: Lucretianism
Similarly, one may worry how haecceity presentism distinguishes itself in its analysis of 
cross-temporal relations from other presentist positions. As before, I shall pick Lucretianism, 
as it is another presentist position that is explicit in its reliance on tensed properties. How 
may a Lucretian answer the problem of cross-temporal relations? It would, rather naturally, 
offer tensed properties of the cosmos. So, when the match is struck, lights the candle, and is 
blown out, it is the cosmos being such that the match lit the candle and was extinguished 
that characterises that causal chain. So, the Lucretian may object that they have an analysis 
of cross-temporal relations too. Furthermore, they may add that it is a simpler, more 
parsimonious account, for they have no need to posit any haecceities to be bearers of 
tensed properties, for the cosmos is perfectly capable of doing so. The worry could be 
extended such that all presentist theories utilising tensed properties are theoretically on a 
par, each notational variants of one another, varying simply in what serves as bearers of 
tensed properties.
" As before, a haecceity presentist should press any rival on what is instantiating 
tensed properties. Haecceities do not cease to exist, but it does not seem obvious to me that 
the cosmos is such that it does not cease to exist. Perhaps a Lucretian might suggest that 
the cosmos persists through a big crunch, or some such analogue, but this renders the link 
between the cosmos and tensed properties even more tenuous, for some subsequent 
iteration of the cosmos that develops with different laws, histories, entities etc. has nothing at 
all to do with Caesar having crossed the Rubicon, or whatever past state of affairs that 
concerns the current iteration of the cosmos. A better strategy for the Lucretian might be to 
take Lucretius very seriously, and suggest ‘tracts of earth’, as Lucretius puts it, or regions of 
spacetime as eternally persisting entities. One positive aspect of this is that the connection 
between a past state of affairs and a region of spacetime is not tenuous – this region of 
spacetime is being such that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. This jettisons the advantage of 
parsimony, however, for it seems that any such robust understanding of spacetime would 
require a commitment to substantivalism. Perhaps such a commitment is independently 
warranted, but that is an independent issue.
" " Regardless, there is an issue I wish to press against the Lucretian which 
the haecceity presentist avoids. It is based on a criticism from Mozersky (2015: 40), and 
runs as follows: it is metaphysically possible that the current state of the world is 
compatible with Caesar crossing the Rubicon and Caesar not crossing the Rubicon. That 
is, the entire physical state of the universe right now could be exactly as it is even if 
Caesar never existed. It is metaphysically possible there is a world, then, exactly like ours 
in which Caesar never existed, in which its history is different. So, if some portion of land, 
or the world, or the cosmos, instantiates the property being such that Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon, the instantiation of this property cannot supervene on, or have its grounding in, 
the physical structure of the world today, as that structure is compatible with it not having 
that property. But these kinds of tensed properties must supervene on, or be grounded in, 
the present for presentists, for that is their sole ontological resource. A Lucretian is free to 
insist, of course, that what distinguishes the two is one instantiating being such that 
Caesar crossed the Rubicon, whereas the other does not. But, again, this is simply 
reaffirming that such tensed properties are sui generis, completely free from any 
grounding in the way the world is. Imagine some future state of the world, with all traces of 
Roman history entirely obliterated. On the Lucretian account, complete, exhaustive, 
perfect knowledge of the present physical state of the universe would be insufficient to tell 
you whether it is the world in which Caesar did or did not cross the Rubicon.
" " The situation is different for the haecceity presentist, for two such worlds 
will differ in that one contains the haecceity of Caesar, and the other does not. Haecceities 
come into existence with their entities; they non-rigidly ontologically depend on them for 
their initial existence. So, the present existence of Caesar’s haecceity entails that it was 
once in a relation of non-rigid ontological dependence with Caesar himself. Now, one 
could simply ask on what grounds this is really different to Lucretianism: the haecceity 
presentist says the worlds differ in regards to one containing Caesar’s haecceity, and one 
not containing any such haecceity (as Caesar never existed). But that is merely an 
analogue of what the Lucretian says. And the haecceity presentist saying that they have 
provided grounding for Caesar’s haecceity in Caesar himself, as haecceities non-rigidly 
ontologically depend on their entity for their initial existence, is not a helpful response, for 
the point is that there could be worlds in which there is no physical difference in the 
present physical state of two worlds, one in which Caesar existed, and one in which he did 
not. A haecceity is an abstract property – it cannot be physically detected such that the 
two worlds are discriminable. So, the present physical state of the world is consistent with 
both Caesar existing and not existing, and thus his haecceity existing and not existing. We 
cannot know if we have any such haecceities to do work in truthmaking, singular 
propositions, cross-temporal relations etc.
" " A haecceity presentist should resist this argument. Perhaps it is consistent 
for the present physical state of the world to be compatible with the existence and non-
existence of Caesar. But that is beside the point, for on the haecceity presentist 
metaphysic, it is not consistent metaphysically, for two worlds will differ, of necessity, in 
their ontology. To restrict difference to concreta is thoroughly arbitrary for a haecceity 
presentist: analogously, the present physical state of the universe is consistent with 
numbers being grounded in universals, or numbers not being grounded in universals. The 
two worlds are, plausibly, physically the same, as universals cannot be physically detected 
such that the two worlds are discriminable. But that the present physical state of the 
universe is consistent with numbers being grounded in universals and numbers not being 
grounded in universals does nothing to militate for, or against, the metaphysical thesis that 
numbers are grounded in universals. And, if they are (or are not), I take it to be necessary 
that they are (or are not). Similarly, that the present physical state of the universe is 
consistent with haecceities existing and not existing does not militate for, or against, the 
metaphysical thesis that haecceities do, or do not, exist. Furthermore, as mentioned, it is 
metaphysically impossible for two worlds to be identical in their ontology but for Caesar to 
have existed in one but not the other. This is because, necessarily, the presently existing 
haecceity non-rigidly ontologically depended on Caesar having existed. So, necessarily, 
for any haecceity, its entity either exists now, or existed.
" " Perhaps the Lucretian may argue that they are entitled to the same 
response: the two worlds are physically identical but differ in ontology, as one instantiates 
a Lucretian property, but one does not. But I do not think it works as well for a Lucretian. 
Haecceities enjoy an essential, that is to say necessary, relation to their entity, and it is 
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haecceities that are the property bearers for a haecceity presentist. But it is regions of 
space, or the world, or the cosmos for the Lucretian. The relation between the Lucretian 
bearers and the properties they instantiate, however, is not necessary. It is contingent. 
Further, such property bearers are physical entities, which explains the initial attraction of 
Mozersky’s criticism. So the Lucretian could help themselves to my response to Mozersky, 
but his ultimate point still stands – Lucretian properties are ungrounded properties, floating 
free of any robust ontology. For any region of space/world/cosmos and so on, it has this 
property, and that is a brute, ungrounded fact. That is not so for haecceity presentism. The 
tensed properties of a haecceity depended upon, and corresponded to, that of its entity, 
and a haecceity non-rigidly ontologically depended upon its entity for its initial existence. 
Thus, I conclude that the haecceity presentist response to Mozersky’s objection is 
superior to the Lucretian’s.
" " 4.3 – Explanatory Priority Once More
" The haecceity presentist solution to cross-temporal relations is also vulnerable to 
another criticism used against it on the matter of truthmaking. This is Sanson and 
Caplan’s (2010) charge that the past has explanatory priority over the present. A revised 
version of this criticism would run as follows: a match was used to light a candle. The 
match is not lit now. What kind of explanations do we have for the match lighting the 
candle? Here are two:
Eternalist solution –the match, in the past, being lit and the candle, in the past, being lit.
Haecceity presentist solution – the haecceity of the match presently instantiates the 
property being the haecceity of a match that was lit and the haecceity of the candle 
presently instantiates the property the haecceity of a candle that was lit.
Sanson and Caplan want to say something like: that the haecceity of the match 
instantiates such a property is importantly dependent upon the way the match was. 
Furthermore, it is the way the match was that explains what it did, namely, light a candle. 
The way the match is now is a mere symptom, or trace, of this fact. That the match was lit 
in the past grounds and necessitates that it is now such that it was lit. It is explanatorily 
more fundamental, and thus explanatorily superior. This reflects a certain ontological 
priority, hinted earlier: the tensed properties of the match’s haecceity, those it has now, are 
grounded in those that it had.
" " The haecceity presentist response should, as in previous cases, be 
modelled on the response given to the analogous worry for truthmaking. The tensed 
properties of the haecceity do indeed importantly depend on the properties of the match, 
for it is the properties of the match that the properties of the haecceity depended upon, 
and corresponded to. It is exactly this that allows a haecceity to characterise its entity 
presently, even if that entity no longer exists, albeit in a manner which is indirect. So 
haecceity presentism does indeed respect the ontological priority of the way the match 
was in determining the way the haecceity of the match is. 
" " I concede that, even though I have provided an answer to Sason and 
Caplan’s worry of presentism not honouring the ontological priority of the past in 
determining the present, there is some residual force to their objection. For even though I 
think the ontological priority is, in some sense, respected, there is still some weight to the 
intuition that it is the eternalist solution that best answers how the match lit the candle – it 
was the match, in the past, being lit, not the haecceity of a match, presently, indirectly 
characterizing how the match was in the past, being lit. It is the former that explains the 
causal relation between the match and the candle, the latter being parasitic on this 
explanation. 
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In response: haecceity presentists should be mindful of the fact that this challenge 
is not uniquely theirs to wrestle with; it is a burden common to all strict presentist 
metaphysics that take their ontological restriction (that is, to exclusively present entities) 
seriously. And I think presentists of all stripes should dig in their heels here: there is a 
distinction between i) giving an explanation and ii) giving an explanation to everyone’s 
tastes. The haecceity presentist response may flout ii), on grounds that it seems to violate 
a plausible intuition about explanation. But that is not to say that it does not offer an 
explanation full stop. It does offer an explanation for cross-temporal relations utilising only 
present ontology.
"  In conclusion, I have argued that haecceity presentism has a coherent and, for those 
inclined towards presentism, attractive basis for an analysis of cross-temporal relations. 
Furthermore, its solution utilises only haecceities and tensed properties, a fact which I think 
lends credence in admitting both to any A-theoretic ontology.
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Chapter 5 - Causation
It might be reasonably asked what, exactly, is the relationship that obtains between 
haecceities such that one may consider that relation and its relata a credible analysis of 
cross-temporal relations? It does not appear to be a causal one, strictly speaking, for the 
relation is between second-order properties instantiating tensed properties: being the 
haecceity of a match that was lit, for example, is a second-order property, a haecceity, itself 
instantiating a tensed property and so it is for its corresponding effect, being the haecceity of 
a candle that was lit. Though the relation itself is not strictly causal, I wish to suggest that it is 
importantly analogous to a causal relation, and that the haecceity presentist analysis of 
cross-temporal relations and causation exhibits important features of more standard 
analyses of cross-temporal relations and causation: for example, it is capable of sustaining 
counterfactuals, is a transitive relation, is asymmetric, and so on. 
I shall also, taking my cue from Craig Bourne (2006), present a case for presentists 
to accept causation as counterfactual dependence and show that this sits well with them not 
being able to provide a genuinely causal relationship.
5.1 - Counterfactuals
Here is one theoretical advantage of the haecceity presentist approach to causation: 
it supports counterfactual conditionals (Lewis, 1973a and 1973b. Mellor, 1995. McDonnell, 
2016. Kaiserman, 2017). Support for counterfactuals is difficult for presentist positions, for 
familiar reasons: belief in only concrete present entities severely limits ones ontology and 
what can enter into counterfactual relations. If one wants to assert the counterfactual 
dependence of the breaking of the glass bottle on it having been struck by the rock, but both 
the glass bottle and the rock no longer exist, the presentist has no entities to support the 
counterfactual dependence of the former on the latter, which is troublesome given that such 
a conditional is easily supported by any ontology that has both the rock and the bottle as 
existents. But the haecceity presentist analyses the singular content and truthmaking 
relation in terms of haecceities anyway, which naturally segues into a way of underwriting 
counterfactual dependence. To briefly repeat the details, the singular content of singular 
propositions is granted by such propositions constitutively depending on the haecceities of 
the entities in the proposition; or, in other words, singular propositions constitutively depend 
on haecceities for singular content – propositions are genuinely singular, and about the 
entities to which the proposition pertains, in virtue of the haecceities of the entities, here the 
haecceities of the rock and the bottle. And so it is for truthmaking, where it is the tensed 
properties of haecceities of entities which do the truthmaking work - <Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon> is true in virtue of Caesar’s haecceity instantiating the tensed property being the 
haecceity of a man who crossed the Rubicon. 
All this naturally suggests an analysis of counterfactual dependence: if one wants to 
assert the counterfactual dependence of ‘If the rock had not hit the bottle, it would not have 
shattered’ or ‘If the match had not the lit the candle, something else would have’ and so on, 
using something like the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics (Stalknaker, 1968. Lewis, 
1973b)  for counterfactuals, one would go to the nearest possible world in which a 
counterpart of the rock did not collide with a counterpart of the bottle – the nearest possible 
world in which a counterpart rock’s haecceity did not instantiate the tensed property of being 
the haecceity of a rock that was thrown at a bottle – and see if it were a world in which the 
bottle counterpart was broken or not – a world in which the bottle counterpart’s haecceity did 
not instantiate the tensed property being the haecceity of a bottle which was struck. And, it 
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seems to me, that any world in which the rock counterpart’s haecceity does not instantiate 
such a tensed property and the bottle counterpart’s haecceity does not instantiate such a 
tensed property is a slighter departure from actuality in which the rock counterpart’s 
haecceity does not instantiate the tensed property but the bottle counterpart’s haecceity 
does – in other words, the haecceity presentist analysis seems to give the right results, that 
a world in which the rock did not strike the bottle is a world in which the bottle did not shatter.
Now, one is likely to bring all a manner of cases designed to test counterfactual 
dependence: early pre-emption, late pre-emption (Lewis, 1986. Hitchcock, 2001. Hall, 2004. 
Paul and Hall, 2013), trumping (Schaffer, 2000) and so on. I admit that such problems will 
occur for the haecceity presentist account. Take late pre-emption: Susy throws a rock at the 
bottle, with Billy throwing a rock of equal dimensions a fraction of a second later. Though it is 
Susy’s throw which causes the bottle to break, one cannot say it counterfactually depends 
on the throw, for if Susy’s rock were not to hit the bottle, Billy’s would have. But, again, my 
point here is merely to establish that the haecceity presentist approach to counterfactual 
dependence is not as radical as it appears. If haecceities are suitable to support 
counterfactual dependence then one should expect haecceities to inherit the difficulties that 
occur for counterfactual dependence generally. Again, what is important, in the first stage, at 
least, for the haecceity presentist account of counterfactuals is that it is sufficiently robust to 
ameliorate initial concerns about the suitability of haecceities in any account of 
counterfactuals, cross-temporal relations, causation and so on. And that haecceities can 
underwrite counterfactual dependence is one way in which the haecceity presentist account 
is analogous to more traditional accounts of causation. 
Furthermore, one can import solutions to the difficulties of late pre-emption and such 
into the haecceity presentist metaphysic; one could, for example, make the tensed 
properties of haecceities more fine-grained, such that they are more modally fragile (Lewis, 
2000) e.g. the property of being the haecceity of a rock thrown thus, such that the bottle’s 
breaking counterfactually depends on the exact physical magnitudes of Susy’s throw. 
Naturally, this also imports the difficulties with modal fragility (such as the generation of 
spurious events, like my wedding being five minutes late being a different event of a 
wedding, requiring a fresh set of invites), but also demonstrates that haecceities are capable 
of preserving the features of counterfactual dependence, positive and negative. And it is this, 
I argue for now, that demonstrates the work they do is importantly analogous to the work 
done by, say, events in a straightforward causal relation.
To be clear, I am not arguing that one should endorse a counterfactual view of 
causation, or that it is the best account of causation, or anything like that (though I will go 
onto argue that taking a view of causation as counterfactual dependence is particularly 
attractive to presentists). What I am arguing is the following: 1) that a haecceity presentist 
can account for cross-temporal relations, causation, and counterfactual dependence in a 
coherent fashion. This in itself puts it far beyond other presentist positions and attests to the 
usefulness of haecceities; and 2) that if one believes that the ability to support 
counterfactuals, explain cross-temporal relations and causation and so on is advantageous 
for a metaphysical position, then haecceity presentism shares in that advantage too. That, 
also, puts haecceity presentism beyond other presentist positions and attests to the 
usefulness of haecceities.
5.2 - Asymmetry and Transitivity
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The haecceity presentist account of cross-temporal relations and causation is also 
asymmetric. Plausibly, if c causes e, then e does not cause c; if the white ball strikes the 
black ball, then the black ball did not strike the white ball. It preserves the asymmetry of 
causation as the tensed properties of the haecceities of objects serve to characterise the 
former causal relations of the objects themselves – it is this feature of haecceities that 
makes them suitable to characterise causal relations without the relation between two 
haecceities being causal itself. Rather, what is true of the haecceities was true of its objects, 
and thus the truth of any such state of affairs in which the objects were present is maintained 
in the properties of the haecceities. So, the haecceity of the white ball instantiating the 
tensed property being the haecceity of a ball that was struck and the haecceity of the black 
ball instantiating the tensed property being the haecceity of a ball that was hit characterises, 
or ‘mirrors’, the asymmetry of the causal relation of the haecceities’ objects, as, again, what 
is true of a haecceity was true of its object. So, the asymmetry of causation is supported by 
haecceities; the black ball’s haecceity instantiates being the haecceity of a ball that was hit, 
not being the haecceity of a ball that was struck in relation to the haecceity of the white ball.
It is this important feature of haecceities that makes them capable of exhibiting 
relevant similarities to more orthodox accounts of causation. Take, further, the transitivity of 
causation; if c causes e and e causes d, then (by and large, at least) d exhibits some degree 
of causal dependency on c. So if, for example, the white ball struck the black ball and the 
black ball struck the yellow ball, the yellow ball then entering the pocket, the white ball, 
ultimately, caused the yellow ball to be potted. This transitivity will be manifest in the chain of 
tensed properties instantiated by the haecceities of the objects that feature in the causal 
chain: for the white, being the haecceity of a ball that was struck, for the black being the 
haecceity of a ball that was hit, and for the yellow being the haecceity of a ball that was 
potted. The chain is exhibited in the stepwise dependence of each effect being dependent 
on its prior cause, the chain terminating in the striking of the white ball which is characterised 
by the haecceity of the white ball instantiating the corresponding second order tensed 
property to the ball’s striking. So just as causation (by and large) exhibits transitivity, the 
characterisation of the causal powers and causal relations of objects in terms of their 
haecceities exhibits transitivity. And this, again, is a consequence of the relation of 
haecceities to their objects.
5.3 - Construing Causation as Counterfactual Dependence
There is a further question of how presentists should understand causation. Craig 
Bourne (2006: 110-115) notes two understandings of causation; in terms of the regularity 
theory, or in terms of counterfactual dependence. Additionally, Bourne notes an interesting 
consequence of adopting a theory of causation as counterfactual dependence, and it is one 
eminently amenable to presentists of all stripes: namely, that it cannot be a genuine relation 
between times (2006: 114). I turn now to the development of this point before looking at it a 
little closer.
Bourne analyses dependence between an event c and an event e in terms similar to 
the following two counterfactuals (2006: 113):
a) If c were the case, then e would be the case
b) If c were not the case, then e would not be the case
If c and e do not actually occur, then b) is automatically true – thus, e causally depends on c 
if and only if a) holds. Conversely, if c and e do actually occur, then a) is automatically true – 
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thus e causally depends on c if and only if b) holds. Bourne remarks that since causal 
dependence implies causation, it cannot be the case that causation is a ‘genuine’ relation 
between c and e. This is because ‘c causes e’ is analysed as ‘if c were not the case, then e 
would not be the case’ – that is to say, in terms of the actual non-occurrence of c and e. But 
relations, if they are to be genuine, must have existing relata. Since there are not existent 
relata, it follows that causation, on the counterfactual dependence view, cannot be a 
‘genuine’ relation.  He goes on to note that a presentist need only add tense operators to 
present tensed c and e and then evaluate the counterfactual in whatever way they deem 
best. 
That counterfactual dependence is not a genuine causal relation, or at least not an 
‘intrinsic’ causal relation, is fabulous news for a presentist of any stripe, for a presentist will 
always lack the resources to provide any genuine causal relations owing to the absence of 
non-present times. Better yet, this is not just the presentist’s burden to bear: The problem of 
non-existent relata entails that causation is not a genuine relation, but it is a problem for all 
who endorse a view of causation as counterfactual dependence (even modal realists will be 
forced to admit that the relation is transworld). For the haecceity presentist, it is transworld 
as counterfactual dependence is assessed in terms of the counterparts of haecceities and 
the tensed properties they do or do not instantiate. 
There is, then, a certain, welcome freedom in choosing to understand causation as 
counterfactual dependence; this freedom, I suggest, is an artefact of understanding the 
relation of causation as not a genuine one. This is good for presentists, as it ameliorates 
some suspicions about using present surrogates to ‘stand in for’ their objects, as if causation 
is not a relation intrinsic to objects anyway, then there is no disadvantage in having causal 
relations characterised by surrogates (here, haecceities), rather than the objects 
themselves. This is one attractive reason for presentists to understand causation as the 
relation of counterfactual dependence.
However, a haecceity presentist does not require tense operators appended to 
present tensed propositions about events: the haecceities are capable of characterising the 
counterfactual dependence in the fashion described in section 5.1. 
" In conclusion, haecceities exhibit important analogies to the relata used in more 
orthodox analyses of cross-temporal relations and causation, and provide a credible way of 
analysing cross-temporal relations and causation in themselves. Further, the haecceity 
presentist is not hindered by having her analysis of cross-temporal relations and causation 
be a strictly causal one if she opts for a view of causation as counterfactual dependence. 
Thus, she should.
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Appendix - The Charge of Cheating
I have, over the course of the first half of this thesis, presented the core commitments of 
haecceity  presentism, distinguished my  version from those that also use haecceities, and 
put it to work demonstrating its usefulness on several problems. In particular, I have taken 
the foundations of the haecceity  presentism endorsed by  David Ingram and argued against 
his disjunctive conception of aboutness and his belief that haecceities come to instantiate 
past-tensed properties when their object ceases to exist. 
I have demonstrated, also, the metaphysical labour a haecceity  enriched ontology 
can do for presentists in terms of singular reference, singular propositions and truthmaking, 
also trying to show that my  own version of haecceity  presentism is the best, and, 
independently  of any  other haecceity theorist, I have provided a haecceity  based account of 
cross-temporal relations, counterfactual dependence and a reason, following Craig Bourne, 
for why a counterfactual theory of causation is a good fit for a haecceity presentist. 
In all these problematics, I have presented a solution that I maintain: 1) does not flout 
any of the ontological scruples of presentism; 2) presents a plausible, coherent solution to 
each problematic for a presentist and; 3) each solution is superior to that of its presentist 
peers which do not make use of haecceities. Thus, I have presented the case for haecceity 
presentism and why  any presentist should be a haecceity  presentist, as it is the most 
capable version of presentism available. The solutions to each problematic so far, however, 
acknowledge that theories in opposition to presentism also have coherent theories of 
singular reference, truthmaking and cross-temporal relations. This is, in effect, the first half of 
the thesis – the defensive portion. 
The second half of the thesis constitutes, in effect, my  wholly novel defence of 
haecceities. It turns haecceities to emotions, and argues that without haecceities, we cannot 
make sense of several of our emotions and their roles in our lives. In other words, 
haecceities are indispensable to the character of certain emotions, and any  theory  that does 
not make use of them in combination with presentism spells disaster for our emotional lives. 
This is in combination, further, with problems I argue are generated, but not often 
acknowledged, by  belief in the past and by  belief in objects that have temporal extent in the 
past. Thus, I also argue against theories that assent to the existence of the past and have 
entities or portions of entities ‘inhabit’ the past. 
That is the positive part of the project of vindicating haecceities and tensed 
properties. With all that said and done, however, I still imagine there are those not fully 
persuaded that haecceities are indeed legitimate posits. I subscribe to the metametaphysical 
principle, nicely  articulated by  Karen Bennett earlier in this thesis, that there is nothing to the 
matter on whether a posit exists or not other than the work it does. If it does plenty  of work, 
that is good reason to believe it exists – and I think haecceities do indeed do plenty of work.  
But there are doubtless those not convinced of this principle and still beset by 
suspicions. The remainder of this half of the thesis is for them. Prior to continuing the 
positive project of rehabilitating the reputation of haecceities and tensed properties in terms 
of their usefulness (or, in emotions, their indispensability) to the presentist, I think it would be 
useful to question, and hopefully  dissolve, some of the suspicions and confusions around 
haecceities and tensed properties; or, more generally, around brute, unanalysable 
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properties. For if such suspicions and confusions are dissolved or allayed, the positive part 
of the project will unfold much more smoothly. 
The intuition behind suspicions about haecceities and tensed properties generally 
seems to trade on the thought that I am, in one way or another, ‘having my cake and eating 
it’. Or, in other words, that ontologically  I am confined to some thin slice of reality, the 
present, while helping myself to a kind of ‘God’s eye view’ of the totality  of reality, such that 
problems of truthmaking and singular reference for non-present entities is rather helpfully 
settled by  present entities. It is difficult, I think, to get to the very  bottom of this intuition. For 
one, I have argued that haecceity  presentism satisfies the desiderata of any  adequate theory 
of reference, truth, cross-temporal relations and causation, and that entails answering 
questions to which the intuition could pertain: for example, I have argued that haecceity 
presentism answers the ‘aboutness’ constraint on a metaphysic, so I do not think the 
intuition is relevant to ‘aboutness’. Secondly, the intuition is quite coarse-grained, for I have 
argued there is no cheating in haecceity  presentism; I do not, for example, say there are 
ungrounded true propositions, or singular reference that does not answer to ontology, or 
brute causal facts and the like. But still, there are those who still feel the pull of the cheating 
objection, even if the nature of the cheating is not entirely clear.
I have discussed and responded to accusations of tensed properties and haecceities 
being suspicious or suchlike throughout the first half of the thesis but I shall now consider 
explicit charges of cheating. There are two respects in which I think the charge of cheating 
can be clearly  articulated: 1) that haecceities are cheating insofar as they are contrivances, 
their characteristics stipulated so that they  solve the problems they  are introduced for. 2), 
that haecceities are cheating insofar as they  are hypothetical, that is, they point beyond 
reality (the present) to ontology the presentist is not entitled to. 
A. Haecceities Are Contrived
The nature of this objection, in short, is that the characteristics of a haecceity  are stipulated 
by  fiat in such a fashion that they  are, in some relevant sense, contrived in order to solve the 
problems for which they are introduced.
It is difficult to get clear about what this objection amounts to. Of course, haecceities 
are indeed contrived if by ‘contrived’ one merely  means ‘a posit of a theory’. But that is an 
entirely  innocuous sense of contrived in which any ontology  introduced by  a theory  is a 
contrivance. Neither is there something especially  problematic with the notion of a posit 
doing the very work for which it was posited; a posit that did no philosophical labour would 
be an idle posit, and that is of no use to any theory. So, again, there must be some 
especially  problematic sense of a posit doing the very  work for which it is introduced that is a 
problem for haecceities and tensed properties.
Perhaps it pertains to the characteristics of a haecceity? For example, that it persists 
beyond the non-existence of its object, is capable of instantiating properties beyond the non-
existence of its object, cannot cease itself and so on? An objector, then, may  press that it 
these characteristics that are stipulated in such a fashion so as to be problematic – by  giving 
haecceities these characteristics, the presentist cheats by building a solution to her 
problems into her posit.
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I cannot make much sense of this version of the criticism either. Firstly, a haecceity 
presentist is entitled to stipulate the characteristics of her posits. They are, after all, the 
posits of her theory. And a haecceity  theorist does not stipulate such characteristics 
arbitrarily  – the sections expositing the nature of haecceities earlier, for example, motivate 
certain characteristics of a haecceity  (such as that there are none of future entities) by 
argument. Certain other characteristics of a haecceity  are not argued for, that is true, but I do 
not think it is in a sense that is objectionable. A quiddity  is a non-qualitative property, and I 
see no trouble in taking that as an essential feature of a quiddity without argument, just as a 
haecceity  is a non-qualitative property. One ought to be free to define the essential features 
of one’s posits. There are ways in which one can, unreasonably, stipulate the essential 
features of one’s posits, such as when one’s stipulation might beg the question, such as if I 
were to say  that haecceities, essentially, were the objects of singular reference, truthmaking 
and so on. That is stipulation as cheating. But I make no such claims, and argue for such 
conclusions. 
Secondly, I worry  that a criticism such as this could easily  be brought to bear against 
any ontology  invoked by  any  theory. Take the eternalist and her belief in past objects. That is 
ontology  that she invokes but I do not. The characteristics of that ontology, that it is 
tenseless, eternal, instantiates properties and so on all leave that ontology  well-disposed to 
function as the objects of singular reference, truthmaking, cross-temporal relations and the 
like. But it would be silly  of me to accuse her of contriving such ontology. There is nothing 
about her ontology  that is obviously  cheating. And I say the same is true of the ontology I 
invoke. If there is something suspiciously contrived about haecceities, this is not it. 
I do not think there is a particularly  obvious way  in which haecceities are contrived, 
then. But the core of the criticism is perhaps suggestive of other ways to express the 
intuition that something is amiss with haecceities. One such way  is that they  are 
objectionably hypothetical.
B. Haecceities are Hypothetical
Something is hypothetical insofar as it ‘points beyond its instances’ (Sider, 2001. Crisp, 
2007. Cameron, 20114). One such example might be an actualist who maintains that the 
property, say, of possibly being 6’7 is a genuine property of mine, but it is so brutely  and 
without further explanation. This property  points beyond its instances in that it does not 
characterise how things are with me, but rather how things could be with me, despite the 
actualist’s insistence that how things are with me is all there is. The parallel to haecceities 
and tensed properties would be thus: haecceities are present uninstantiated properties that 
characterise what things there were, despite my insistence that past things no longer exist, 
and tensed properties are present properties of haecceities that characterise the way  that 
things were, despite that, as entailed by  the first point, there are presently no past things 
such that they could be any way at all.
I think what any  presentist ought to do is question the metaphilosophical 
assumptions behind the objection itself, for the objection rests on a particular view of 
ontological economy  wherein the hypothetical nature of certain properties is deemed 
suspicious from the start. I have already given an example of irreducibly  modal, tensed and 
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4 Cameron argues against tensed properties on the grounds that they make no intrinsic difference to a 
bearer at the time, which is plausibly a way of understanding them as hypothetical.
haecceistic properties as hypothetical, but others can be produced: for example, the 
dispositional properties of an object may be taken not to supervene on or be grounded in 
any of its non-dispositional properties. That is, perhaps one may take the dispositional 
property  of being soluble, instantiated by  salt, to not be reducible to any  non-dispositional/
categorical properties of salt. 
But I do not see why  a haecceity  presentist should not just challenge the thought that 
hypothetical properties are suspicious. In fact, if hypothetical properties constitute a class of 
properties, her haecceities and tensed properties among them, and further to the class of 
properties are modal and dispositional ones understood as irreducible properties, then I 
think the haecceity  presentist should instead say her posited properties are in good 
company. This is because I endorse a different view of properties to the objector; for myself, 
there is not a question of whether properties are or are not ‘suspicious’, but whether there 
are any  such properties. And I further endorse the thought that one way of knowing if there 
are any  such properties is the work they  do for a theory, which is what I have attempted to 
do with haecceities and tensed properties.
I shall press this point with irreducible modal properties. The modal case is a 
particularly  apt one, for the parallels between presentism and actualism are quite strong. 
The actualist denies possibilia, but acknowledges that there are, for example, possible ways 
for things to be or possible states of affairs, just as the presentist denies the past and future 
but acknowledges that there are ways the world was and ways the world will be. The 
actualist must provide some kind of ontology to underwrite these possible ways for things to 
be or possible states of affairs; whether it is the property  itself that is primitive, as in possibly 
being 6’7, or a modal operator itself that is taken as primitive with a property  in its scope, 
such as having the property  being 6’7 under the scope of the diamond. The property  itself, or 
the operator, or whatever is taken to be irreducible is not what is important, but rather that 
there is an irreducibly  modal residue. Given actualism’s stringent ontology, the work such 
irreducibly  modal properties do is significant, which is, I believe, good reason to believe they 
exist. In short, actualism is an attractive position, but the actualist will only  ever have the 
actual world and its contents to underwrite any propositions concerning possibility  or 
possible states of affairs. There will always be something hypothetical about the ontology  it 
deploys to underwrite such propositions about possibility  or states of affairs, for such things 
are, strictly  speaking, ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the ontology  actualism has. Should this count 
strongly  against actualism? I believe not, no. The very  same point applies to haecceity 
presentism. There will always be something hypothetical about the ontology it deploys to 
underwrite propositions about the past, say. But, again, that is because such propositions 
are ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the ontology  it has. Rather than find haecceities and tensed 
properties suspect, then, I find them in good company with analogous modal properties.
Indeed, the untested presumption behind the inadmissibility of primitive or irreducible 
properties relates to what Sam Baron describes as:
…rely[ing] on unexplained metaphysical convictions to press the point: Sider presumes, but does not 
argue for, the claim that hypothetical properties should not be part of  one’s ontology. Similarly, Cameron 
presumes,  but does not argue for, that only difference-making properties are kosher. If  the presentist 
digs in her heels in this way, these cheating objections lose their dialectical force. (2012: 265)
I do not think a presentist should be too afraid of using so-called ‘hypothetical’ 
properties, then. The hypothetical nature of a property is not in itself a bad thing; that is an 
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artefact of a certain kind of view about ontology  and philosophy  more generally. Further, 
hypothetical properties offer an advantage in themselves in that they  permit a more 
parsimonious theory.
In conclusion, I have confronted two explicit charges of cheating haecceity 
presentism faces and argued that they  are not successful. Thus, one should not be 
dissuaded from utilising haecceities in one’s ontology.
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PART II – AFFECTIVE ATTITUDES, MORALITY, AND TENSELESSNESS
SUMMARY
This is the second thematic half of my thesis. Throughout I argue, through a variety of 
scenarios, that each of eternalism, perdurance, and stage theory possess certain theoretical 
commitments that make it impossible to rationalise or vindicate the importance of certain 
emotions or moral concerns in our daily lives. Haecceity presentism does allow this, and it is 
haecceity presentism that supports these novel lines of attack. Consequently, tenseless 
theorists must accept the truth of haecceity presentism if they wish to vindicate emotions, or 
accept that their theories simply cannot provide a rationalisation of our emotional (and, in 
some respects, moral) lives for persons, which is a very alienating result.
" Chapter 6 is concerned with grief. It argues that grief cannot be rationalised or 
vindicated in a way that respects its role in our emotional lives if, on the first prong of attack, 
eternalism is true and, on the second prong of attack, perdurance or the stage theory are 
true. For grief to be rational, I argue, it requires the non-existence of the object of grief – that 
it has objectively ceased to exist – and its haecceity remain to characterise its former 
qualities and confer singular content on propositions concerning that object of grief.
" Chapter 7 moves more strictly into the ethical dimensions of tenselessness, focusing 
on perdurance and stage theory. Here I wonder whether temporal parts or stages really are 
the sort of object that, amongst other things, can be responsible for actions. I argue no and, 
as temporal parts and stages cannot act, they cannot be responsible for any actions, and 
this produces disastrous consequences for emotions such as regret and moral projects 
associated with it, such as rehabilitation. Haecceity presentism faces no difficulty here and, 
further, allows us to make sense of regret whilst also making acts of self-improvement 
rational.
" Chapter 8 remains within the ethical dimensions of tenselessness but moves back to 
eternalism. Here, reprising and expanding upon an argument I briefly mention at the end of 
the previous chapter, I introduce something called chronal horrors. Chronal horrors are 
disvalued experiences that, under eternalism, are real with respect to all times: they are 
eternal. I argue that the existence of chronal horrors for eternalism has radically alienating 
consequences for it as a theory and for our moral practice: for example, an individual having 
suffered a grossly unpleasant action, such as torture, must endure the eternality of that act 
of torture.
" Chapter 9 is about hope. It considers a cluster of issues around hope, such as its 
relationship to the open future, epistemology, and the perception of change. The majority of 
the chapter, however, is concerned with what, metaphysically speaking, satisfies a hope. I 
argue that there exist hopes whose satisfaction not only require the reality of tense, but the 
truth of haecceity presentism. The conclusion then follows.
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Chapter 6 – Grief: Eternalism, Perdurance, and Stage Theory
6.1 - Motivating the Haecceity Presentist Account of Grief
The haecceity presentist account of grief rests upon the robust ontological change unique to 
presentism: what licenses and illuminates grief as intelligible, what vindicates its importance 
in our actions and feelings, is that an element of our ontology has ceased, exiting our 
inventory of what is, its haecceity persisting to characterise how it was. The desideratum of 
wanting a theory to vindicate, in a deep sense, our emotions is informed by, and shares 
something in spirit, with the project David Cockburn (1997) embarks on in Other Times: 
Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future. Cockburn characterises what he 
considers ultimately at issue in the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time 
thus:
It is a central contention of this book that ethics...needs to be given a very much more central place in 
the discussion: the fundamental issues in the philosophy of time – for example, those concerning ‘the 
reality of tense’ – can only be properly grasped within a framework in which the significance of time in 
our ethical thinking has a central place. To state the contention boldly one might say: the dispute 
between the tensed and tenseless theories simply is, unbeknownst to its central contemporary 
participants, a dispute about the place which tense should occupy in our justifications of action and 
feeling (1997: 8)
Despite the occasional derisory remark (including Mellor’s excoriating characterisation of 
Cockburn’s work as, ultimately, ‘conceptual botanizing’ (1999: 429), interest in the role tense 
plays in action and feeling is still a live issue. Thus, Bradford Skow, at the end of his 
Objective Becoming, a defence of a tenseless view of time, is forced to admit the following:
I do not think that the fact that we are biased towards the future provides much of an argument for objective 
becoming. But I do think an interesting question emerges from reflecting on the argument. One of the argument’s 
premises was: the bias towards the future is rational. Is it?...I am asking whether our time-biased pattern of 
caring and valuing can find a home in the block universe, or if, having been convinced that the block universe is 
true, we should abandon it and adopt a different pattern. I hoped when I started this book to make progress on 
this difficult question. But I have not. (2015: 236)
Exploring Skow’s ‘difficult question’, then, is also an important part of the following chapters. 
However, the challenge of providing a metaphysics or ontology that rationalises grief 
without recourse to robust ontological change of the sort unique to presentism is not wholly 
the burden of tenseless theorists. Any theory of time that lacks such change will, I argue, be 
vulnerable to the charge that they cannot, philosophically speaking, give the right sort of 
account of grief, in that they cannot provide the resources to have it sufficiently vindicated, 
the result being a significant and unwelcome disturbance to our emotional lives.
When I say 'robust ontological change', which I think is crucial in offering the 
vindication of emotions just mentioned, I mean change which exhibits negative temporal 
ontological symmetry – both the past and present do not exist. I stipulate this to preclude the 
growing block theory. The growing block theory assents to the existence of the past, but 
denies existence to the future (Lucas, 1989. Tooley, 1997. Forrest, 2004. Correia & 
Rosenkranz, 2015). The tide of becoming rolls ever forward as things – entities, events, 
properties of entities and events, and so on – come into existence or come to be 
instantiated. Given that the growing block combines an eternal past with a privileged 
present, defenders of the theory may well argue that it combines the advantages of a tensed 
theory (the open future, robust ontological change, the privileged present) with the 
advantages of a tenseless theory (the existence of the past and all entities that inhabit it, 
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thus inheriting the familiar tenseless solutions to the truthmaking problem, singular 
reference, cross-temporal relations and an account of causation).
" Much has been said in arguing against the growing block (most famously, that if it 
were true, you could never know that 'now' actually is 'now': Bourne, 2002. Braddon-Mitchell, 
2004, 2013. Merricks, 2006: 104-106) but I wish to attack it anew, and all such theories 
which do not endorse negative temporal ontological symmetry, from the position I attack 
eternalism and tenseless theories of persistence: that it struggles to provide a metaphysical 
backdrop against which some of our emotions are rational and, additionally, that it generates 
certain kinds of ethical problems. And that is why I stipulate robust ontological change to 
demand exact temporal ontological symmetry. For while on the growing block things do 
come into existence, they never cease to exist, and something exiting existence is key to 
providing rationality for certain of our emotions and dissolving these ethical problems, or so I 
shall argue. This chapter will focus on the emotion of grief, and how the object of grief exiting 
existence rationalises grief.
                To further elaborate, take the moving spotlight theory (Broad, 1923: 59. 1933: 277. 
Horwich, 1987. Skow, 2009: 666. Cameron, 2015.). Both the past and future exist on the 
moving spotlight theory, but the present is privileged insofar as it roams along the temporal 
mosaic, its illumination endowing what is illuminated with the property of ‘being present’. A 
moving spotlighter could, perhaps, argue that although what constitutes my grief does exist, 
it no longer has the property of being present, and that is why I grieve. Or, to stray into wilder 
metaphysical thickets, take Quentin Smith’s degree presentism (2002: 119). According to 
degree presentism, as entities recede into the past, the magnitude of their existence recedes 
with it. So a recently past event, say, suffers a slightly diminished degree of existence, 
whereas a long distant past event has a vastly diminished degree of existence. So what 
explains my grief, then, is that the object which constitutes my grief no longer wholly exists. 
Rather, its existence has suffered a privation in that it has begun its indelible decline in its 
degrees of its existence, never to wholly exist again. What constitutes my grief, then, will 
never be ‘fully’ real once more. 
                A defender of this doctrine could, perhaps, cash out how grief loses its hold with 
how far diminished the existence of something is, for we typically grieve less as time wears 
on. A defender of this doctrine could, too, construe ontological change as things increasing 
in degrees of existence, before achieving full existence in being present, before diminishing 
in existence as they become past. Thus, change consists in the gradual accrual of 
existence, achieving full existence, and then dissipating in degrees of existence.
This stands in contrast to the haecceity presentist analysis, where grief is a 
propositional attitude that has a propositional object: should I be grieving my mother, my 
grief is an attitude towards the proposition <My mother, a very important and cherished 
figure in my life, is gone>. If the proposition is singular, then, following the haecceity 
presentist analysis of singular propositions, the proposition is about my mother in virtue of 
the proposition constitutively depending on her haecceity. That is, her haecceity confers 
upon the proposition genuinely singular content. This allows the haecceity presentist to 
avoid the apparent incoherence in maintaining that grief is an attitude towards an object that 
has ceased to exist. The haecceity conferring singular content allows the haecceity to 
characterise its object without demanding that one assent to the existence of that object. 
Thus, the haecceity characterises its object in such a fashion that points to its former 
existence, its pastness. This is why haecceity presentism entails endurantism: entities are 
wholly and entirely present at all times they exist. Only the present exists. Thus, objects not 
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located in the present have no existence at all. The emotion of grief, its hold, sway and 
importance to our actions and thoughts, is vindicated and rationalised by the ‘deep’ and 
important fact that the person we grieve has indelibly ceased.
Contrast my solution to something like an existentially pluralist presentist one 
(McDaniel, 2017: 78-80). Past, present and future all exist, but the past and future exist 
differently to the present, with each falling into different domains of quantification being 
governed by distinct quantifiers, none being subsets of the general existential quantifier. 
Grief, then, might consist in the object that constitutes my grief coming to have a different 
mode of existence in coming to be past. 
              Or, perhaps, the unconventional moving spotlight view of Ross Cameron (2015), 
where past entities exist but fail to instantiate certain important properties, or ‘Williamsonian’ 
presentism (Williamson, 1998: 257-273. 2013), where objects exist eternally but bereft of all 
their interesting properties after they have ‘ceased’ to exist (such a view is sometimes, and 
in my opinion mistakenly, taken to be a version of haecceity presentism).
" Given that all the theories just adumbrated lack robust ontological change, any 
specific argument that a theory lacking such change cannot accommodate grief will apply to 
all. Eternalism, however, is my principal foil when considering a theory of time, as it is (for 
me, if not many) its strongest rival and the best defended of any B-theoretic theory of time.
" This is the first prong of attack against the B-theory (and non-presentist A-theories5). 
It is an attack that concerns the image of time that the B-theory, I shall argue, entails: 
eternalism. The argument can be summarised as followed:
(1) The B-theory entails eternalism.
(2) Eternalism does not allow for robust ontological change.
(3) Grief, to be intelligible and rational, requires appeal to robust ontological change.
Therefore:
(4) Grief is neither intelligible nor rational on B-theory.
One may quibble with the first premise: is not the growing block theory, for example, a B-
theoretic presentism, in that it combines B-theoretic belief in past existents with an A-
theoretic present and open future? Also, is not the moving spotlight theory, for example, a B-
theoretic presentism, in that it combines B-theoretic belief in past and future existents with 
an A-theoretic privileged present? Thus, the B-theory does not entail eternalism.
" I disagree, and do not think that either the moving spotlight or growing block are 
genuine instances of the B-theory, as they make use of indispensable, unanalysable and 
objective tense. Thus, they are versions of the A-theory.
There is also another prong of attack, the second prong, which I wish to bring against 
the B-theory. This prong of attack does not depend upon the image of time entailed by the B-
theory. Instead, the attack depends upon two images of persistence I shall argue are 
entailed by the B-theory: perdurantism or stage theory. The argument can be summarised as 
follows:
(1) The B-theory entails perdurantism or stage theory.
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5 My arguments against non-presentist A-theories are, essentially, simply modified versions of my 
arguments against eternalism. That is because the major non-presentist A-theories all assent to the 
existence of the past.
(2) Grief, to be intelligible and rational, requires appeal to enduring entities6.
Therefore:
(3) Grief is neither intelligible nor rational on B-theory.
The classic rationale behind the first premise, with respect to perdurantism, is found in Lewis 
(1986: 202-204): Lewis argues from temporary intrinsic properties to perdurantism by asking 
how we can account for me, now, being straight-shaped, but not being straight-shaped in the 
future. It cannot be that I instantiate both, as that would entail a contradiction. Lewis offers 
three solutions: 1), that straightness is actually a relation, and that I am only straight with 
respect to, or straight at, one time, but not straight with respect to, or straight at, some other 
time. But this conflicts with straightness seeming to be an intrinsic property, and 
straightness-with-respect-to-t is no more an intrinsic property than being heavier than my 
nephew is an intrinsic property 7, so we should reject this solution. Solution 2) is simply to 
accept presentism, as it removes any contradiction in denying that my present straightness 
and future non-straightness have equal reality. All my present properties are my properties 
simpliciter. Solution 3), the perdurantist solution, is to say that each property is held by 
distinct temporal parts, or person stages. What sort of thing is a temporal part, or person 
stage8? Lewis says the following: 
A person stage is a physical object, just as a person is...It does many of the same things a person does: 
it talks and walks and thinks, it has beliefs and desires, it has a size and a shape and a location. It even 
has a temporal duration. But only a brief one, for it does not last long. It begins to exist abruptly and 
ceases to exist soon after. Hence a stage cannot do everything that a person can do, for it cannot do 
those things that a person does over a longish interval (1983: 76)
! For the first premise in respect of stage theory, see Sider (2000. 2001: 188-209) and 
Hawley (2004). In essence, Sider takes umbrage with the fact that a candle, for example, on 
the perdurantist view, never has a shape simpliciter, and thus never, strictly speaking, 
changes shape itself; rather, it is the temporal parts of the candle that have shapes, and 
variation between those shapes occur as the candle, for example, melts. Sider’s view, stage 
theory (or the stage view), asserts that we are instantaneous person stages, each stage 
related to others by a temporal counterpart relation. Thus, person stages have their 
properties simpliciter and, as each stage is distinct, there is no contradiction in a future stage 
futurely being bent, whereas the present stage is straight.
" Quibbles with the first premise to the effect that the B-theory does not entail 
perdurance and stage theory are dealt with in the corresponding section later, where I side 
with Ross Cameron in thinking that non-presentist endurantists cannot explain changes in 
the appearances of objects.
" Thus, the plan for this chapter is to pursue the two prongs of argument: 1), to argue 
that grief requires robust ontological change for its rationality, and eternalism cannot provide 
for that (so we should reject it) and 2), to argue that grief cannot be rationalised on a 
perdurantist or stage theorist metaphysic (so we should reject them). Given that both are 
entailed by the B-theory, we should, further, reject the B-theory.
6.2 - First Prong: That Eternalism Cannot Vindicate and Rationalise Grief 
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6 Strictly speaking, this should read ‘presentist enduring entitiesʼ, but I go on to argue that a non-
presentist endurantism is incoherent.
7 For further arguments against temporary intrinsics being properties with respect to times, including the 
troubles of such a solution at timeless worlds, see Sider (2001: 98-110)
8 Lewisʼ use of ‘person stageʼ muddies the waters, as person stage, as used by a stage theorist, is 
explicitly a person, whereas Lewis simply notes a temporal part/his understanding of a person stage is 
just person-like.
Arthur Prior’s famous ‘Thanks goodness that’s over!’ argument aims to demonstrate that for 
certain utterances it would be very implausible to suppose we were thankful for some 
tenseless fact or relation: rather, we are obviously thankful for some kind of tensed fact, such 
as the fact that my headache has ceased to exist. He says:
One says e.g. ‘Thank goodness that’s over!’, and not only is this, when said, quite clear without any date 
appended, but it says something which it is impossible that any use of the tenseless copula with a date 
should convey. It certainly doesn’t mean the same thing as, e.g. ‘Thank goodness the date of the 
conclusion of that thing is Friday, June 15, 1954’, even if it be said then. (Nor, for that matter, does it 
mean ‘Thank goodness the conclusion of that thing is contemporaneous with this utterance. Why would 
anyone thank goodness for that?) (1959: 17)
Mellor tackles Prior’s challenge of the purported indispensability of tensed facts thus: the 
utterance ‘Thank goodness that’s over!’ is to be treated as a conjunction of two utterances: 
‘Thank goodness!’ and ‘That’s over’. The second of these two conjuncts, Mellor says, can be 
given tenseless, token-reflexive truth conditions (it could also be given tenseless, dated truth 
conditions, should one prefer). ‘That’s over’ is true, of an event, if that event is earlier than 
the utterance of that token of ‘That’s over’. So, to use MacBeath’s example, if Mellor is 
suffering a headache over being tormented by Prior’s challenge prior to 12 but, having a 
solution occur at 12, the headache ceases, then any utterance of ‘That’s over’, in reference 
to the event of the headache, is true after 12, but not before 12 (1994: 301). So far, so good. 
The first conjunct, however, is where perplexities arise – though we may have token-
reflexive truth conditions for token utterances of ‘That’s over’ (which, in itself, is not very 
surprising), the first conjunct is thanking goodness for something – and Prior says it is 
precisely that something that is an irreducibly tensed fact.
" Mellor denies that one is thanking goodness for a fact. Rather, he says that what one 
is really doing when one thanks goodness is expressing relief, here relief that a painful 
experience has stopped. That is, one feels relief when the painful event is earlier than the 
token utterance of ‘That’s over’. As Mellor says:
…the relief which ‘Thank goodness’ expresses is usually felt only when ‘That’s over’, said of a pain, is 
true, namely, just after a pain has stopped. However, there is a little more to it than that. The 
coincidence of these tenseless conditions is not merely that. The ending of the pain is also, we believe, 
the cause of our relief; and our saying ‘Thank goodness’ in conjunction with ‘That’s over’ expresses, 
among other things, our recognition of this further, tenseless fact’ (1994: 298)
Now, one’s attention may drift to the use of ‘usually’. Mellor introduces this qualification as 
he is concerned about those who, rather than finding relief from the absence of pain, find 
such an absence to occasion unease. Mellor’s own example is a masochist. Nevertheless, 
such a figure, masochist or otherwise, is quite easily dispensed with when one shifts Mellor’s 
analysis to a higher degree of generality. Rather than it being the absence of pain that 
occasions relief, one may need only say that it is the absence of a disvalued experience, or 
the absence of a disvalued event, that occasions relief. This is MacBeath’s amendment to 
Mellor’s account, and it seems to solve the problem of masochism (1994: 306).
" Now, the trouble with this is that it was advantageous for Mellor to have the 
masochist as an example. This is because Mellor is keen to deny that there is any 
necessary connection between relief and the stopping of painful experiences, as he is 
concerned that one may explain why such a necessary connection exists via tense – the 
reason it is natural to experience relief after a painful experience is because the experience 
is past, a tensed fact. The threat is compounded by Mellor’s curiously weak response to the 
question of why relief is natural after a painful experience rather than before: for him, there is 
no answer as to why it is particularly natural. He continues, however, that there is also no 
answer to the question of why relief should be felt when a painful experience is past, rather 
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than present or future. Indeed, he says that one cannot answer the latter question by 
supplying ‘an a priori truth that relief is never felt, in relation to a pain, while the pain is 
present’. (1994: 297) And it is the masochist, Mellor contends, that precludes any such a 
priori truth. 
Bringing masochists within the fold of a generalised principle, MacBeath contends, 
restores the link between pain and relief as an ‘exceptionless necessary truth’ (1994: 308). 
The trade-off, though, is that, apparently, if it is a necessary truth that relief is only 
experienced after a disvalued state of affairs then, a priori, relief can never be felt while a 
pain is present. Thus, according to MacBeath, the best explanation of why relief comes after 
a pain is that the pain is past. 
"  I do not think any opponent of tense should be swayed by this at all and, really, 
neither does MacBeath. But before progressing towards his solution, I think more careful 
attention should be directed towards how relief is dealt with in Mellor. The thanking 
goodness, for Mellor, is not the thanking goodness for any kind of tensed fact. It is, rather, 
the expression of relief, and that expression is caused by the pain being earlier than the 
tokening of the ‘thank goodness’. In effect, it is the pain being earlier than ‘now’. But the 
example is specious, as can be seen if one considers how this fares as an analysis of 
emotions across the board (the problem with Prior’s argument is not the argument itself, as 
such, but with the use of a headache as an example). Consider grief. One does not ‘thank 
goodness’ when experiencing grief at the loss of a loved one, certainly, but there are 
appropriate analogues. Let us amend Mellor’s analysis of emotions for grief – ‘Grief! My 
mother has died’ is the conjunction of two conjuncts ‘Grief!’ and ‘My mother has died’. The 
latter can be given tenseless truth conditions. Any reference to ‘My mother has died’ is true 
at any point after which my mother has died, but not before, just as in the case of the 
headache. ‘Grief’, then, is an expression of a particular kind of sadness that is caused by my 
mother having ceased to exist. So, the emotion that ‘Grief!’ expresses is felt only when ‘My x 
has died’, when said of a person x, is true, namely, just after that person has died, has 
ceased. And that, the Mellorian can say, is entirely consistent with a tenseless metaphysic 
and, more importantly, the analysis adequately vindicates the rationality of any episode of 
grief: I grieve because my mother has ceased to exist.
" First, it is less plausible to consider the relationship between grief and a person 
passing as merely causal. It is not the case that one moment prior to their passing, all is 
well, and one moment after their passing, I am subject to grief. Rather, prior to their passing, 
as the moment of their death grows closer, one experiences a swelling of something akin to 
proto-grief, the growing acknowledgement that their time diminishes. Proto-grief may indeed 
be logically distinct from grief but it is, I think, continuous with it. But the Mellorian analysis 
has grief merely be an expression of an emotion that is felt when it is true to say of a person 
that they have passed. But the first twinges of grief are felt long before it is true to say that. 
The notion of smuggling in truth conditions to emotions occludes their qualities. It is not 
outrageous, further, to suppose there is something like proto-relief, or at least something 
continuous with relief. If anyone dwells on our experiences with pains and the like, one is not 
entirely free of relief one moment, entirely full of relief the next. Rather, as pain calms and 
appears to recede, we experience an onset of cautious relief in response to its fading, 
towards the prospect of being free of pain. In other words, the connection between an 
emotion and the event that occasions it is more fine-grained than the Mellorian analysis 
permits.
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" Second, I say that the plausibility of the Mellorian analysis of grief above is 
deceptive. Certainly, it seems to make very good sense, for both the haecceity presentist 
and the Mellorian agree that grief is rationalised by the object of grief having ceased to exist. 
But my contention is that the plausibility of the Mellorian analysis rests on reading critical 
verbs - ‘died’ and ‘ceased’ - as tensed. In other words, I say the Mellorian is equivocating. 
Reading the verbs as tensed does indeed adequately vindicate grief, for the object of my 
grief has irrevocably vanished from reality, has truly ceased to be. But a tenseless 
understanding of those verbs cannot sanction that understanding: the object of grief is still 
entirely real, though admittedly not presently existing. So the grief, really, is not occasioned 
by the object of grief ceasing to be simplicitier, but rather by the object of grief having the 
entirety of their temporal extent earlier than the expression of ‘Grief!’. But, the haecceity 
presentist should ask in the same tenor as Prior, why would anyone grieve for that?
" However, the Mellorian can produce an obvious retort to what the haecceity 
presentist has said: certainly, the object of grief is real with respect to all times, but the 
haecceity presentist charge of equivocation is baseless, for grief can be vindicated by noting 
that I grieve because the object of grief does not exist now, at the time of the tokening of 
‘Grief!’. It is certainly not strange to imagine that an episode of grief might be caused by the 
entire temporal extent of a person being earlier than a tokening of ‘Grief!’ if one bear this in 
mind. I am grieving, in short, because - presently - myself and my mother are not 
simultaneous, and will not be simultaneous again. All of this is consistent with a tenseless 
reading of ‘died’ or ‘ceased’.
" The haecceity presentist can, I think, fairly ask ‘Simultaneity of what?’. Responding 
‘Myself and my mother’ does not answer the question properly, for what persons are 
according to tenseless theories of persistence may very well threaten the vindication of 
episodes of grief. And, indeed, this is what I argue in section 6.4. Thus, in stressing 
simultaneity, I say the Mellorian has strayed into an argument rooted in tenseless theories of 
persistence rather than the B-theory more generally, and politely request that the reader wait 
until section 6.4, where this concern is addressed.
" I still do not think the Mellorian will be swayed by this: in fact, I know she will not, as 
Mellor himself (1981, 1994: 23-38) is well aware of the need for tensed beliefs:
...tensed beliefs are indispensable, not only for timely action in general and timely conversation in 
particular, but also for the conscious communication, sincere and insincere, of anything at all, tensed or 
tenseless. And the reason in both cases is that no agent, and above all no user of language, can do 
without token-reflexive beliefs. So, far from the tenseless view of time, with its token-reflexive analysis of 
tensed belief, implying that tensed beliefs are dispensable, it alone explains exactly why they are not 
(1994: 36)
And this is certainly true for a number of tensed beliefs. My belief that ‘The meeting starts 
now’, a tensed, indexical belief, is made true by a tenseless fact, ‘The meeting starts at 1PM, 
09/11/37’. But I do not go to the meeting because it starts at 1PM, 09/11/37, and I could have 
believed all along it starts at 1PM, 09/11/37 without that making me go the meeting at all 
(Perry, 1979), but clearly the indexical belief itself is not some extra, special fact. And that, 
the Mellorian will say, is the same thing with grief. My belief that ‘I grieve my mother’s 
passing’ is made true by ‘My mother dies on 10/10/40’. But I do not grieve for that tenseless 
fact, and I could know it the entire time without me grieving if I do not know that 10/10/40 is 
‘now’. But that is not some extra, special fact.
" But grief escapes the categories of ‘timely action in general and timely conversation’, 
nor is it an element, essentially, of conscious communication (thought it can be consciously 
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communicated). Grief’s relation to action, too, is not as simple, and takes various, 
sometimes unpredictable, forms: I may refuse to eat or wash, withdraw, abuse alcohol or 
drugs and so on. But what is really crucial is that the purported tenseless truth conditions of 
the tensed belief do not adequately vindicate the importance of the emotion and its 
connection to our actions. The problem, as I see it, is that the Mellorian analysis forces us 
into something like what Gale (2002: 84) remarks on as follows: ‘If the past-present-future 
perspective were to be non-objective, an agent’s axiological biases in favour of the future 
would be merely subjective. There would be a serious and depressing bifurcation between 
agents and nature’. On a similar note, if we turn to Cockburn (1998: 84): ‘The problem for 
the four-dimensionalist is to show how anything like our current emotional life might be 
consistent with the claim that ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ events all have the same kind of 
reality and so, in themselves, are all of the same significance’
" Just as we demonstrably have certain axiological biases towards the future, I believe 
we too have certain axiological biases towards the past. Grief is one such example, 
nostalgia another. And if the distinction between past, present and future is non-objective, as 
Gale remarks above, then the importance of that bias, the way in which it shapes our 
conduct and self-conception, our relationship to others and the world, is diminished, if not 
lost. Violence is done to the equilibrium and legitimacy of our emotional lives and the 
emotions themselves. The submission of emotions as reasons for actions that are not 
squarely perfunctory, like attending a meeting, may possibly become problematic too, as the 
‘bifurcation of man and nature’ takes hold, and moral reasoning that involves emotional 
reactions, and the kinds of biases such reactions latch on to, become artefacts of subjective 
preferences, almost arbitrary. This, ultimately, is why I demur from the Mellorian analysis.
MacBeath himself goes on to pursue an analogous strategy when arguing against 
the Mellorian analysis, though his tactics are different. MacBeath’s example is actually one 
of Prior’s: it is that of relief at not having to sit an examination again. This is MacBeath’s 
gloss:
Consider, for example, a father who, looking at his daughter on 1 June 1982 as she studies for her 
finals, says, ‘Thank goodness I’m never going to sit another examination’. Maybe the idiom of thanking 
goodness for facts is indeed tendentious, but what alternative account would Mellor offer of what the 
remark amounts to, or of what it expresses relief, surely, is not being expressed…Gladness looks like 
the best candidate; but we cannot say of gladness what Mellor says of relief in relation to his headache 
when he claims that the relief expressed by ‘Thank goodness that’s over’ is ‘not necessarily relief from 
or about anything, just relief’ (1994: 309)"
MacBeath goes on ‘...even if the truth conditions of the sentence ‘I’m never going to sit 
another examination’ can be stated tenselessly, it is not the fact that consists in the obtaining 
of those truth conditions that the father is glad about’. And that, I think is correct, as is the 
thought that Mellor’s denial of the intentionality of emotional expressions, like ‘Thank 
goodness’, does not work in more complicated circumstances than pains and their 
corresponding reliefs once those pains have ceased.
" That, however, is as far as I agree with MacBeath. His favoured solution to the 
problem of tensed facts for opponents of tense is that what one thanks goodness for is an 
‘intentional fact’. An ‘intentional fact’, curiously, need not be a fact. In the case of the father 
thanking goodness for not sitting another exam, MacBeath says we are not implying that, 
indeed, he will not sit another exam after his utterance. But, should the father’s belief prove 
true, then it is indeed a fact that the father thanks goodness for – but not a tensed fact! 
Rather, should the father’s belief be true, it is true because of a tenseless fact, ‘the fact that 
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he never sits another examination after the time at which he holds the belief’ (note that 
MacBeath moves between ‘facts’ and beliefs himself). Finally, MacBeath acknowledges that 
it is not this tenseless fact that the father thanks goodness for. Rather, what the father thanks 
goodness for is indeed the ‘intentional fact’. His thanking goodness connects not with ‘what 
is the case’ but ‘what is believed to be the case’ (1994: 310). But what is believed to be the 
case is made true (if it is true) by a tenseless fact. Thus, we need not admit tensed facts, but 
we do have irreducibly tensed beliefs, in the same fashion that indexicals may be irreducible.
" It seems quite simple to reraise Prior’s question against MacBeath’s analysis – when 
the father thanks goodness for never having to sit another examination, he is not thanking 
goodness for his belief he is never going to sit another examination. One can thank 
goodness for beliefs – say I go home, worried that I left the oven on, only to find that is not 
on, though I did leave the iron on. ‘Thank goodness I believed I left the oven on!’, I might 
say. But that it is not what is happening with the father. So the father does not thank 
goodness for a tenseless fact, and does not thank goodness for a tensed belief that is made 
true, if it even is true, by a tenseless fact.
" MacBeath does anticipate this objection but his response is woolly, and depends 
upon whether one is willing to buy into his ‘intentional facts’. MacBeath reiterates that he is 
not thanking goodness for his belief. Rather, he is thanking goodness that he is never going 
to sit another examination, which is what he believes to be the case. And if the belief is true, 
then it is made by a tenseless fact. 
" I still do not understand, precisely, what it is the father is thanking goodness for on 
MacBeath’s view, other than the ‘intentional fact’, which may very well not be a fact, that he 
is not going to sit another exam (which is something be believes to be the case). But none of 
this is any clearer. My concern with ‘intentional facts’ is that something being a fact suggests 
the existence of what the fact pertains to (indeed, that seems constitutive of a fact). And the 
fact the father and examination example suggests is a tensed fact, not a tensed belief, and, 
indeed, MacBeath is explicit in suggesting the father is not thanking goodness for a tensed 
belief, but rather the state of his affairs itself, which he believes to be true. MacBeath again 
anticipates something like this but merely reiterates his position once more. His get out 
revolves around the father thanking goodness for something he believes to be a fact, but not 
thanking goodness for his belief, which, rather happily, seems to exonerate him of the 
problem of facts suggesting the existence of what they are about while not having his relief 
be directed towards a belief that he will never sit another examination. I think MacBeath’s 
solution has an air of cheating to it. 
" Regardless of these worries concerning intentional facts, MacBeath’s solution, in 
seeking to deny tensed facts and the objectivity of tense, is vulnerable to the same worry as 
the Mellorian analysis: our emotions and emotional lives lose their vindication and 
rationalisation, and the substantivity of emotions in reasoning (morally, aesthetically, in 
empathetic dialogue and so on) diminishes owing to their distance from reality, from what, at 
the fundamental level, is. MacBeath fares better on preserving the equilibrium of our 
emotional lives, for he is willing to countenance some sort of factuality for tense, albeit in a 
way that is not straightforward. But my original complaint remains: once again, Gale’s 
‘bifurcation of man and nature’ has occurred.
" One response to this I have encountered, and one that manifests at various points of 
what I argue throughout the thesis, is a good friend of the incongruous stare: the indifferent 
shrug, the ‘so what?’. I sympathise with Lewis here, in that it feels like something I cannot 
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really defeat, as it is not an explicitly philosophical point. Unlike Lewis, however, I feel it is 
overwhelmingly obvious why someone ought to care, for surrendering emotions to the 
entirely subjective destroys, or at least strongly diminishes, their capacity to be rationalised 
and offer rationalisation for our actions, thinking and ethical projects. That is a very alienating 
thing, and something to be considered in the process of our evaluation of the positive and 
negatives of a theory. One is obviously free to opt for the path of declaring emotions to be 
incapable of rationalisation, or to not hold the value and weight we typically ascribe to them, 
but with this also comes the responsibility of making sense of their role with any such 
revisionary metaphysic: a mereological nihilist who simply said ‘There are no composite 
objects, that’s it, deal with it!’ would not persuade us of very much, and I say the same is true 
with the denier of rational emotions.
" In conclusion, then, I think both Mellor’s and MacBeath’s B-theoretic solutions to the 
purported need for tensed facts fail, and the rationalisation and vindication of grief is not 
possible under eternalism, and thus the B-theory.
6.3 - Second Prong: That Perdurance and Stage Theory Cannot Vindicate and 
Rationalise Grief – Rejecting Non-Presentist Endurance
Here is the argument I presented earlier concerning the relationship between the B-theory 
and perdurtantism and stage theory:
(1) The B-theory entails perdurantism and stage theory.
(2) Grief, to be intelligible and rational, requires appeal to presentist enduring entities.
Therefore:
(3) Grief is neither intelligible nor rational on B-theory.
One may deny premise (1) or premise (2). I think both are true, so I will argue against the 
denial of both: premise (1) in a moment, and (2) when discussing grief for tenseless theories 
of persistence. Additionally, as my argument also establishes that endurantism requires 
presentism to be effective as a theory of persistence, any A-theories that believe in non-
present times also cannot rationalise grief.
" Earlier in this chapter, I discussed Lewis’ rationale for believing in perdurantism. The 
rationale, in essence, concerned the problem of temporary intrinsics, and how one thing (like 
a person) can be F (straight, say) at t1 and also fail to be F (bent, say) at t2. Lewis’ solution 
is that the entity itself is never straight or bent, but rather some of its temporal parts are. 
Stage theorists, like Sider (2001) and Hawley (2004), say that person stages are F or fail to 
be F. So entities themselves are indeed F or fail to be F, in contrast to perdurantism, but 
persons, strictly, span a very short duration, the greater continuity of stages related to one 
another via a temporal counterpart relation. Both of these solutions, which are B-theoretic, 
solve the problem.
" However, though it is common for B-theorists to be perdurantists or stage theorists, is 
there an entailment from B-theory to perdurance or stage theory? Some philosophers think 
no, and that one can coherently combine some form of endurantism with non-presentist 
theories. 
" What makes this difficult is the following: the B-theory says there are many times that 
exist. An enduring object exists at all those times simpliciter. There are times when one and 
the same enduring entity is F, and times when one and the same enduring entity is not F. But 
this is contradictory. Thus, the B-theory and endurantism are not compatible.
" Peter van Inwagen (1990) argues that properties like temporary intrinsics (intrinsic 
monadic properties) are actually relations to times. Thus, when we say A is F at t1, and not F 
at t2, what we are really saying is that A has the being F relation to t1, but fails to have the 
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being F relation to t2. Sally Haslanger (1989) argues that intrinsic monadic properties are as 
they appear, and not actually relations to times, but that the instantiation of these properties 
is not simpliciter i.e. intrinsic monadic properties are only ever instantiated in a certain way. 
So, a is F at t1-ly, but not F at t2-ly. Mark Johnston (1987: 129) too suggests ‘relativizing the 
instantiation relation’ in a fashion similar to Haslanger.
" Though each theory is consistent in offering a version of non-presentist endurance, 
Ross Cameron (2015: 153) is unconvinced that any theory of non-presentist endurance can 
satisfactorily account for changes in appearance. Cameron says that:
A theory of how I persist through time must account for not just how it can consistently be the case that I 
am now 6ft tall but was 5ft tall, but must account for why, when you look at me now, I appear to be 6ft 
tall but do not appear to be 5ft tall, and why, when you looked at me when I was ten years old, I 
appeared to be 5ft tall but did not appear to be 6ft tall (2015: 153)
" As Cameron notes, the solution is simple for presentist endurantists, for I simply am 
6ft tall now, as given that only the present exists, how I am presently is how I am simpliciter 
(and when I was presently 5ft, I was 5ft simpliciter then). And the perdurantist can say that 
the reason I look 6ft now (i.e. on this date and time, or at the moment of this thought or 
utterance) is that the temporal part you perceive now is 6ft, and the temporal part you would 
have perceived when Cameron was 10 was 5ft. The stage theorist can say something very 
similar, just involving person stages and noting that the instantiation of those properties was 
also simpliciter.
" But non-presentist endurantists are not able to offer this solution. This is because, as 
endurantist views, whenever you encounter an entity, you are encountering it wholly i.e. in its 
entirety. But if I am encountering an entity in its entirety, why is it the case that I perceive the 
entity as 6ft now and not 5ft?
" Someone who holds van Inwagen’s view would say the following: I bear the is 6ft 
relation to the present time, t1, and the is 5ft at relation to some past time, t2. But, as 
Cameron notes:
...my standing in those relations to those times is not itself subject to change...I always (at least, at every 
moment at which I exist) bear the is 6ft relation to t1 and the is 5ft relation to t2. A fortiori I bear the is 6ft 
relation to t1 and is 5ft relation to t2 now. Why, then, do I now look 6ft tall and not 5ft tall?  (2015: 154)
The van Inwagen style theorist cannot say I look 6ft tall now because I: 1) bear the is 
6ft relation to t1 and 2) t1 is now, as this is an examination of a kind of endurance theory 
within the context of the B-theory, so the van Inwagen style theorist cannot help themselves 
to an objective now. As a non-presentist endurantist, the van Inwagen theorist holds that 
both t1 and t2 are equally real. So, the obtaining of the relations between the is 5ft at relation 
and t2 and the is 6ft relation at t1 are both equally real. But, when you look at Ross (and for 
the non-presentist endurantist, you look at all of Ross, for he exists wholly and entirely at 
any point in time), he is 6ft, not 5ft. The van Inwagen style theorist, Cameron contends, has 
no resources to explain why he appears thus, given that there is no metaphysical reason to 
privilege one relational fact over the other.
" And so it goes for anyone who opts for the Haslanger/Johnston style theory of B-
theoretic endurance, where the instantiation relation is relativised. Ross has the property of 
being 6ft tall t1-ly and being 5ft tall t2-ly. However, as a theory of non-presentist endurance, 
he has those two properties in those two ways now. But, when you look at Ross, you only 
see him as being 6ft tall. Likewise, when t2 was present, you would see Ross as being 5ft 
tall. In other words, why is there a change in appearance – a change in Ross’s height – 
without a corresponding change in properties?
" The temptation is to respond in the same fashion as the van Inwagen style theorist: 
Ross appears 6ft tall now as he has the property t1-ly and t1 is now. But the same response 
to the van Inwagen theorist applies. There is nothing to privilege t1 over any other time, and 
I am wholly and entirely present at any time I exist. Given that t1 and t2 are equally real also, 
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I am 6ft t1-ly and 5ft t2-ly simpliciter. But, when you look at Ross, he appears 6ft, despite 
having is 6ft tall one way and is 5ft tall another way. And at any time you look at Ross this is 
true. So why does he appear in different ways at different times? Again, there is no 
straightforward answer.
" Thus, I follow Cameron in thinking that their failure to explain changes in the 
appearance of objects is sufficient to reject them. A B-theorist should opt for perdurantism or 
stage theory, as the metaphysics of the B-theory entails perdurance or stage theory.
6.4 - Second Prong: That Perdurance and Stage Theory Cannot Vindicate and 
Rationalise Grief – Rationalising Grief for Perdurantists and Stage Theorists
Having argued that the B-theory entails perdurance and stage theory, I now wish to 
construct a theory for the rationalisation of grief for perdurantists and stage theorists that, 
ultimately, I shall urge we reject. This is in response to the second premise of the second 
prong of my attack: grief, to be intelligible and rational, requires appeal to presentist 
enduring entities. Should a theory that uses perduring or stage theoretic entities be able to 
rationalise or render grief intelligible for those entities, then the second premise of my 
argument is false and the argument fails.
" First, however, I wish to briefly reconstruct the haecceity presentist analysis of grief, 
and how it rationalises and vindicates grief. This will be useful not only as a refresher, but 
also to have the salient features of the theory ready to contrast with the perdurantist and 
stage theorist analyses of grief I shall soon introduce.
As I said earlier: on the haecceity presentist analysis, grief is a propositional attitude 
that has a propositional object: should I be grieving my mother, my grief is an attitude 
towards the proposition <My mother, a very important and cherished figure in my life, is 
gone>. If the proposition is singular, then, following the haecceity presentist analysis of 
singular propositions, the proposition is about my mother in virtue of the proposition 
constitutively depending on her haecceity. That is, her haecceity confers upon the 
proposition genuinely singular content. This allows the haecceity presentist to avoid the 
apparent incoherence in maintaining that grief is an attitude towards an object that has 
ceased to exist, which asserts that grief is about something that is not. The haecceity 
conferring singular content allows the haecceity to characterise its object without demanding 
that one assent to the existence of that object. Thus, the haecceity characterises its object in 
such a fashion that points to its former existence, its pastness. This is why haecceity 
presentism entails endurantism: entities are wholly and entirely present at all times they 
exist. Only the present exists. Thus, objects not located in the present have no existence at 
all. The emotion of grief, its hold, sway and importance to our actions and thoughts, is 
vindicated and rationalised by the ‘deep’ and important fact that the person we grieve has 
indelibly ceased.
" So that is the haecceity presentist analysis of grief. As I have said, it entails 
endurantism, and enduring entities are important for its rationalisation of grief. What about a 
B-theorist? I have argued, previously, that one should not opt for non-presentist theories of 
endurantism as a B-theorist, for they cannot make sense of the changes in appearances of 
objects. So, a B-theorist should be a perdurantist or a stage theorist. One will recall, too, that 
the second prong of my attack had the premise that grief requires enduring entities for its 
intelligibility and rationalisation. Of course, those who are perdurantists and stage theorists 
will look to deny this. So now is the time, as promised earlier, to develop a theory of the 
rationalisation of grief for perdurantists and stage theorists.
Let us begin with perdurance: for perdurantists, objects are something like spacetime 
worms, spread out in time as in space, the wormlike temporal object being the mereological 
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sum of its temporal parts; that is, the temporally extended object that is you is the sum of all 
its temporal parts. On this view of persistence, there are, for example, times when me and 
my grandfather have contemporaneous temporal parts, times when I have temporal parts 
that are later than his last temporal part, and times when my grandfather has temporal parts 
that are earlier than my first temporal part. For the stage theorists, each person stage is an 
entity simpliciter, and not an aspect of a greater aggregate. Nevertheless, there is a 
temporal counterpart relation that obtains between, for example, grandfather-person-
stage-1, grandfather-person-stage-2, grandfather-person-stage-3 (and Kyle-person-
stage-1....) and so on, such that there are times when there are contemporaneous Kyle- and 
grandfather-person-stages, times when there are Kyle-person-stages later than the last 
grandfather-person-stage, and times when there are grandfather-person-stages earlier than 
the first Kyle-person-stage.
"  With this in mind, perdurantists and stage theorists may seek to rationalise grief as 
follows: imagine the dreadful anguish of having one’s child taken away and permanently 
exiled to an island, never to leave its borders. The anguish would not decrease in its 
intensity if one is reminded they continue to exist there. Or imagine the longing and sadness 
of a husband whose wife is jailed. She exists, but that is of no comfort, for she does not exist 
here with him, like the child on the island. And, the perdurantist or stage theorist says, 
though my grandfather still exists tenselessly, there are no temporal parts of him/
grandfather-person-stages that exist now, where now is taken to be a temporal indexical 
picking out the temporal part/Kyle-person-stage simultaneous with my utterance (or date and 
time, if you prefer). I grieve, then, that one of his temporal parts/a grandfather-person-stage 
is not contemporaneous with my present temporal part/Kyle-person-stage, where present is 
again understood indexically.
" Or, perhaps, it is not merely that a temporal part/person-stage of the entity that 
constitutes my grief is not contemporaneous with my present temporal part/Kyle-person-
stage (and cannot be, as all temporal parts/person-stages are earlier), but that one of the 
temporal parts/person-stages of a perduring or stage theoretic entity will no longer have 
experiences that are contemporaneous with my experiences; that is, they will not come to 
enjoy new experiences, instantiate new properties, and so on. Thus, when one says ‘I wish 
they were here, now’ about a departed loved one, what one wishes is that a temporal part of 
them (or a person-stage) were present such that they could experience what I am 
experiencing. And this might explain the force behind such wistful remarks as ‘I wish my 
grandfather were here to see my graduation/his great-grandson/my wedding’, and so on. 
Here, it is not just grief that there are no contemporaneous temporal parts or stages, but also 
the wish that there be contemporaneous temporal parts or stages that stand in a relation of 
contemporaneous experiences. 
" So, explaining grief seems to be within the perdurantist’s and stage theorist’s grasp. 
Ultimately, such emotions are to be explained in terms of two (or more) perduring or stage 
theoretic entities and the temporal relations that hold between certain temporal parts or 
person stages. Such an explanation, then, is perspectival, and the attitude may be described 
as a perspectival attitude: grief is intelligible only with respect to the perspective of a 
temporal part or person stage, and that part or person stage’s relation to another temporal 
part or person stage of the object that constitutes that grief. 
For example, my grieving at t2 is a perspectival attitude, as it involves my temporal 
part or person stage at t2 grieving that one of the temporal parts or person stages of my 
grandfather, say, is at t1. And the same is true of wishing: my wish at t4 that my grandfather 
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could witness my graduation is the wish that my grandfather, who has a temporal part or 
person stage at t1, could have a temporal part or person stage at t4 such that it could enjoy 
contemporaneous experiences with the temporal part that is wishing. Such an explanation 
demonstrates that grieving and wishing are consistent with perdurantism or stage theory, as 
long as one is willing to understand grieving and the like as perspectival attitudes in which 
grief is only intelligible in relation to a temporal part or person stage. 
Furthermore, the explanation complements the prevalent eternalist attitude that tense 
may play many important roles psychologically, in terms of action and belief, for example (‘I 
know the meeting is soon, so I shall run to its location), that may not be given tenseless 
translations but nevertheless make no serious demands on ontology.
" The difficulty with this explanation of grief, as I see it, is one of arbitrariness. Let us 
articulate an example: say that it is now t2. My grandfather died at t1, and his last happy, 
conscious temporal part is located at t0. A later temporal part of mine is located at t3. Let us 
say I am done with my grieving then, reconciled to the loss of my grandfather (well, that his 
latest happy temporal part is located at t0, its lack of contemporaneity with t3 bothering me 
less than it did at t2). 
" But here is an issue: why do I grieve at t2, but not t3? Indeed, it is reasonable that 
people eventually stop grieving, so it is not surprising that one of my later temporal parts 
should not experience grief. But why do I experience grief at t2 at all? Purportedly, because, 
at t2, I have no temporal parts contemporaneous with my grandfather’s last happy one. But 
then there are manifold temporal parts later than t2 where I have no contemporaneous parts 
with my grandfather, and I do not grieve at most of them. There seems to be something 
about t2 in addition to having no contemporaneous parts with my grandfather’s last happy 
one that provokes the grief. But what could it be?
" Perhaps at t2, but not at t3, there is some property that distinguishes my t2 temporal 
part from my t3 temporal part, its instantiation explaining my grief at t2, it not being 
instantiated at t3 explaining the absence of my grief. It cannot be that my temporal part at t2, 
but not t3, has the property experiencing grief, for why my temporal part at t2 is experiencing 
grief is what is at issue. Perhaps it is some property of ‘temporal distance’? Grief is at its 
most fulminant after a death, and tends to dissipate with time. So, at t2, I am 1 day later than 
the last temporal part of my grandfather and at t3, 301 days later than the last temporal part 
of my grandfather. 
But this is peculiar. Firstly, to make a Priorian argument again, why on Earth would 
anyone’s grief dissipate with the realisation that my present temporal part is now 301 days 
later than my grandfather’s last temporal part? It is not as if one is grieving, suddenly 
becomes conscious of the temporal distance between parts, and then becomes persuaded 
to stop grieving. Further, why should distance be of any substantial importance? The B-
series stands in tenseless relations of earlier than, later than and simultaneous with. 
Introducing finer temporal metrics, such as n days later than, is just to provide a more fine 
grained tenseless relation - the tenseless manifold stands exactly as it was, and being told 
that the t2 temporal part is 1 day later than the last happy temporal part of my grandfather 
and that the t3 part is 301 days later is still, ultimately, simply to say that both are later than 
the last temporal part. If we take the B-theory seriously, then those relations have held, do 
hold, and always will hold. The relation between the temporal parts specified is eternal, and 
introducing the days between such relations merely provides a more specific description of 
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what was, ontologically speaking, already the case. I have not been told why I grieve at t2 
but not t3, or what makes my lack of grief at t3 rational or appropriate over my grief at t2 
(and vice versa).
" Perhaps it will be replied that the perdurantist and stage theorist analyses of grief 
does not, explicitly, capture what it is to grieve. But what it does do is provide something like 
the correctness or appropriate conditions for grief. It cannot provide the truth conditions of 
grief, because I cannot think of what it would be to grieve truly. But grief can be correct, 
perhaps, if it is appropriate for its object. And the serious metaphysics behind grief being 
correct, or appropriate, is that one’s temporal part under consideration is later than the last 
temporal part of the entity that constitutes one’s grief. That is all it takes for grief to be 
appropriate, as it entails there are no contemporaneous temporal parts. Certain further 
psychological attitudes, like the phenomenological component of the grief, why one grieves 
at t2 rather than t3 and so on, are to be understood as egocentric, and an artefact of how, 
psychologically, we situate ourselves temporally.
" This sits well with what the hardline defender of tenseless grief might suggest are the 
metaphysical facts about grief: no, things do not cease to exist. What, strictly speaking, grief 
amounts to is no contemporaneous temporal parts or stages, in the fashion of the latest 
temporal part or stage of the object of grief being earlier than a certain temporal part or 
stage of the griever. And though the object of grief has not exited existence, this provides the 
ground for the psychological explanation of grief. In a B-theoretic, strict sense, the griever 
and the grieved are still isolated such that they have no contemporaneous temporal parts, 
and this forms the basis of an A-theoretic, entirely egocentric and psychological 
representation of the grieved as gone, ceased. So grief, as it is felt, is a product of the 
human psychological tendency to represent things A-theoretically, but what grounds that 
representation is no tensed fact, but rather the B-theoretic picture of a temporal part of the 
griever standing in a B-relation to a temporal part of the grieved, the B-theoretic fact 
represented A-theoretically by the griever. Maybe this can be joined with some kind of 
evolutionary story about how human psychology has evolved to make use of A-theoretic 
representations, though it would need to be one which explained the evolutionary role of 
grief.
" But I do not find think this is an explanation of grief. Here is why: imagine we live in a 
fully deterministic universe, but we humans psychologise any choice we make as free. There 
is an evolutionary story for this, perhaps that decisions made that we think are free are 
quicker, which confers a survival advantage. So while, strictly speaking, no choice is ever 
free, we humans egocentrically and psychologically represent such decisions as free. But 
this does not explain freedom to choose. It eliminates it, while trying to preserve an anaemic 
nod to it that is so wildly different from our standard concept of freedom to choose so as to 
be entirely alien. Note, I am not saying that our concepts dictate our metaphysics. But if one 
chooses a metaphysics that makes no real room for the freedom to choose, one should be 
honest about it. Rather, what has been explained here is the basis of our illusion of the 
freedom to choose. And, analogously, I say that the eternalist explanation of grief should be 
honest and say that they have an explanation of the illusion of grief.
" That itself sounds strange. One can have the illusion of the freedom of choice, for 
there is no phenomenal component that corresponds to such a freedom in making a 
decision (one does not, I think, feel a free choice). But there is no illusion of grief, for part of 
grieving is its phenomenal character (recall the earlier difficulty in the eternalist analysis of 
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grief sundering grief from its felt qualities). But, in an important sense, we are the victim of a 
deceit; imagine the mother grieving her dead son on some misinformation. She might be 
experiencing grief but she is deceived about the grounds for it, for she believes her son is 
dead. When he pops through the door, she ceases to grieve because she understands she 
was the victim of misinformation, and that her grieving was without cause. So while we may 
not be experiencing illusory grief, what occasions the grief is itself something like an illusion. 
And if that is the case on the tenseless analysis, it is difficult to see what is left of grief as we 
typically understand it.
Indeed, I think nothing is left, for the tenseless analysis of grief seems to tell me that 
my grief is a mistake, and grieving involves a lack of fit between metaphysics and 
psychology. All the psychological explanation does is demonstrate that the ‘proper’ eternalist 
explanation involving temporal parts and stages is inadequate, and the ‘grief’ is shifted to a 
relationship between tensless facts and A-theoretic representation. So here is my 
contention: the eternalist must either maintain a tenseless analysis of grief that is 
inadequate, or urge us to give up on grief entirely. 
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Chapter 7 – The Moral Dimension of Perdurance and Stage Theory
"
This chapter is concerned with the ethical dimension of perdurance and stage theory. In the 
previous chapter concerning grief, I spoke quite loosely of temporal parts and person stages 
having certain episodes of experience, like grieving and wishing, and left that unchallenged. 
I still argued that perdurance and stage theory could not offer a sufficiently robust account of 
grief to preserve its importance in our emotional lives. However, what if we were to challenge 
the assumption that such objects – temporal parts and person stages – could experience 
such things? Here, I wish to argue that they cannot experience things like grief and wishes, 
and explore the kind of consequences this has for our notion of responsibility, understanding 
of ourselves morally, and the sort of moral projects we typically undertake, such as 
rehabilitation.
"
The argument against perdurance and stage theory has the following structure:
1) Regret for, and rehabilitation in respect of, a past misdeed requires an intelligible 
relation of responsibility to be rational.
2) Perdurance and stage theory do not permit an intelligible relation of responsibility.
Therefore
3) One cannot rationally regret, or a rationally experience rehabilitation in respect of, a 
past misdeed under perdurantism and stage theory.
I also argue, in addition to 2), that stage theory makes certain obviously true attributions of 
moral blameworthiness and responsibility false.
By rationally, as previously, I mean that the emotion and state in question – regret 
and rehabilitation – lack the deep vindication I believe they require in order to justify their 
role in our emotional lives. And the role of regret and rehabilitation in our emotional, ethical 
and, should one be a theist, religious lives is very important. Regret shapes and informs our 
subsequent conduct, prudentially and morally, and the manner in which our conduct is 
subsequently informed can be salutary. Sometimes, we regret very great errors, and may 
strive to be rehabilitated, importantly free of our previous disgrace, but nevertheless the 
bearer of its trace. Both regret and rehabilitation are important to the development of people, 
crucial to explanations of certain actions, and central to some of our ethical projects. They 
are pivotal to our emotional equilibrium, and any theory that cannot justify that importance is, 
I argue, weaker compared to one that can. My contention is that perdurance and stage 
theory cannot accommodate that importance as these theories of persistence cannot 
provide an intelligible relation of responsibility.
" This has consequences, too, for emotions and states within the vicinity of regret. 
Forgiveness, for example, has an intimate connection with regret and rehabilitation, as does 
guilt, for what is crucial about our experience of regret or our feeling that we are successfully  
rehabilitated is that there is some event for which we are responsible that is causing those 
experiences.
"
! 7.1 – Perdurance and Stage Theory: No Candidates for Responsibility
Here, I shall argue that we ought to reject perdurantism and stage theory as theories of 
persistence. This is because, under perdurance and stage theory, people do not act; only 
their temporal parts or person stages do. So, human persons do not act, and thus cannot be 
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responsible for actions. Consequently, there is no rational way of regretting or experiencing 
guilt, or undertaking a project of rehabilitation (and many more things, but I am focusing on 
the ethical and moral dimensions of tenseless theories of persistence). For my arguments 
here, I shall be looking closely at: 1) what sort of thing is a person, according to perdurance 
and stage theory; and 2) what does persistence consist in, according to perdurance and 
stage theory i.e., what does it mean to say that the person p is the same person at t1 and at 
t2. I first argue strictly against perdurance to establish my line of attack and then apply that 
line of attack to stage theory: this is because the arguments are almost identical, their tenor 
simply transposed to dealing with person stages rather than temporal parts (though person 
stages do introduce an additional complication to the dialectic, as they are explicitly persons, 
though of a very small duration).
The answer to 1) for the perdurantist is that a person is, to quote Lewis (1986c: 306) 
‘a temporally extended composite object whose parts tenselessly and changelessly occupy 
certain temporal locations’. 
The perdurantist answer to 1) leads to trouble for the answer to 2). This is because, 
in a strict sense, it is misguided to ask what it means to say that Kyle-at-t1 is the same 
person as Kyle-at-t2, for neither Kyle-at-t1 nor Kyle-at-t2 are persons at all; rather, they are 
temporal parts of Kyle, the person. And, further, they are not identical at all, for they are 
simply different temporal parts of me, just as my different spatial parts of me, equally real as 
they are, are not identical. In summary: 
…on the relational view, where our identity is based upon a relation between different stages, it is 
alleged that we do not have one person who performed the crime and is later on trial for it. Rather, there 
is one stage where an evil deed is taking a place, but there is no self-same substance that exists at both 
times (Oaklander, 2003: 161)
Such a suggestion is not a new one. It was made in outline, ante litteram, by Thomas Reid:
Our consciousness, our memory, and every operation of the mind, are still flowing like the water of a 
river, or like time itself. The consciousness I have this moment can no more be the same consciousness 
I had last moment, than this moment can be the last moment. Identity can only be affirmed of things 
which have a continued existence. Consciousness, and every kind of thought, are transient and 
momentary, and have no continued existence; and, therefore, if personal identity consisted in 
consciousness, it would certainly follow, that no man is the same person any two moments of his life; 
and as the right and justice of reward and punishment are founded on personal identity, no man could 
be responsible for his actions (1969: 360)
And in a more technical tenor:
…a tenseless view of time goes hand-in-hand with a view of persons according to which a person-at-a-
moment is only loosely identical (genidentical) with the ‘same person’ at other times in its career (Hoy, 
1978:275)
Thus, perdurance is incompatible with the thought that Kyle-at-t1 is strictly identical with 
Kyle-at-t2, given that both exist tenselessly. And if that is the case, to whom do we attribute 
moral responsibility for past actions? That is, to which individual is responsibility to be 
assigned?
The first option is to say that I am responsible. But I, on the perdurance view, do not 
do anything at all, for what ‘I’ am amounts to, in Lewis’ terms, is ‘a very complex temporal 
solid embedded in a tenseless spatiotemporal matrix with other objects and events and 
standing in changeless causal relations to other existents’ (1986c: 307). Attributions of 
responsibility to such an entity are scarcely intelligible, for this aggregate is not conscious, 
and it does not act.
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The second option is to say that my temporal part at t2 – the part in the dock, say, in 
Oaklander’s earlier remark - is responsible for what my temporal part at t1 – the part that 
committed the crime – did. Lewis notes two difficulties with such a suggestion: 1) why should 
my temporal part at t2 be held responsible for what my temporal part at t1 has done?; and 2) 
what does it mean to attribute responsibility to a temporal part? For temporal parts ‘…don’t 
kill anyone, or rob banks, or tell lies.’ (Lewis, 1986c: 308). He notes, further, that the 
performance of such actions would rather require a contiguous series of temporal parts, but 
those seem no better suited as bearers of responsibility than a single temporal part.
Crucial to this strategy is the denial that temporal parts can kill, rob banks or tell lies, 
and it would seem entirely sensible for a defender of perdurance to apply pressure here. 
Peter Geach frames a version of Lewis’ line of thinking as follows:
McTaggart in 1901 was a philosopher holding Hegel's dialectic to be valid, and McTaggart in 1921 was a 
philosopher not holding Hegel's dialectic to be valid'. If we regarded 'McTaggart in 1901' and 'McTaggart 
in 1921' as designating two individuals, then we must also say they designate two philosophers: one 
philosopher believing Hegel's dialectic to be valid, and another philosopher believing Hegel's dialectic 
not to be valid. To be sure, on the view I am criticizing, the phrases 'McTaggart in 1901' and 'McTaggart 
in 1921' would not designate two philosophers, but two temporal slices of one philosopher. But just that 
is the trouble: for a predicate like 'philosopher believing so-and-so' can of course be true only of a 
philosopher, not of a temporal slice of a philosopher. So if our example, which is a plain and true 
empirical pro- position, were construed as a conjunction of two predications about time slices of 
McTaggart, then it would turn out necessarily false; which is an absurd result. (1972: 310)
Reference to Geach is particularly handy as Sider tackles him head on in order to dismiss 
such concerns:
P.T. Geach, for example, objects to four-dimensionalism by complaining about four-dimensionalists like 
Quine who analyses sentences of the form [x is F at t] as involving a subject term for a stage, [x at t], 
and a predicate F. Whatever the merits of the objection, it does not apply to four-dimensionalism as 
such, for one’s metaphysical account of the nature of persistence is separable from one’s analysis of 
temporal language. A four-dimensionalist could follow Geach in construing [x is F at t] as a predication of 
[is F at t] to subject x, but then go on to give a metaphysical account of the truth of such a predication in 
terms of stages (2001: 210)
Whilst Sider is correct in that one’s analysis of temporal language is separable from one’s 
theory of persistence, I do not think that Geach’s argument just relates to language: it is, 
rather, a point concerning the nature of temporal parts that make them unsuitable for 
predications of certain sorts, like robbings, killings, or beliefs. And the nature of temporal 
parts is not a linguistic issue, but a metaphysical one, and when there is at least a prima 
facie tension between a metaphysics of persistence and personhood and the sorts of things 
we typically predicate or attribute to persons, then it is fair game to query that metaphysics. 
So, in this instance, I do not think that language and persistence is so easily disentangled. 
Of course, Sider is correct that one could give an account of the truth conditions of such 
predications in terms of parts or stages, but he does not, and that is important to rebutting 
the arguments of Geach and Lewis. It is a hard headed prejudice against such arguments 
that seems to guide Sider here.
"
Indeed, Sider’s engagement with these sorts of objections places them as squarely – and, 
perhaps, merely – linguistic or epistemic; they do not determine, and are not determined by, 
the metaphysics. Take the following:
One also hears the complaint that predicates of stages cannot be defined without reference to 
continuants. This, too, need not embarrass the four-dimensionalist, who claims merely that temporal 
parts exist, not that one vocabulary is analytically prior to another. A worm theorist is under no obligation 
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to translate person-predicates, for example ‘believes that snow is white’, into predicates of stages. 
Persons are composed of subatomic particles, but few think that language about persons can or should 
be translated into the language of physics. (2001: 210)
And:
It is sometimes urged against four-dimensionalism that we cannot ‘individuate’ stages without making 
reference to continuants, by which it is meant, I suppose, that we could not pick out particular stages 
unless we had the ability to pick out particular continuants. But this argument is a non-sequitur; its 
epistemic premise concerning our ability to pick out particular temporal parts lends no support 
whatsoever to its metaphysical conclusion that temporal parts do not exist (2001: 211)
But, again, I think this is too swift, and, again, Sider does not seriously think about how if 
certain predications or attributions of properties become incoherent in the face of revisionary  
metaphysics, then this might mean there is something wrong with the metaphysics. To be 
clear, this is the not the point that language should inform our metaphysics, but that tensions 
of this sort are deserving of serious reflection. 
Here is the sort of thing I mean: Sider says, in the second quotation, that our ability to 
discriminate parts being dependent on our ability to discriminate continuants says nothing 
about the non-existence of temporal parts. But what about the normative practice of blame? 
To blame is to hold a person responsible for an action, to recognise them as having done 
something one considers wrong. The exercise of this ability is common and demands no 
great sophistication, and we are capable of assessing the appropriateness and warrant of 
blame; whilst it may not be truth apt, as such, we can and do discuss whether we are 
blaming correctly. I have argued, however, that the perdurantist does not have persons to 
blame, for temporal parts are not people (they could not be, for then persons would be 
strange ‘mega persons’, aggregates of the many, many people that are their temporal parts), 
and persons themselves do not do anything at all anyway. So, our ability to discriminate and 
normatively engage with continuants here is not only prior to parts, but it does seem to 
militate against perdurance, for this practice would be an utter mystery if perdurance were 
true. Rendering critical elements of moral practice mysterious is a significant drawback of 
any theory, and good reason to suspect that theory is false.
What if we turn to Sider’s paragraph above that one concerning abilities, where he 
says that the perdurantist does not owe us translations of person-predicates into stage-
predicates? Well, the perduranist does not owe us translations. But she certainly does owe 
us some kind of account of how practices that seem entirely dependent upon the existence 
of enduring continuants can be parsed without enduring continuants, much in the same 
fashion that B-theorists owe us (and do, indeed, try to provide) the truth conditions of tensed 
discourse in entirely tenseless terms. And, to repeat my diagnosis a few paragraphs above, 
Sider does not do this, and this enterprise is what is crucial to rebutting the arguments he 
deems linguistic or epistemic.
So Lewis’ argument, I believe, stands: and what we are interested in, really, in 
understanding the relation of responsibility is that which obtains between persons and their 
actions, and if that relationship is threatened or incoherent, then so also is morality, 
rehabilitation, regret, remorse, and so on. Mellor takes a similar path, close to Lewis’ point 
above:
If a thing is [a causal sequence of events] it has temporal parts ('phases') namely the events in the 
sequence; the ontological distinction between things (substances) and events is destroyed, since it is 
just lack of temporal parts that distinguishes a thing from temporally extended events. Well, why not 
destroy the distinction—perhaps there are no things without temporal parts? But if so, no temporally 
extended object is wholly present at a time; conversely, what is present at a time is not wholly identical 
(and so, perhaps, pace Parfitt, not identical at all) with anything at any other time. And where then, for 
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example, in the case of people, do our notions of moral and of legal responsibility for what we have 
ourselves done, and intended ourselves to do, go? (1975: 251)
What is important, then, for the point concerning responsibility is that perdurance threatens 
responsibility by not permitting continuants, in the strictest sense.
Against perdurance, then, the crux of Lewis’ argument is that the only things to which 
responsibility can be assigned on its metaphysic are not the sort of things to which 
responsibility is assignable. Thus, there is no intelligible relation of responsibility for 
perdurantists. Consequently, there is no rational sense of experiencing regret, or undergoing 
rehabilitation, or other like emotions in the vicinity – guilt, shame, and so on. Further, if you 
think it is necessary that moral agents are the sort of entity to which responsibility is 
assignable, perdurantism9 has with it, in addition, that there are no moral agents.
 
That morality presupposes a conception of persons as both: 1) capable of 
attributions of responsibility; and 2) persisting entities is not too contentious a thought. Mellor 
stresses the same point differently:
…the first prerequisite for moral and legal responsibility is identity through time. Nothing and no one can 
be held responsible for an earlier action unless he, she, or it is identical with whoever or whatever did 
that earlier action…Now whatever identity through time may call for elsewhere, here it evidently requires 
the self-same entity to be wholly present both when the deed was done and later when being held 
accountable for it (1981: 106)
And Samuel Scheffler:
Morality as we normally think of it is intimately bound up with a conception of ourselves as existing 
agents over time with ongoing values, plans, personalities, loyalties, and commitments. That conception 
of ourselves enters into morality in two different ways. It enters both as a characterization of the nature 
of beings who can be the objects of beneficial and harmful conduct, and as a characterization of the 
nature of beings who are capable of helping and harming others. (1982: 237)
So it should not be surprising that a theory of persistence that fails to fulfil either or both of 
these fails to have moral agents. Failure to permit moral agents is, I think, a very significant 
problem for a theory.
" Let us now put stage theory to the test and have it answer the two questions posed 
earlier. These questions were: 1) what sort of thing is a person, according to perdurance and 
stage theory; and 2) what does persistence consist in, according to perdurance and stage 
theory i.e., what does it mean to say that the person p is the same person at t1 and at t2.
" For stage theory, there are not, in a very strict sense, continuants, as the person 
stage I am now is an instantaneous person stage that bears relations to other instantaneous 
person stages via a temporal counterpart relation. So, compared to perdurantism, the 
answer to 1) is that a person is the sort of thing we typically think a person to be but 
extremely brief. The answer to 2) is that persistence does not really occur, but we can 
attribute temporal properties to instantaneous person stages and give them a counterpart 
theoretic analysis. To use Sider’s own example:
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9 Lewis formulates his argument confusingly, as he argues against the ‘tenseless theoryʼ, but the 
‘tenseless theoryʼ is not a theory of persistence. Further, he states that ‘The first stage is the recognition 
of the fact that morality presupposes a conception of persons as perduring agents...if persons do not 
perdure, but are simply tenseless matrices of causally related-events…ʼ. But his argument is that 
perduring entities are not moral agents. Presumably, he means ‘persistʼ rather than ‘perdureʼ. 
…the truth condition of an utterance of ‘Ted was once a boy’ is this: there exists some person stage x prior to 
the time of utterance, such that x is a boy, and x bears the temporal property counterpart relation to Ted. 
Since there is such a stage, the claim is true. Despite being a stage, Ted was a boy; he has the historical 
property of once being a boy (2001: 193)
" Sider acknowledges that this invites a pretty obvious objection: that stage theory 
makes statements about me really statements about someone else. But that is clearly 
absurd, so we should reject it. And, indeed, Perry makes this sort of objection thus:
[on (a view like) the stage view] the little boy stealing apples is strictly speaking not identical with the general 
before me…[The stage view] denies what is clearly true: that when I say of someone that he will do such and 
such, I mean that he will do it. The events in my future are events that will happen to me, and not merely 
events that will happen to someone else with the same name (1972: 479-80)
Such an objection has its modal analogue, too, most famously expressed by Kripke:
"
[According to modal counterpart theory,]…if we say ‘Humphrey might have won the election (if only he had 
done such-and-such)’, we are not talking about something that might have happened to Humphrey but to 
someone else, a ‘counterpart’. Probably, however, Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, not  
matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world (1980: 45)
" "
And this analogy is not very surprising given that both theories analyse certain kinds of 
properties – modal and temporal – counterpart theoretically. 
" I am troubled by Sider’s temporal counterpart relation in a similar fashion. If we look 
at Sider’s example – ‘Ted was once a boy’ – then it does not, in the strict sense, have 
anything to do with adult stage Ted, and has everything to do with a counterpart of Ted that 
is a boy. In other words, it is not the property of ‘once being a boy’ we are ascribing to adult 
stage Ted, but something closer to ‘there being a counterpart of Ted that is a boy’. But these 
two properties are evidently not equivalent: the property ‘once being a boy’, when ascribed 
to Ted, solely concerns Ted. But the property ‘there being a counterpart of Ted that is boy’, 
when ascribed to Ted, concerns Ted and a temporal counterpart of his. As Benovsky notes:
Sider’s response can only appear to be satisfactory if one takes the expression “once being a boy” to be a 
suitable paraphrase of the expression “once there being a counterpart of x that is a boy”, but such a strategy,  
objectors like Sally Haslanger will claim, “strains the limit of credibility” (Haslanger (2003, p. 337) (2016: 44)
Elsewhere, Benovsky makes an interesting point that decouples the analogy of counterparts 
in modal cases to temporal cases (2015: 18). He notes that he can boast he the he can 
climb Everest, even if he did not (his doppelganger did). But that is different to boasting that 
he did climb Everest. That his doppelganger achieved the feat certainly represents the 
possibility of Benovsky being able to do it, but not his really climbing it. And that is okay for 
the modal case. But clearly not for the temporal case: in the temporal case, I want to say 
that I did something – not that some temporal counterpart of me did something such that it 
represents me as doing it. In other words: even if a temporal counterpart of me did do 
something (offer a caustic remark at a party, say), the temporal counterpart relation is quite 
explicit in saying that I did not: rather, a wholly distinct person stage x offers a caustic 
remark10 and bears the temporal counterpart relation to me. But this is distinct from saying I 
offered the caustic remark: this solely concerns me, whereas the invocation of a counterpart 
does not.
" And in cases of responsibility where we wish to engage in moral evaluation or certain 
moral practices, it is utterly critical that we can say some individual did indeed do something 
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10 Try and ignore that a caustic remark requires time to utter: the particular problem of duration for stage 
theory is treated a little later.
such that they are responsible for doing it. But that is just not the case for the stage theory, 
and I do not see how it can be if temporal properties are analysed counterpart theoretically. 
" Of course, Sider attempts to resist the force of any Humphrey-esque objection:
…Perry is wrong to say the stage view denies that ‘You will do it’ means that you will do it. ‘Ted was 
once a boy’ attributes a certain temporal property, the property of once being a boy, to me, not to 
anyone else. Of course, the stage view does analyse my having this property as involving the boyhood 
of another object, but I am the one with the temporal property, which is the important thing (2001: 195)
But I very much disagree that, when it comes to actions to which we want to attribute 
responsibility, that my simply having the temporal property is the important thing: it is that I 
did it. Analysing my having performed an action in terms of the actions of another, distinct 
object simply does not offer enough to sustain an intelligible relation of responsibility, moral 
or otherwise. Thus, I conclude that we should reject stage theory 11.
7.2 – Perdurance and Stage Theory: Actions Take Time
"
Lewis has a second argument to make against perdurance. It is that human actions take 
time to perform. He quotes Phillip Quin on this point:
Human actions in the full-blooded sense, because they involve bodily motion, take time to perform. A 
body can be in motion at an instant of time and have instantaneous velocity and acceleration, but it 
takes a finite interval of time for a body to move or to make a motion. . . . Perhaps disembodied spirits of 
humans could act at an instant too. However, embodied humans can only perform actions in the 
spatiotemporal world by making motions which span finite temporal intervals. Maybe too there are 
mental acts that contribute causally to the genesis of human actions but occur at a single instant. Mental 
willings or decidings, if there are any such things, might be examples of such instantaneous mental acts. 
Nevertheless, the human actions to which they contribute, such as arm raisings, are not instantaneous. 
Of course, it makes sense to ask what action, if any, a human agent is performing at an instant to time. 
But I do not perform the action of raising my arm, or any other, instantaneously. (1983: 64-65)
Quinn is discussing bodily actions, but his point applies quite generally to many mental 
actions insofar that a good deal of them take time to perform.
"  Lewis takes this as his starting point, noting that ‘No human agent performs any 
action unless there is some action such that the agent persists while performing it’ (1986c: 
309). Take, for example, the raising of an arm, which begins at t1 and ends at t5 with my 
hand raised. The question for the perdurantist is: who raises their arm? Not the temporally 
extended and tenseless ‘I’, says Lewis, for this ‘I’ is not the sort of thing that has hands or 
feet, and it is also not the sort of thing that can intend, think or act, for it is the temporal parts 
for the perdurantist that are supposed to do the intending, thinking and acting. But, Lewis 
says further, it cannot be a temporal part of me that performs the action anyway, for ‘…no 
temporal part lasts long enough to perform this or any other action’ (1986c: 309). Therefore, 
there are no agents that persist while performing an action. It follows, then, that there are no 
human actions if persons are the way perdurantism says they are. And if there are no human 
actions, there is no responsibility for actions.
" Sider, of course, has something to say about this for opponents of stage theory. One 
could easily substitute temporal parts for person stages in this response to defend 
perdurantism too (and Lewis anticipated this line of defence, 1986c: 310):
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11 Hawleyʼs stage theory differs in allowing stages to have temporal extent, but is equally vulnerable to the 
line of attack pursued here.
The sentence ‘Ted believes that four-dimensionalism is true’ attributes, according to the stage theorist, a 
belief to my current stage. But how can an instantaneous stage believe anything? Beliefs take time. 
Having a belief does indeed require having had certain features in the past. This is not inconsistent with 
the stage view, which interprets the past having of the relevant features as amounting to having 
temporal counterparts that have those features. In order to have a belief, a stage must stand in an 
appropriate network of counterpart relations to other stages with appropriate features. Thus, the 
property having a belief is a highly relational property (2001: 198)
I do not find this example convincing for beliefs for the same reasons I gave against stage 
theory earlier: the property ‘having a belief’, when ascribed to Ted, solely concerns Ted, 
whereas the property ‘there being n counterparts to Ted that stand in an appropriate network 
of counterpart relations with appropriate features such that they hold a belief’ concerns Ted 
and a very large number of other objects. They are distinct properties, and for any past 
action, it is not I that performed it.
" Shifting from belief to an action makes the case worse. Take an episode of 
temporally extended violence: an assault, and the utterance ‘Ted once assaulted Tom’. Not 
only is Ted, the person stage now, having responsibility for the assault he once performed 
analysed in terms of the actions of prior, distinct person stages, the temporally extended 
nature of the assault means there are very many person stages – the only things that are 
people for the stage theorist – responsible for the assault (or, more strictly, for a very great 
number of assaults against a very great number of Tom person stages). Consequently, if a 
trial were to occur, and Tom’s lawyer declared ‘One man, Ted, is responsible for the assault 
of Tom and one man, Ted, deserves to be punished for it!’ he would be speaking falsely. But 
this is absurd. So, again, we should reject stage theory as, in addition to denying us an 
intelligible relation of responsibility, it also makes obviously true attributions of moral 
blameworthiness and responsibility false.
7.3 - What If Temporal Parts and Person Stages Could Perform and Be Responsible 
for Actions?
Additionally, there is a further twist to Lewis’ strand of argument that he does not pick up on. 
He does not do so, I assume, because he thinks that: 1) temporal parts or instantaneous 
stages cannot perform actions; and 2) temporal parts and instantaneous stages cannot be 
responsible for actions. Regardless, it is a useful line to pursue, for even if 1 and 2 were 
false (which, I have argued, they are not!), and temporal parts and instantaneous stages 
could do those things, it introduces a big difficulty anyway.
 It is suggested in this line: ‘Why should my present temporal part be held 
responsible for what an earlier temporal part of me is tenselessly doing?’ (1986c: 307). The 
‘doing’, in this line, should of course not be read tensed, and there is no suggestion that the 
‘doing’ is occurrent, just at an earlier time. But the point remains, however, that it is, in an 
entirely tenseless fashion, entirely real. And that is a troubling thought for moral psychology: 
can we be rehabilitated, for example, if the actions that we seek rehabilitation in respect of 
are, tenselessly speaking, still out there, real with respect to all times? Forgiveness is 
difficult at the best of times, but we can we forgive at all if the action we are considering 
forgiving indelibly has its occurrence as part of reality? How is absolution, in the theistic 
sense, possible when the totality of one’s sin is still real? 
Haecceity presentism has the resources to deal with this, and in a fashion very much 
like it treats grief. As with grief, the haecceity of an event morally relevant to a person12 (say, 
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12 To be clear, I am not saying that only morally relevant events have haecceities. This is just how a 
haecceity presentist should deploy their ontology to rationalise and vindicate episodes of emotions like 
regret.
in that it is a regretted event, or an event in which a morally bad action took place) persists 
to characterise the very features that prompt regret or shame in that person. But, 
importantly, those very features no longer exist (for, as noted above, their continued 
existence would threaten the rationality and intelligibility of any project of overcoming that 
regret or shame). It is this that sanctions the crucial liberty persons require from their 
previous immoral or imprudent behaviour without totally erasing that behaviour. As T.S. Eliot 
wrote in Burnt Norton (1943): ‘Go, go, go, said the bird: human kind/Cannot bear very much 
reality’.
The next section is dedicated to this thought, and the relationship between the 
permanence of a misdeed and its implications for our moral self-conception.
67
Chapter 8 – Chronal Horrors
In this chapter, I argue that belief in eternalism entails a radically alienating consequence – 
the existence of chronal horrors. A chronal horror is any disvalued event understood as 
eternally real, as all events are in eternalism. The argument, in outline, is that if a theory 
entails such a consequence – one that is alienating with respect to our moral thinking and 
psychology - then that is a major deficiency for that theory when compared to a theory that 
does not suffer that consequence. Eternalism is a theory that does suffer this deficiency, 
whereas haecceity presentism does not. Thus, in assessing the adequacy of a theory, the 
radically alienating consequence of chronal horrors for eternalism should count against it.
I begin by quickly looking at arguments that dispute the immoral consequences of 
belief in modal realism, and conclude there is a parallel with eternalism that generates an 
analogous, alienating consequence. I then look at numerous arguments that say, in one way  
or another, that we should not be bothered by chronal horrors, and argue that they are not 
persuasive.
8.1 – From Modal Realism to Chronal Horrors
Concerns about the immoral or alienating consequences of belief in eternalism are 
infrequent, though its modal analogue – modal realism – has those who, in one way or 
another, share worries about its moral import (Adams, 1979. Tännsjö, 1987. Heller, 2003. Le 
Poidevin, 201613). It may be profitable, then, to briefly explore what is morally troubling in 
respect of modal realism in order to prompt reflection on what may be analogously troubling 
about eternalism. And there is, I shall argue, something in spirit that unites the two strands of 
troubles, though in different ways: the arguments for the immorality of modal realism are that 
it sanctions moral reasoning that is inconsistent with moral truths. I want to argue that 
eternalism is an alienating theory because it has unacceptable moral consequences: 
namely, that all disvalued events (which includes grossly immoral events), and those that 
have suffered from any disvalued event, must contend with the eternal reality of that event 
and its consequences. A metaphysic that licenses so profoundly alienating a view of moral 
action should be rejected.
Adams objects to modal realism on grounds of immorality thus:
Our normal belief in the absoluteness of actuality is reflected in our value judgments too. We may be 
moved by the joys and sorrows of a character known to be fictitious; but we do not really believe it is 
bad that evils occur in a non-actual possible world, or good that joys occur in a non-actual possible 
world, though of course it would be bad and good, respectively, for them to be actual. I think that our 
very strong disapproval of the deliberate actualizing of evils similarly reflect a belief in the absolutely, 
and not just relatively, special status of the actual as such. Indeed, if we ask, “What is wrong with 
actualizing evils, since they will occur in some other possible world anyway if they don’t occur in this 
one?”, I doubt that the indexical theory can provide an answer which will be completely satisfying 
ethically. (1979: 195)
David Lewis, naturally, has a response about why the modal realist does not need to deny 
that it is wrong to actualise evils:
What is wrong with actualising evils, since they will occur in some other possible world anyway if they 
don’t occur in this one?’ – if you actualise evils, you will be an evil-doer, a causal source of evil. That is 
something which, if you are virtuous, you do not want to be. Otherworldly evils are neither here nor 
there. They aren’t your evils. Your virtuous desire to do good and not evil has nothing to do with the sum 
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13 I base the term ‘chronal horrors’ on what Le Poidevin calls their modal counterpart, ‘modal horrors’.
total of good and evil throughout reality. It has to do with what befalls you and your worldmates, and in 
particular it has to do with the way in which what befalls yourself and others depends causally on what 
you do.
For those of us who think of morality in terms of virtue and honour, desert and respect and esteem, 
loyalties and affections and solidarity, the other-worldly evils should not seem even momentarily relevant 
to morality. Of course our moral aims are egocentric. And likewise all the more for those who think of 
morality in terms of rules, rights, and duties; or as obedience to the will of God.
If modal realism makes a problem for anyone, it is for utilitarians. But not even for commonplace 
utilitarians, who might go in for a certain amount of generalised benevolence under the heading of 
solidarity with humanity, or out of kindness to those whom they are in a position to help. The problem 
belongs only to utilitarians of an especially pure sort. Only if morality consists of maximising the total of 
good, absolutely, regardless of where and to whom the good may accrue, can it lose its point because 
the sum total of good throughout the plurality of worlds is non-contingently fixed and depends not at all 
on what we do. (1986a: 127)
Mark Heller (correctly, I think) points out that while Lewis successfully responds to the letter 
of Adams’ objection, he does not quite address the spirit (2003: 2). And the spirit, for Heller, 
is that ‘the modal realist has to consider more people in moral decision making than we 
ordinarily do consider’ (2003: 3) and what this entails. Heller is keen to note, further, that the 
spirit of Adams’ objection need not be attached to pressing such a particularly severe 
consequence – that is, that there would never be any reason to avoid doing evil. Rather, in 
decoupling the spirit of the objection from Adams’ particular presentation of its 
consequences, one is free to explore the point more generally. Heller’s entire project is to 
demonstrate that there is at least one moral consequence of modal realism that conflicts 
with one obvious moral truth. Given, by Heller’s lights, that the moral truth is obviously true, 
we have reason to believe the falsity of any theory that conflicts with it. So, if modal realism 
conflicts with the moral truth, it is not just immoral but false. Heller argues that if modal 
realism is true, then there are cases in which it is permissible to let children drown when it 
would be very easy to save them. 
The spirit of Adams objection, as distilled by Heller, is not directly applicable to 
eternalism: the eternalist has more people be real than a presentist, but that is not quite 
enough to build an objection. But if we abstract from this, we set upon something that is 
applicable to eternalism, and does generate a quandary: the eternalist, in moral theorising, 
has to consider more real times than we ordinarily do consider. That is, in thinking morally, 
the eternalist must consider that the results of that moral decision are eternally real.
Now, the temporally charged version of Heller’s attack is, as I see it, the following: if 
there is at least one moral consequence of eternalism that is repugnant, then it is profoundly 
alienating in respect of our ordinary moral thinking and psychology. Any theory in conflict 
with our ordinary moral thinking and psychology fails to fulfil a basic desideratum, and is thus 
inadequate. Thus, we ought to reject any such theory.
This is a weaker argument than Heller’s, for I am not saying that eternalism is false 
as a result of its morally repugnant consequence. Rather, I am arguing that in assessing 
eternalism – in undergoing the weights and balances approach of theory choice – it is a 
heavy strike against it, and that no such strike exists against haecceity presentism.
8.2 – Chronal Horrors, Mere Counterparts, and Occurrence 
Chronal horrors – eternally real disvalued events – are not something we are familiar with 
ordinarily, as it requires a particular way of treating the temporal structure of the world, and it 
is that way of treating the temporal structure of the world that gives them their character. 
Compare this to a quotidian case of guilt: that is an emotion that concerns having committed 
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an action one would rather not have done. There is nothing that pertains to the temporal 
structure of reality. Chronal horror at one’s misdeeds, however, is a response to not only 
having done something one would rather not have done, but that what one has done is 
eternally real, eternally part of reality. And this generalises, not only to the permanence of 
actions, but to the corresponding consequences of those actions. It is not that one lied to a 
loved one, but that the action of that lie is forever part of reality. The fact of one’s lying to a 
loved one is indelible, as is the fact that a loved one is, eternally, a victim of that lie. And 
nothing can get rid of that. In other words, chronal horror is something felt in addition to 
ordinary guilt and other emotions.
That a chronal horror is earlier than whatever happens to be ‘now’ is irrelevant to it 
being a chronal horror (and I shall defend this later), for that does nothing to diminish its 
reality, nor does the copula in any such facts not being tensed; the copula in, say, ‘Sally is 
murdering Samantha’ and ‘Samantha is being murdered by Sally’, when the murder 
occurred 50 years ago, may not be like the tensed copula we are acquainted with in 
manifold ordinary locutions, but the action the copula relates to a subject is not any less real 
for it. The copula in ‘2 plus 2 is 4’ is certainly not tensed, but that makes no difference to it 
being real.
" Chronal horror and guilt (and other emotions to which chronal horror can attach) are 
distinct in other ways too. One feels guilty for one’s own actions. Vicarious guilt is difficult to 
understand, as there is a close conceptual link between guilt and responsibility; I feel guilty 
because I am responsible for something I wish I were not (and endangering responsibility is 
exactly why tenseless theories were argued against in the previous chapter)
But chronal horror need not be restricted to things for which one is responsible. I can 
experience chronal horror when I consider any greatly immoral or disvalued event. This too 
distinguishes it from mere horror, on the same grounds which it can be distinguished from 
guilt. Mere horror may be experienced in relation to, say, the extermination of a population, 
and what rationalises the horror is the relation of the extermination to some set of normative 
principles I endorse. Mere is perhaps something of a misnomer, for I do not suggest that the 
felt quality or importance is somehow meagre, defective or diminished. It is every bit as 
fulminant and raw as it should be upon learning of the extermination of a populace. Rather, it 
is mere as opposed to chronal because, I contend, the quality and content of the experience 
is changed upon being told that this extermination of a populace is forever real. 
" One response is that an event never ceasing to be is not as terribly shocking as I am 
suggesting. ‘Go into any history class during a lesson on World War 2 and its manifold 
atrocities and you’ll find many students learning about the facts of the war, facts that have 
not ceased to be, and you’ll doubtless find some distress, but nothing like this chronal horror 
you describe, with people tormenting themselves over permanent agonies and suchlike!’. 
But this equivocates two senses of ‘ceases to be’ for facts. There is a sense in which facts 
do not ‘cease to be’ that is acceptable to the haecceity presentist, for the haecceity 
presentist will supply entirely present ontology to ground the fact. For them, facts about the 
past are grounded in the haecceities of entities and tensed properties. So to say that some 
person suffered a great mistreatment does not require the continued existence of the person 
or the mistreatment, for the original event is characterised by haecceities and tensed 
properties, so the entities involved in such events do indeed exit reality and, with it, the 
properties they had. So though the entities cease, their haecceities do not, and as the facts 
are constituted by the haecceities, the facts themselves do not cease to be. Further, there is 
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no worry about haecceities experiencing a mistreatment forever, for haecceities are 
properties, and thus cannot experience mistreatments. That is the sense that facts not 
ceasing to be is acceptable to presentists and, I would wager, the lay sense of facts not 
ceasing to be, for most people do not trouble themselves with the ontology of facts. 
But the sense of not ceasing to be utilised by the eternalist is importantly different 
here, for on the eternalist picture the constituents of such facts are the entities themselves; 
there are no surrogates to be substituted for the entities and neither should there ever be, for 
it is precisely that past entities themselves figure as constituents in singular propositions, 
facts, counterfactuals, truthmaking and so on that is supposed to grant eternalism dialectical 
superiority in the debate on the nature of time. Any attempt to amend analyses of singular 
propositions, facts etc. that are chronal horrors in terms of surrogates is certain to be 
arbitrary and unwarranted. And, given that the entities themselves are the constituents, the 
entities themselves are ineradicably part of that event’s reality, with all that demands. A 
member of a populace being exterminated has, is and will always suffer the reality of being 
exterminated at 12:07 AM, 09/11/2031. And this tenseless fact does not correspond to its 
tensed, mere counterpart – that I will be exterminated shortly is terrifying, but that the 
extermination is forever real is a greater horror to bear.
Oaklander anticipates something like this in seeking to establish what he, attributing 
to Hestevold (1990), is the wrong way to treat tenseless facts:
To say that an extraction is tenselessly occurring on Tuesday (t2) is to say, assuming that time is 
relational, that the extraction is simultaneous with each member of the set of simultaneous events that 
constitutes t2. This fact, however, does not exist on Tuesday or on Wednesday or on any other day; it is 
eternal. But to say that an event’s occurring at a certain time is an eternal fact does not imply that the 
event in some sense is always occurring, although looked at from an external God-like perspective, it 
may appear as if this is so. But from the inside, and in reality, my painful experiences are (hopefully) 
short-lived, and as they are succeeded by more pleasant experiences, my awareness of the painful 
ones become a mere memory (1993: 164)
For Oaklander, ‘experiences and events are not eternal or sempiternal, and they do not exist 
all at once, totum simul’. I’m not entirely convinced Oaklander is being honest here, 
however: he concedes that, if we imagine a God’s eye view of all time, events do look like 
they all eternally exist and are occurrent, albeit tenselessly. But we do not experience as 
them as such (‘from the inside, and in reality’), so eternal existence is not a big deal. But the 
latter looks merely like a perspectival, epistemological point: that I do not experience the 
eternality of an event and what it prompts in me (for example, pain) does not answer the 
question of whether the pain causing event and pain are indeed eternal.
Regardless, even if Oaklander is right, his response does not relate to chronal 
horrors as I have described them, for I do not say they exist all at once, and I also do not 
assert that the chronal horror itself is eternally occurrent. What I do say is that they are real 
with respect to all times, which makes no mention of occurrence and does not depend on it 
either way. And that they are real with respect to all times is what decouples chronal horror 
from its mere counterpart, as the recession of the awareness of any awful experience (being 
tortured, say) and any loss of the intensity of its unpleasantness does not correspond to a 
diminishing intensity of the reality of that awful experience – and that is troubling and makes 
a difference to me. The eternal reality of my torture, for example, may do violence to my 
ability to self-conceive and self-determine: I may feel burdened by the reality of victimhood, 
be troubled by the indelibility of the violation to my personhood and the power of my captors 
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over me, feel anger or despair that I cannot be free of its influence – not just through 
memory, but through reality itself. None of this is morally irrelevant: the everlasting reality of 
the torture, in this instance, is radically alienating, and excludes the salutary avenues of 
rehabilitation and repair. The haecceity presentist is free of such a radical consequence, and 
she possesses the important advantage of having the means to characterise the former 
reality and nature of the injustice without having the injustice remain. And it is this that plays 
a role in the positive recovery from such injustices: its echo remains such that we can learn 
from it, consider it, reclaim it or reconfigure and integrate it within out life’s narrative, but the 
eternal reality of the harm is not there to haunt us.
Furthermore, eternalists tend to be fond of arguing for the analogous nature of time 
and space: Dresden is remote, but no less real than London, just as times are remote, but 
no less real that what happens to be ‘now’. A chronal horror, then, would have it that the 
bombing of Dresden and the death of manifold inhabitants is remote, but no less real than 
the Dresden that happens to be ‘now’. Eternalists should not be too surprised at the reality of 
chronal horrors.
8.3 – Should We Care Less?
Let us return to the analogy with modal realism: if modal realism is true, there are concrete, 
non-actual entities right now dying in a horrendous war. Their death is no less real or painful 
than ours. But, a modal realist might argue, not caring, or being bothered less, is justified by 
their being non-actual, and neither is that diminished degree of concern impugned by 
actuality being an indexical; the borders of our concern, it might be argued, latch onto the 
borders of what is actual in matters modal. Given certain analogies between modal realism 
and chronal realism (eternalism) and time and space, then, we should apply the same 
thought to chronal horrors; we need not be terribly bothered by chronal horrors because the 
diminished lack of concern is warranted by the non-present, where ‘present’ is understood 
indexically, nature of the suffering, and neither should the indexical nature of ‘present’ be 
problematic, for the borders of our concern latch onto what is ‘present’ in matters temporal.
This view that ‘distance makes a difference’ in terms of concern is endorsed, though 
in a weaker form than the above, by Oaklander, and bears similarities to Lewis’ response to 
Adams earlier. Oaklander says:
More recently [Schlesinger] claimed that “our attitude toward the present may be described as regarding 
it as distinct from every other temporal position, for while the future is yet to be born and the past is 
rapidly fading, the present is palpably real”. I suggest that we can make sense of Schlesinger’s 
phenomenological claims without countenancing transitory temporal properties. Again, a spatial analogy 
makes the point. I am here and so experience space differently from the way I would if I were outside 
space. I can know what goes in distant space but, given causal laws, I can affect what goes on 
elsewhere less surely and can reasonably regard what takes place there as less important, because it 
affects my life less. Similarly, I am now (at this time), so those events that are at temporally distant times 
are less affected by me and have less effect upon me than those in the present. (1993: 162-163)
The weaker ‘distance makes a difference’ view differs from the strong version in the 
following, crucial respect: though Oaklander acknowledges ‘those events that are at 
temporally distant times are less affected by me and have less effect upon me than those in 
the present.’, he does permit those temporally distant events to affect me. In other words, he 
preserves and explains the intuition that temporally distant events often bother me less 
whilst allowing them to still affect me.
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 The problem with the weak ‘distance makes a difference view’, however, is that it is 
not strong enough to stave off chronal horrors, for it does not mandate that I ought not to be 
bothered by chronal horrors. Rather, it fully permits me to be bothered by such things as it 
does not circumscribe the borders of my moral concern to what is happening now. Thus, the 
problem continues.
 It could be responded that in allowing the past to affect me, though, the weak 
‘distance makes a difference view’ may actually be able to accommodate the reality of 
chronal horrors whilst affording them a salutary role in our moral thinking and practices: the 
defender of the weak view might stress, not unfairly, that it is not incoherent for the 
perpetrator of a very immoral action to insist that it is the reality of the chronal horror itself 
that has guided her rehabilitation and attempt at reparation. Thus, a tenseless theorist might 
add, chronal horrors, though unpleasant, can play an important role within eternalism.
 I must concede that it is not incoherent for an individual to affirm the role a chronal 
horror can play in rationalising and prompting positive moral projects. However, the issue I 
have with this purported accommodation of chronal horrors is that it is egocentric, which 
makes it difficult to see the extent to which the accommodation of chronal horrors truly is 
salutary: for a good deal of very immoral actions, more than one person is involved in the 
occurrence of that action. If I gravely assault someone, the eternality of that assault does not 
just relate to me, but the victim also. The victim might challenge any propriety I have over 
the chronal horror, or any of the aims or goals it might prompt for me, the perpetrator, 
whether positive or negative: they may find it appalling that their injury is used in ways they 
do not agree with, sanction or consent to. True, there are possible salutary instances of 
chronal horrors - if the perpetrator and victim are both comfortable with the role that the 
chronal horror is playing in each other’s thinking or moral projects, for example. But those 
circumstances are very much exceptional, and establish that the salutary role of chronal 
horrors is quite limited. Thus, I do not think the attempt to accommodate them is very 
successful.
  I must admit a difficulty, however: my argument in the paragraph above seems to rest 
on the unargued assumption that the suffering of the victim counts for more than the 
redemption of the perpetrator, and that is why they do not offer anything greatly salutary in 
being embraced by eternalism. Why is this? I admit, I do not have a perfectly clear answer. I 
do think it is intuitive that the suffering counts for more. Take the following question posed to 
Alyosha by his brother Ivan in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov:
" Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, 
" giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one 
" tiny creature - that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance - and to found that edifice on its 
" unavenged tears: would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell me the 
" truth!" (2009: 269)
Alyosha responds ‘No’. Admittedly, the question posed to Alyosha is not perfectly analogous 
to the one I am facing, but the shape of the intuition I have deployed and is found in Ivan’s 
question - that suffering counts for more, and might even null anything salutary that emerges 
from it - is a plausible one. And, if we are like Alyosha, we might think that in the example of 
the grave assault, what does emerge as salutary from the assault - the perpetrator’s 
affirmation of the reality of the assault, as a chronal horror, to rationalise his project of giving 
reparations - is nullified by the victim’s refusal to have his suffering utilised in any such 
fashion. So, I think chronal horrors remain a problem for the weak ‘distance makes a 
difference view’.
 What if we were to strengthen Oaklander’s point in the following way: those events 
that are at temporally distant times are less affected by me and have less effect upon me 
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than those in the present because of a lack of causal influence. Thus, we ought not to be 
concerned with events that are at temporally distant times. This view, the strong ‘distance 
makes a difference’ one, does explicitly offer a reason not to be bothered by any temporally 
distant events, including chronal horrors.
" However, I’m not sure the strong view is very persuasive. The fact that no temporal 
influence may occur between past and present does not offer good reason to exercise a 
diminished degree of concern with the past or with chronal horrors. If diminished concern 
with the past were as easily mustered as being reminded that one cannot causally influence 
it, emotions like regret, shame and embarrassment would be easily soothed. In fact, it is not 
implausible that regret, shame and embarrassment have something of their character 
because the event or action to which they are directed are beyond causal influence; it is not 
because I cannot influence the past that I should not be concerned with it, but rather I am 
concerned with the past because I cannot influence it – ‘If I only could go back in time and 
do it differently, I would not be in this sorry mess!’. Regardless, lack of causal influence does 
not solve the issue.
Perhaps one should exercise a diminished degree of concern with future chronal 
horrors because the future is, to those without a God’s eye view of the great temporal 
tapestry, epistemically inaccessible? That our concern latches onto our epistemological 
borders is more plausible than the sphere of our causal influence, for one cannot be troubled 
by something that one does not know of, but it is very easy to be troubled by something 
outside of our causal influence. But even though one does not know the precise details of 
any specific future chronal horrors, I do not think the epistemological inaccessibility of the 
future does much to assuage the uneasiness of knowing that, in a very general sense, there 
are likely many future chronal horrors, even if one is not apprised of their specific details. I 
do not need to know when I will die to be troubled by the fact that I will die, and the 
permanence of the event of my death, even if it should be a painless one, may still be 
sufficient to trouble me greatly.
Relatedly, and as discussed by Ross Cameron (2015: 175), an eternalist might 
motivate a lack of concern about future chronal horrors by introducing branching futures to 
the eternalist metaphysic: we do not know what future branch is ours. But this is merely a 
restatement of epistemic inaccessibility point dressed up with branching futures. 
Furthermore, the uncertainty of what future branch is ‘ours’ is merely an epistemic, not a 
metaphysical, uncertainty: all the branches are real regardless, and thus so are the chronal 
horrors, so this does not defuse the worry.
" I think, ultimately, what a defender of the restricted concern solution really wishes to 
endorse is that one should not be concerned with chronal horrors because they are not 
happening to you, now. In the great temporal tapestry, the region of spacetime you occupy 
has no chronal horrors that pertain to you there, and that is alright. But chronal horrors need 
not be enormous calamities, great wars, famines, plagues and so on, though these types of 
events do indeed make the nature of a chronal horror more vivid. Rather, a chronal horror is 
any kind of disvalued event in conjunction with its permanence. I would be surprised to find 
any person who has not participated in some event they have come to disvalue and 
experience shame, guilt, embarrassment etc. over. On the eternalist metaphysic, such 
events are forever part of reality– and that in itself can inspire chronal horror. Regardless, 
assume we are dealing with an individual who has, throughout the entirety of their life, 
undergone no experience they have come to disvalue. Their life is a very splendid one of 
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chronal joys, replete with events of permanent loveliness. That their life contains no chronal 
horrors hardly gives good reason for not being bothered by chronal horrors. It may give good 
reason to not feel a certain kind of first-person relationship to the chronal horror, as one is 
not casually responsible for it in any fashion, but I have already argued that chronal horror 
need not involve any attitude of guilt, or causal responsibility, in the first place.
 Rather, what the modal realist solution needs is its quite strict temporal egocentrism 
and a moral injunction: you ought to only be concerned with your own temporal duration and 
the events that occupy it, not the temporal duration of any others and the events that occupy  
those, and you ought not to be concerned with chronal horrors. But the moral injunction is 
entirely unexplained and the candidates proposed so far – lack of temporal influence and 
epistemological inaccessibility – do not work. Further pressure can be put upon the temporal 
egocentrism too. Imagine its spatial analogue, spatial egocentrism: all spatial regions are 
equally real and ontologically on a par but the immediate spatial region you occupy is ‘self-
occupied’. So, all other spatial regions are equally real but non-self-occupied, where ‘self-
occupied’ is to be understood indexically as referring to the self that makes the utterance (or 
mentally tokens it or whatever). And, as in the other solutions, our concern latches onto the 
borders of the region that is ‘self-occupied’. But this seems even more objectionably 
arbitrary, for why should our concern only extend to the immediate spatial regions we 
occupy? That another region of space is equally real but not-self-occupied gives no reason 
to be less concerned with what occurs at other spatial regions. One needs strict spatial 
egocentrism in combination with the moral injunction that one should not care about what 
occupies and occurs in other spatial regions, but it is difficult to see why one should not care. 
Given that the eternalist treatment of time is analogous to that of space, any eternalist that 
endorses this style of explanation owes us a response to these difficulties. In the absence of 
any such explanation, I think it is reasonable to believe that eternalism has a morally 
repugnant consequence – chronal horrors – and the alienating quality of chronal horrors 
produces some serious dissonance with our everyday moral reasoning and psychology. This 
which is a severe mark against its adequacy which does not affect haecceity presentism. 
Further, haecceity presentism’s ability to support and rationalise the role of disvalued 
episodes of experience in positive ethical or personal projects counts to its advantage.
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Chapter 9 – Hope
This chapter considers hope in light of three tranches of questions that relate to it as a non-
doxastic attitude. The first tranche asks whether hoping for an event to be a certain way 
requires the future to be open: that is, does hope require that the future be unsettled, in that 
the thing I am hoping for is not yet determined in a particular fashion? More precisely, can 
one consider hope appropriate if the future is not open, in that the object of my hope is 
already fixed in its properties or nature? If the appropriateness of hope and how it satisfied is 
contingent upon the future being open, then on a tenseless metaphysic, hope cannot be 
justified. I articulate an epistemic conception of hope that relates it to our ignorance of the 
future rather than it being metaphysically open, concluding that hope does not require an 
open future for its justification.
" The second tranche of questions relates to becoming. I ask whether one can indeed 
know or experience things coming to be or coming to exist without there being a 
corresponding change in ontology – that is, the question of whether we can experience 
change without tense, whether one can have veridical experiences of things coming to exist 
or ceasing to exist without tense. The phenomenology of a party ceasing to be exciting, or 
the anticipation of a party that one hopes to be exciting, and is, thus fulfilling the hope, 
encourages the thought that one does have veridical experiences of events losing, and 
gaining, properties. But on the epistemic conception of hope, one never comes to know, or 
experience, things ceasing to be or coming to exist, as entities do not vary in their 
properties. Rather, one comes to know or experience the tenseless properties of an entity. 
There are no veridical experiences of thing ceasing or becoming in the tensed sense – in 
other words, the epistemic conception of hope suggests that these experiences are a 
deception. I present a version of the knowledge argument – the temporal knowledge 
argument – to test how the epistemic conception handles this challenge. Ultimately, 
however, I say that the temporal knowledge argument faces the same issues as its 
progenitor: there are some rather compelling responses to the knowledge argument, the 
ability response and phenomenal concepts response, which can be given a temporal twist.
" Finally, having gone through other arguments against the epistemic conception of 
hope, I move to the one I endorse, which concerns whether hopes require objective 
becoming and objective ceasing to exist to be satisfied. I say they do, and that there is no 
plausible account of the tenseless satisfaction of a hope. So, as with the other emotions and 
attitudes discussed throughout this thesis, the tenseless theorist must acknowledge there is 
no important, vindicable role for hope in our emotional lives. I go on to spell out that, even if 
the tenseless theorist bites the bullet and endorse revisionary conclusions about how we feel 
and the importance of those feelings to us, tenseless theories are nevertheless not 
explanatorily adequate in light of this, for they presently do not say why we should not be 
upset by the sudden irrelevance or unjustifiability of our emotions and attitudes. Thus, we 
need a new new B-theory, prompted, ultimately once more, by my Priorian, ‘Thank goodness 
that’s over!’ style arguments.
9.1 - Hope: Does It Require an Open Future?
This section considers whether hopes can be appropriate if the future is already settled: that 
is, if things in the future, like events and persons, are already a certain way, is there any 
sense in hoping for them to be a certain way given that they already are a certain way? The 
way I choose to examine this is by launching straight into an account of hope that would be 
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amenable for someone who believes that the future is fixed. I call this the epistemic 
conception of hope.
The epistemic conception of hope says hope is appropriate as even though the 
future is decisively settled, we do not know in which way it is settled. So my hoping that the 
party is exciting, or what have you, is the hope that the party is settled in one way, a way in 
which it is exciting, rather than another, and it is indeed already settled one way, rather than 
another, but I do not know which. This view of hope fits naturally with opponents of 
presentism, A- and B-theorists alike, so its success at integrating a settled future with hope 
would demonstrate that hope does not require an open future to be appropriate. I shall argue 
that the epistemic conception of hope ultimately is compatible with a settled future, so 
presentism’s open future is of no advantage with regards to hope. I shall go on to urge, 
however, that hope being compatible with a settled future is not the be all and end all of the 
dialectic, and thus the advantage the epistemic conception of hope confers on theories that 
assent to the existence of the future is not very significant. One theory that assents to the 
existence of the future is eternalism, and I treat it as my foil here as it is through much of the 
previous chapters. A-theories that assent to the existence of future concrete entities are 
dealt with in the final section of this chapter, though the arguments are not substantially 
different.
The proposition that the future is epistemically inaccessible and how that fits with a 
tenseless view of hope requires a little expansion, as the future is epistemically inaccessible 
for a presentist too, for it does not exist; so not knowing that things are settled one way or 
another is an explanation equally available to a presentist. Rather, it is not knowing in 
combination with one’s metaphysics of the future. For the presentist, one cannot know the 
future for there is no future to know. For the eternalist, though the future exists and is settled, 
the fact that causation is temporally asymmetric and later temporal occurrences are not 
going to be accessible by earlier ones means I simply cannot know the future despite its 
existence.
At first blush, the epistemic conception seems to fare well. It captures the anticipatory  
element of hope by shifting it into a change in what one knows, or experiences, rather than a 
change in what events exist and how those events are: the fulfilment of a hope comes to be 
in what is hoped for not only being congruent with how I desire it to be, but also with my 
knowing that it is how I desire it to be (and, conversely, my hope being frustrated consists in 
what is hoped for not being congruent with how I desire it to be, and my coming to know that 
it is not how I desire it to be). So whatever I am hoping for is indeed settled in a determinate 
fashion already, so that element of a hope is, admittedly, fixed. But the completion of the 
hope, so to speak, comes in my knowing that whatever is hoped for is how I desire it, or in 
knowing that it is not how I desire it. And that happens when the object of my hope is no 
longer epistemically inaccessible i.e. the hoped for event is no longer later than now.
The epistemic conception seems to threaten the appeal to presentism as a 
vindication of hope, as it points towards the justification of hope being consistent with a 
settled future. For the epistemic conception, the appropriateness of hope does not consist in 
the object of the hope being unsettled (e.g. the appropriateness of hoping for a good 
marathon time does not consist in the properties of myself and the marathon being 
unsettled), but in our lack of epistemic contact with how it is. If that explanation goes through 
unhindered, then it is a big positive for the eternalist, for no recourse to tense, or tensed 
ontology, is needed for the phenomenon, and we have tenseless hope as appropriate. The 
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epistemic conception makes no use of anything outside of what the presentist already does, 
in that it too subscribes to an analysis of hope as a kind of imaginative projection.
What might a presentist do to undermine the epistemic conception of hope? Perhaps 
one might try the following: the eternalist treatment of time is symmetrical. There is no 
metaphysical or ontological distinction between past, present and future. If that is the case, 
and if the future is epistemically inaccessible from the present as the events of later parts of 
the same entity are later than the present then, by parity, so should those that are earlier 
than the present part of the same entity. Thus, we cannot know the past. This is absurd, so 
we should reject the epistemic conception (taking temporal symmetry very seriously in this 
way has been discussed by Adams (1986: 319-320) and Markosian (2004)).
The error in this argument is easy to diagnose, however. It is true that the eternalist 
treatment of time is symmetrical, and there is no ontological or metaphysical distinction 
between past, present and future. But the lack of a distinction in the ontology or metaphysics 
of the past, present and future does not permit the inference that there is no epistemological 
distinction between the past, present and future. It is consistent to assent to no distinction in 
one, and to a distinction in the other. The eternalist is in no hot water here.
 Furthermore, the same argument could be posed against presentism: presentism 
treats the past and future symmetrically. The future is epistemically inaccessible as it does 
not exist. By parity, so should the past be epistemically inaccessible, as it does not exist 
also. Thus, either we do not know the past (which is absurd), or by modus tollens we do 
know the future (but we do not, thus a reductio). Again, the symmetry in ontology and 
metaphysics does not mandate one in epistemology: the past has existed but the future has 
not. The past is epistemically accessible via memory, records, testimony and the like – and 
these resources are just as available to the eternalist. This argument fails.
Here is another attempt that treads on similar lines: eternalism treats the past and 
future symmetrically. Part of this is that an entity instantiates the properties it does 
regardless of its position in the temporal order: if July 21st, 1973, 14:07PM is sunny in 
Philadelphia, then July 21st, 1973, 14:07PM is sunny in Philadelphia earlier than that, and it 
is sunny later than that. It is fixed before that date and time, and it is fixed after that date and 
time. In other words, entities do not change in their properties – or, more kindly, entities do 
not change robustly in their properties. This does not mean that they cannot experience, as 
Skow puts it, ‘anaemic’ change (2015: 27), which he describes thus: ‘Something is 
[anaemically] changing if and only if i) it is currently one way, and ii) it was (not long ago) 
some other, incompatible way’ (2015: 22). Now, we know that the epistemic conception of 
hope will have it that my hope for a party to be exciting is fulfilled when I come to know, or 
experience, the party as exciting. Plausibly, something being exciting is a property of an 
event. But as the party comes and goes, so does my hope and so does the excitement of 
the party. We might remark that the party was exciting, but surely is no longer, and one does 
not continue to hope that the party remain exciting as it occupies a portion of time earlier 
than now. Eternalism, however, would at the very least mandate the fact that the party 
remain exciting. If that party remains exciting, why can we not have backwards hopes? What 
justifies hope exclusively for the future? Why should we not hope for the party to remain 
exciting, or continue to hope that the earlier temporal part enjoy it as exciting?
The epistemic conception of hope can, I think, not only avoid the problem of 
backwards hopes but also demonstrate their coherence: imagine I am in a competition to 
decide the best artist in Rotherham. The best portrait will be selected on the first of the 
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month, but the results will be released on the seventh of the month. The winner, then, has 
already been decided by the fifth, but the results not known to the competitors. It seems 
quite fair to say that I hope I was selected by the panel, that I was chosen as the winner. But 
that does not concern the future, as the winner is already settled. I hope for something to 
have obtained in the past. And one does not need to remain hopeful that the party is 
exciting, as simply just is – that is a commitment of eternalism.
The issue of the open future, then, does not overly trouble the defender of the 
epistemic conception. They have an approach that it is consistent with the future being 
determinate. Still, the question of whether hopes require tense to be intelligible is still 
unanswered, both in connection to hope’s ties to the experience of change and in terms of 
how one might consider something like its truth conditions.
9.2 - Becoming: The Relationship Between Hope, Change, and Tense
If the eternalist is using an epistemological argument, it may be best to avoid meeting it with 
a squarely metaphysical one. Recall that the epistemic conception of hope purports to shift 
the coming to be of an event from ontology – in which an event would objectively come to 
exist before ceasing to exist – to epistemology – the event is already determinately one way 
or another, but my hope is fulfilled (or frustrated) by coming to know or experience what is 
hoped for. And if I know or experience it in a way that coheres with my hope, then the hope 
is fulfilled (and if it does not cohere with my hope, it is frustrated). So the epistemic 
conception of hope does, in some way, argue that coming to be, that is, coming to exist, is 
something experiential or epistemic. We know or experience things coming to be, and that is 
how we can get a tenseless analysis of hope without recourse to them coming to be or 
existing in an ontological sense.
A better place to put the pressure on, I think, is whether one can indeed know or 
experience things coming to be or coming to exist without their being a corresponding 
change in ontology – that is, the question of whether we can experience change without 
tense, whether one can have veridical experiences of things coming to exist or ceasing to 
exist without tense. We are familiar with the phenomenology of anticipating an event that 
one hopes will be exciting and coming to confront it, when it occurs, as exciting, meaning the 
hope is positively fulfilled. This encourages the thought that one does have true experiences 
of events gaining and losing properties. But events do not gain or lose properties according 
to the epistemic conception of hope, so those experiences are illusory.
" Kiernan-Lewis takes an epistemic approach in arguing against eternalists. He argues 
that “The fact Prior considers so decisive against a tenseless reality is an epistemic fact, an 
item of knowledge. It is the sort of knowledge we have when we are pleased something has 
ceased. “Thank goodness that’s over” means “Thank goodness that has ceased!” (Kiernan-
Lewis, 1994: 323). Kiernan-Lewis opts to construe this “epistemic fact” as analogous to the 
one employed in the knowledge argument. The knowledge argument, offered by Frank 
Jackson (1982) as an argument against physicalism, runs as follows:
Mary is confined to a black and white room. There she has access to all the information 
necessary to obtain complete and exhaustive knowledge of all the physical facts of the 
world. But, when Mary exits her black and white room and sees a rose, she learns 
something she did not know before: what it is like to see red. Seeing as she knew all the 
physical facts, she has learnt a non-physical fact. Physicalism claims that all the facts are 
reducible to, or supervene on, the physical facts. So, physicalism is false.
Prior’s argument can be given a parallel gloss:
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B-theorists hold that the world is tenseless, so complete and exhaustive knowledge of the facts of the 
world is complete knowledge of the world simpliciter. Yet, I know what it is like to have a headache 
cease to exist, for a headache of mine to cease to be. This is something I could not know if the 
tenseless account of the world were true. So, the tenseless account of the world is false.  (Kiernan-
Lewis, 1994: 323)
The upshot of this formulation is that the tenseless theory of time maintains that all 
events are equally real at all times: they are, ontologically speaking, “on a par”. If all events 
are equally real, then there is no intelligible sense in which an event can “cease to exist”. 
Perhaps it can ‘cease’ to be simultaneous with my current awareness of the experience but 
that is not the experience ceasing, strictly speaking, but rather my awareness of the 
experience. But we do know what it is like for something to cease to exist, so the tenseless 
theory is false. What Kiernan-Smith finds so objectionable about the thought that reality is 
tenseless, then, is best summarised as follows:
If reality is tenseless, then reality cannot begin to have or cease to have any feature that it does not 
tenselessly possess. Hence, on this view, the only available sense of “exist,” and the only sense needed 
to provide a complete description of reality, is the tenseless sense. It is simply false, according to the 
tenseless view that anything, in a strict, non-Pickwickian sense “begins to exist” or “ceases to 
exist” (Kiernan-Lewis, 1994: 322)
" One may import this argument into the case of hope as follows: as an event comes 
to be, my hope for the party will be fulfilled or frustrated. If it is exciting, the hope is fulfilled, if 
it is unexciting, the hope is frustrated. With the fulfilment or frustration of the hope comes the 
ceasing of the hope. As the party finishes, I do not maintain any hope about the party – I 
have experienced it ceasing and, with that, the excitement ceasing or diminishing. A 
tenseless description of the party, then, misses something, for if the tenseless description 
exhaustively captured all properties of the party, there would be nothing intelligible about my 
hope ceasing to be. But my hope does cease to be, so the tenseless theory is false. 
Earlier, I noted than an eternalist may simply respond that this is an artefact of 
hardwired axiological biases. But that misses the point, for that explanation does not 
address the crucial questions of our believed veridicality of the change. One who favours 
that explanation must concede that such experiences are not veridical, or at least not as we 
take them to be, which threatens hope’s role in our emotional lives and preferences, which I 
take to be a negative. I take it to be a negative because I think we can be subject to genuine 
and deep instances of hope, just as we can be subject to genuine and deep instances of 
grief and remorse, instances of such depth that the experience of a hope’s culmination and 
withdrawal demand their vindication through being veridical, comporting with something in 
reality’s structure: my hope that my child survives dangerous surgery, for example, and how 
the emotional force of that hope impresses so greatly on my thoughts and conduct leading to 
the operation and subsequently, when monumental relief swells in me as I hear the hope 
has been satisfied through successful surgical intervention. To be told the experience of 
those changes is non-veridical robs them of their importance, and there is lack of fit between 
what matters to me and the way the world is.
" Of course, an eternalist need not be swayed by any of this. They can say it’s not 
veridical, sure, but that’s no big deal, as we have lots of non-veridical experiences, and as 
long as we can say what is really going on, it is not a problem. But my point is that, in the 
current strands of eternalism, there is not an entirely plausible story of what is actually going 
on in episodes such as these and without a plausible account of what is going on, the 
challenge sticks for eternalism – in other words, we need a new new B-theory.
Regardless, Oaklander (1992) responds that Kiernan-Lewis’ argument is question 
begging, for on a B-theory of time I do not know my headache has ceased in the A-theoretic 
sense of going out of existence, for the A-theoretic sense of ceasing to exist is something an 
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eternalist would deny. But as Craig points out (Craig, 2000: 160), Oaklander has not noticed 
that Kiernan-Lewis’s argument is not framed in terms of propositional knowledge (that my 
headache has ceased to exist) but in terms of non-propositional knowledge (what it is like to 
be aware that my headache has ceased). Now, even if the B-theorist denies us the 
propositional knowledge that our headache has ceased, he cannot deny the 
phenomenological fact that we know what it is like to be aware that our headache has 
ceased. So on the B-theory I have an awareness of things really ceasing to exist, even 
though they do not: so I am frequently deceived by non-veridical experiences, as our 
awareness of things ceasing to exist is pervasive. Craig remarks (Craig, 2000: 160) that on 
the B-theory of time I could not know what it is like to be aware that my headache has 
ceased, so Kiernan-Lewis is implying that such knowledge is inherently - and indispensably - 
tensed. Indeed, Kiernan-Lewis argues elsewhere:
Someone - say, a timeless God - who knew all but only the tenseless facts, and so knew my headache 
‘ceases’ in the sense of there being times after which it tenselessly occurs, would still not know what it is 
like for a headache to cease. Since no analysis of my experience of the ceasing-to-exist of a headache 
in tenseless terms is possible, no tenseless reduction of my experience can succeed (Kiernan-Lewis, 
1994: 232)
Craig remarks on the twofold challenge Kiernan-Lewis has presented to B-theorists: 
“(1), The B-theorist must explain how I can be deceived by the awareness that things cease 
to exist in cases where it is my inner experiences themselves of which I am aware they 
cease to exist; and (2) The B-theorist must explain how an awareness of becoming [and 
ceasing] can exist if reality is tenseless” (Craig, 2000: 160).
The eternalist could, perhaps, argue that non-propositional knowledge that 
something has ceased to exist, that is phenomenal awareness that something has ceased, 
is merely the awareness that some event has come to stand in a B-relation to one’s present 
thoughts. The ceasing of my hope insofar as it is fulfilled or frustrated is simply explained by 
the object of that hope standing in an earlier than relation to my experiences now. And so it 
is for hope for future events: that, and them ‘coming to exist’, is simply explained by the 
event standing in the later than relation to my experiences now. Ceasing to exist and coming 
to exist can be tenselessly redescribed as certain epistemic relations to events that 
correspond to B-relations. This in itself is also a kind of epistemic fact, insofar as my coming 
to stand in a simultaneous with B-relation with the entity hoped for brings with it knowledge 
of the properties of that entity, and with that the fulfilment or frustration of my hope. I hope 
the future party (later than) is exciting, and when the party is now (simultaneous with my 
experiences), I know whether it is exciting or not. It has come to be one or the other, in terms 
of my experience of it, and shall cease to be one or other, in terms of my experience of it, 
and that is a sufficiently robust sense of coming and ceasing to exist, phenomenally 
speaking, to undermine the argument. The party maintains these features tenselessly, of 
course, but this is neither here nor there, for the phenomeneology of hope can be explained 
tenselessly.
Here is one problem with this explanation that a presentist might offer: it simply 
demands too much of phenomenology. The explanation depends on a kind of double 
awareness: first, there is the immediate, unreflective awareness of an experience. This kind 
of awareness is capable of occurring prior to any kind of sophisticated, propositional 
cognitions, and often does. Think of the ‘sinking heart’ feeling upon hearing bad news, or the 
strongly somatic element of seeing something frightening, like a lion. Or, more benignly, 
think of idle thoughts, of watching rolling clouds, undulating waves or an insect crawl across 
a table, or the ticking of a clock. Such awareness, in the former cases, plausibly occurs prior 
to a judgement about the awareness. In the latter case, such awareness of passage, of 
coming to and ceasing to exist, perhaps needs no judgement at all. One simply apprehends 
the flux of passage. The eternalist explanation requires a second, reflective judgement on 
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the experience of the first, unreflectively aware experience, for it requires that awareness of, 
say, becoming excited, be judged as standing in a B-relation as being simultaneous with 
one’s awareness that one is phenomenally aware of being excited. In other words, the 
presentist response seeks to disentangle one’s experiences, at the unreflective level, with 
one’s judgement of those experiences, at the reflective level – that is to say, the presentist 
seeks to separate unreflective and reflective awareness, whilst the presentist seeks to 
combine them. If they can be disentangled, then awareness of a B-relation between one’s 
judgement of an experience and an experience itself is not sufficient to explain Kiernan-
Lewis’ tensed fact of experience in tenseless terms, for there will be instances of this fact 
without an attendant judgement that this fact is simultaneous with my judgement that it is 
occurring now. Instances of this may be like the first and second types of example earlier, of 
phenomenal awareness being prior to a judgement, or of phenomenal awareness having no 
judgement.
Though I am not convinced of the eternalist strategy here, trouble lurks not too far in 
the form of a very large elephant in the room: the temporal knowledge argument is, of 
course, a version of the knowledge argument, and the knowledge argument is subject to two 
pretty compelling responses: the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concepts strategy. 
And there is simply nothing to stop the temporal counterparts of these responses to the 
temporal knowledge argument cropping up. Experiencing something as ceasing is really just 
the exercise of an ability to recognise changes in B-relations. Tie this up with some kind of 
evolutionary explanation and empirical studies on the acquisition of this capacity and there 
we go. Or, alternatively, experiencing something as ceasing is not a fact in addition to the 
tenseless way things are, but a different way of it being presented.
It would be noble (or foolish, depending on your perspective) to stand one’s ground 
and carry on fighting against these responses – and in fact, I feel quite some sympathy for 
those that do and a compulsion to join in – but, sadly, the writing is on the wall, and it states 
that the knowledge argument has not exactly fared very well. This is not to say that it cannot 
be resuscitated, of course, but I am keen to move on to what I think is the real challenge to 
the epistemic conception, and that involves a hope’s conditions for satisfaction.
9.3 - Satisfaction Conditions
I now press the attack in the fashion I have done with grief, guilt, regret and so on – 
that the eternalist view renders such emotions unintelligible in an unrestricted sense and that 
it is the satisfaction, in the case of hope, of such emotions that requires tense. That is, the 
eternalist conception of hope forbids its actual, robust satisfaction. 
Hoping, really, is something like the following, on the eternalist view: ‘my hope that 
the party is exciting is the hope that myself, later than now, is temporally coincident with a 
party that is indeed exciting, regardless of the fact that the properties of the party are already  
determined and my later self already has its hope fulfilled or frustrated’. But (and, again, to 
alter Prior’s famous words) why would anyone hope for that?
Now, any defender of the epistemic account can respond that this is to misread their 
analysis of hope. To read it in this way is to understand a defender of the epistemic account 
as claiming that they offer a tenseless translation of the propositional object of hope – what 
hope really is, in tenseless terms. But this would be to make the same mistake as the old B-
theory of time. Prior’s argument, in its original guise, was precisely aimed at this error of the 
old B-theory, the error of thinking that one can give tenseless translations of tensed 
discourse. Such a project fails but, as history has taught us, this is no strike against the new 
B-theory of time, which sought to offer the truth conditions of tensed discourse whilst 
recognising that there may indeed be no straightforward tenseless translation of such 
discourse. It is not inconsistent for a tenseless theory to admit the indispensability of tensed 
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discourse whilst denying any reality to tense, metaphysically speaking, just as it is not 
inconsistent for any theory of indexicals to admit their indispensability whilst denying any 
reality to I-facts, or suchlike.
The defender of the epistemic conception is quite right to point out that they need not 
be offering tenseless translations of the propositional content of hopes. However, the 
situation is not quite so straightforward as offering the truth conditions of hope. We can and 
do say that we truly hope for things to be a certain way but that is merely in the sense of 
authentically or emphatically hoping for things to be a certain way. The idea of the truth 
conditions of emotions like hope is quite obscure.
This is not to say that our emotions float free of any constraints, of course, in terms of 
their objects.I think the rationalisation, or intelligibility, of hope consists in its satisfaction 
conditions. The positive satisfaction conditions of a hope (its fulfilment, as I have been 
calling it) are for what is hoped for to come to be as it is hoped for. So, if one hopes for a 
party to be exciting, that hope is fulfilled when the party comes to be, and it is exciting. For 
those instances of hope that have a past temporal direction, such as the hope that I have 
won the best artist in Rotherham competition, the winner already being determined but the 
announcement yet to made, share the same form of satisfaction conditions. Here, the hope 
that I have won the competition is fulfilled by the competition coming to be finished by myself 
being elected as the winner. That it has already been determined that I am the winner, 
unbeknownst to me, does not alter the fulfilment of that hope.
The defender of the epistemic conception is free to adopt satisfaction conditions 
rather than truth conditions for her theory. Those satisfaction conditions, of course, will be 
tenseless ones, and perhaps the simplest satisfaction condition concerning a hope for a 
party to be exciting is the following: 
" my hope that the party is exciting is satisfied if the party, later than ‘now’, is exciting
Or, the dated version, which does indeed seem even more promising
" my hope that the party is exciting is satisfied if the party, on 25th July, is exciting
The latter does indeed seem quite a reasonable satisfaction condition of a hope. But that, I 
think, is inherited from reading the copula as tensed, rather than tenseless. Reading the 
satisfaction condition as a tensed one would very naturally offer a plausible satisfaction 
condition, for it concerns the coming to be of a party, on 25th July, and the hope that in 
coming to be, that party is exciting. A tenseless reading of the satisfaction condition, 
however, is a different story, for then the hope that the party is exciting would be satisfied by 
the party, tenselessly on the 25th July, being exciting. If that is the satisfaction condition of my 
hope, then my hope, should the tenselessly occurring party be exciting, is always satisfied, 
at any time prior to the party and at any time after the party. But I take it that hearing that 
there is a certain tenseless fact in which a party on the 25th July bears a tenseless relation to 
the property of being exciting does not satisfy my hope. It is the smuggling in of the tensed 
copula, with all the whoosh and jerk of becoming that it conjures up, that lends the tenseless 
satisfaction condition its plausibility. The problem, I think, is that my hope just is not about 
the tenseless occurrence of a party that stands in a B-relation to a position I currently occupy  
in the B-series.
" Still, I do not expect a defender of the epistemic conception, now embellished with 
tenseless satisfaction conditions, to be swayed. It is fair of them to query why, exactly, the 
tenseless satisfaction condition of the party does not work. And I imagine they may try and 
rally even more plausible examples of tenseless satisfaction conditions that do seem to 
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satisfy hopes. For example, imagine that I hope my operation, to occur 17th October, goes 
well. The tenseless satisfaction condition, at its simplest, would be:
" my hope that my operation goes well is satisfied if my operation, on 17th October, 
" goes well
And that seems to make a good deal of sense – I certainly do hope my operation goes well, 
and goes well on that day! But, again, I ask the defender of tenseless satisfaction conditions 
to draw their attention to how one is to read the verb ‘goes’. Read tensed, the satisfaction 
condition would indeed be plausible, for it concerns the coming to be of what is hoped for, 
how it was hoped for. It is the hope that an event which has yet to occur, occur in a particular 
way. Read tenselessly, there is no ‘going’, so to speak, merely a relation between the 
tenseless occurrence of an operation and how it tenselessly occurs. Note, too, that this hard 
to parse, for ‘occurrence’ itself is naturally understood as tensed. The tenseless copula is a 
difficult thing to understand. It is at its most intelligible in statements of fact that are not 
temporal at all, such as mathematics – ‘2 and 2 is 4’, or ‘A right angle is 90 degrees’. But 
when we hope, we are not concerned with how things stand, tenselessly speaking, and I 
think our hopes are not satisfied by tenseless states of affairs.
" But, a friend of tenseless satisfaction conditions may say, imagine a spin on the 
previous scenario: I hope that my operation goes well on 17th October, without any 
complications or hitches. Luckily enough for me, I own a crystal ball that deals with tenseless 
satisfaction conditions. I shake the ball, and it yields its knowledge. Written upon its display 
is the following indubitable prognostication: ‘the operation on 17th October goes well. And 
‘goes’ is entirely tenseless’. Who could fail to have their hope satisfied by that?
" Well, indeed, who could not be satisfied by that? But that is not because the 
satisfaction condition is tenseless. It satisfies the hope because it specifies, without 
ambiguity, what happens in the future. Whether this is tenseless or not is beside the point, 
for A-theoretic eternalists, like a moving spotlighter, could do the same with their own crystal 
ball. Of course a hope is satisfied if one knows, without incertitude, that it will be satisfied. 
But this is all inconsistent with the defender of the epistemic conception of hope, for it is 
central to their analysis of hope that the future is not epistemically accessible.
" Further, consider the following: ‘I hope I am never the victim of a chronal horror!’. 
Given that chronal horrors are entailed by eternalism, there is no tenseless satisfaction 
condition for this hope. And, as I have argued in the chapter on chronal horrors, this is a very  
bad result, for it is precisely the sort of hope we do want satisfied. And so it is for legion other 
hopes that are complicated by tenselessness, either in terms of time or persistence: ‘I hope I 
will be free of the spectre of that assault’, ‘I hope the man responsible for that murder is 
blamed’, and so on. And, throughout, I have argued that it is only haecceity presentism that 
can explain and support the importance of having these sorts of emotional reactions. For the 
hope that relates to being free of the spectre of an assault: the hope is satisfied, for the 
assault is no more. Its haecceity persists, of course, but a haecceity of an assault is not an 
assault, and its haecceity does valuable work. For the hope that relates to the murderer 
being blamed: the hope is satisfied, for haecceity presentism does indeed have an 
intelligible relation of responsibility and permits attributions of blame. The victim of the 
murder, too, is not subject to a chronal horror, for his murder is no more. Its haecceity 
persists, certainly, but as before, a haecceity of a murder is not a murder, and it too does 
valuable work, for it characterises the murderer as a murderer whilst also opening up the 
possibility of rehabilitation and forgiveness.
" This also precludes any non-presentist A-theories that believe in the past form giving 
tenseless or tensed satisfaction conditions for hope, as things like chronal horrors will exist 
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on those theories, either because they have always existed, but are simply now non-present 
(moving spotlight), or because they have come to exist and shall now remain existing 
(growing block). 
9.4 – Satisfaction Conditions: Non-Transparent?
The following objection has been presented to me: the issue with satisfaction conditions, 
really, is one of transparency, in that I am arguing that the satisfaction conditions of a hope 
are transparent, insofar as they obviously involve tense. But beliefs that relate to tense are 
actually non-transparent, in that they are made true by the tenseless nature of reality.
" Here, the objector continues, is an example of a hope whose satisfaction conditions 
are not transparent: Jonny is the unfortunate subject of a Matrix scenario. That is, he is 
plugged into a machine and experiences a virtual world in which everything is the result of 
the fluctuations of a computer programme. Johnny wants to jump from the roof of one 
building to another. Jonny does not know he is in a Matrix scenario – he’s quite convinced 
that everything is on the level. The satisfaction conditions of Johnny’s hope, then, are not 
transparent, in that they consist in the fluctuations of a computer program being such that 
he, within the Matrix, leaps from one rooftop to the next – not in the actual act of leaping. 
Jonny successfully performs the ‘leap’ and, his hope satisfied, is immensely pleased at his 
extraordinary athletic aptitude. And there we have it, the objection runs – a hope that is 
satisfied, but the satisfaction conditions are non-transparent. Given that tenseless 
satisfaction conditions would be non-transparent, then, the eternalist is off the hook.
" I deny that Jonny’s hope has been satisfied at all. Jonny hoped that he would leap 
from one building to another. But he did no such thing – he was the victim of a computer-
generated deception that he leapt from one building to another. Just as my hope to swim the 
Atlantic is not fulfilled if it occurred in a dream, my hope to leap from one building to another 
is not fulfilled if it is merely the illusion, borne from a program, that I have done so. Of 
course, if Jonny hopes to jump from one building to another within the context of a computer 
program, then his hope is fulfilled – but it is no longer non-transparent, as Jonny is aware 
that such a hope is fulfilled relative to the operation of the Matrix. The same point applies to 
any hope that is relative to a context – for example, a child may have their hope to slay a 
dragon fulfilled within a game they play but, much like Jonny’s hope to leap a building, there 
are no satisfaction conditions for the child’s hope outside of the context of play, for there are 
no dragons to slay, just as there are no buildings to jump.
However, it can be argued against this point that if semantic externalism is true, then 
the content of Johnny’s hopes will be determined causally by his being embedded in the 
Matrix simulation: that is, the meaning of ‘jump’, ‘building’ and so on are determined by the 
digital illusions in which he is immersed, so the satisfaction of that hope is non-transparent, 
for programmes and code within the Matrix scenario are to what the various words of his 
hope refer.
The most straightforward way out of this quagmire is to turn the tables and utilise 
semantic externalism to undermine such sceptical scenarios and show that they cannot 
apply to Johnny in the way the sceptic desires, ala Hilary Putnam (1981). Anthony Brueckner 
(2003) offers the following argument, which I have tweaked for Johnny:
1) If Johnny is in a Matrix scenario, then it is not the case that if Johnny’s word 
‘building’ refers, then it refers to buildings.
2) If Johnny’s word ‘building’ refers, then it refers to buildings. So,
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3) Johnny is not in a Matrix scenario.
Premise 1 just is semantic externalism, the thesis that meanings and truth-conditions of 
sentences depend upon the way one’s external, causal environment is. If Johnny had been 
immersed in a Matrix scenario from birth, then all there would be externally to him is a pod, 
the liquid he is submerged in and a supercomputer. Thus, there would be no causal 
connection between Johnny’s digitally produced representation of a building and buildings 
themselves – there just is not the kind of causal connection between images or 
representations of buildings and buildings for that reference to occur.
Premise 2 is where trouble sets in: in order to know its truth, is it not the case Johnny 
needs to know he is not in a Matrix scenario in order to use disquotation in stating the 
referents of his words? 
Brueckner (1992, 2011) offers the following response: in moving through the argument, 
Johnny does not know whether he is: 1) not in a Matrix scenario and thus speaking English, 
where ‘building’ refers to buildings or 2) in a Matrix scenario and thus speaking Matrixese, 
where ‘building’ refers to digital representations. However, Brueckner contends, Johnny does 
know certain things about the semantic features of his own language: He knows the 
meaning of ‘refers’, and he knows what quotation marks are. And if he knows these, then he 
knows disquotation can be applied to any referring terms in the language he speaks, 
securing the truth of premise 2. As for premise 1, Johnny can assert that he also knows this 
to be true owing to his a priori knowledge of the theory of semantic externalism and how it 
applies to sceptical scenarios like the Matrix one. Further, anyone presenting the semantic 
externalism argument against me is obviously going to accept premise 1, for their argument 
depends on the truth of semantic externalism in the first place.
Alternatively, one can make a point similar to Brueckner’s in the fashion of Crispin Wright 
(1995) and Harold Noonan (1998: 59):
1) ‘Snow is white’ in my language has disquotational truth conditions.
2) If I am a BIV then ‘Snow is white’ in my language does not have disquotational truth 
conditions.
3) I am not a BIV [from 1) and 2)] [or, for us, in a Matrix scenario]
There we have it: we can resist the force of the sceptical scenario by taking ourselves 
through the argument and coming to know that we are not in a Matrix simulation, so the idea 
that the satisfaction conditions for Johnny’s hope might be non-transparent loses traction, as 
its force rests upon on us being potentially subject to such deceptions.
However, it might be responded that Brueckner’s and Noonan’s arguments are 
something of a red herring in the dialectic and my response has deliberately misunderstood 
the original Johnny example. This is because the original Johnny example involves someone 
who actually is in a Matrix scenario, and someone who actually is will have their hope 
satisfied non-transparently. Very well: I shall introduce Johnny* who, by fiat, just is in a 
Matrix scenario, and has never been outside of it, and is none the wiser about his 
circumstances. Could we say that Johnny*s hopes are satisfied non-transparently? Yes, I 
suppose we could – just as the truth, satisfaction or appropriateness conditions of everything 
Johnny is immersed in is similarly non-transparent. But Johnny* is in a Matrix scenario 
(simply by stipulation, I might add), and his language is Matrixese and the referents of his 
words executed computer programmes. But I am not in a Matrix scenario, as per the 
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arguments above, and my language is English, not Matrixese, and the referents of my words 
are things out there in the world, like concrete buildings. In fact, I find the stipulation that 
someone truly is in a Matrix scenario – and that is the end of that – to be somewhat question 
begging, for whether someone can be subject to such a delusion is the question at hand. 
Regardless, I say we should not be too troubled by Johnny*, for we have the means to know 
that we just are not in the same situation as Johnny*.
A proponent of the sceptical argument might rephrase it, however, to something more 
challenging. Let us return to Johnny, who knows the arguments to resist sceptical scenarios, 
and knows he is not in a Matrix scenario. However, a scientist, keen to prove that hopes 
have non-transparent satisfaction conditions, sedates and kidnaps Johnny, seamlessly 
introducing him into a Matrix scenario. Now, he smiles to himself, Johnny will have his hopes 
be satisfied non-transparently.
This is doubtless a tricky amendment to defuse. Here is my attempt: Johnny, when 
first thrust into the Matrix, still plausibly has none of his hopes satisfied. This is because the 
reference of his words is still causally connected to those things that were around him 
outside of the Matrix scenario, so his hopes about jumping from building to building still 
relate to buildings. However, as time passes and he spends longer and longer in the Matrix, 
reference might indeed begin to shift from English to Matrixese, and his hopes now are 
satisfied non-transparently. But there are still facts about Johnny that limit the bite of the 
sceptical scenario, for he has lived outside it: it is true, for example, that his hopes used to 
have transparent satisfaction conditions, and conditions for other facts about him were 
similarly transparent too. It is also true that all these are now non-transparent after reference 
has shifted, but I think this relates to the fact that Matrixese is a language without 
disquotational truth conditions, which makes it non-transparent by default. And that is the 
best I can say. This is not a terrible thing, as sceptical scenarios are notoriously difficult to 
topple. But I feel confident in asserting that hopes do have transparent satisfaction 
conditions even in light of these scenarios, for I am confident I am not in one, and that I 
speak a language with disquotational truth, and satisfaction, conditions.
" Regardless of one’s thoughts about Johnny, the point originally put to me was that 
these kinds of scenarios demonstrate the intelligibility of non-transparent satisfaction 
conditions for a hope and, their intelligibility grasped, we can see then how non-transparent 
satisfaction conditions are legitimate and model tenseless non-transparent satisfaction 
conditions for superficially tensed hopes in the same fashion. Even if you do not agree with 
my arguments, though, that hopes do indeed have transparent satisfaction conditions, I have 
argued that the candidate tenseless satisfaction conditions explored above – B-relations and 
dates – do not do the necessary work and, in some cases, simply cannot do the necessary 
work. So even if non-transparency were an element of a hope’s satisfaction, the most 
plausible tenseless satisfaction conditions that would function non-transparently do not, or 
cannot, do what they were deployed for. I think, then, that the path of non-transparency is a 
dead end.
I think, then, that hopes cannot be satisfied by their tenseless satisfaction conditions, 
unless the hope itself is peculiarly tenseless (such as, perhaps, odd hopes about 
mathematics or suchlike). Further, I have argued that there are hopes that simply have no 
tenseless satisfaction conditions, and these sorts of hopes are very much ones we want 
satisfied. 
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CONCLUSION
In writing this thesis, I had two goals in mind. The first goal was to articulate my haecceity 
presentism and argue that it is the best version of haecceity presentism. The second goal 
was to mount a novel deployment of haecceity presentism against tenseless theories of time 
and persistence in order to demonstrate that they cannot rationalise or vindicate crucial 
elements of our emotional and moral lives. 
The second goal, in effect, is an attempt at resuscitating the spirit of Arthur Prior’s 
argument in ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over!’, and issuing its challenge anew: tenseless 
theorists of time and persons seem to think Prior’s original argument has been neatly laid to 
rest, but I have endeavoured to redeploy the thought that inspired it. The intended 
consequence of this redeployment is an ultimatum for those who believe in the truth of 
eternalism, perdurance and stage theory: for those who feel the importance of honouring the 
substantivity of emotions in our thinking, action, and practices, moral and otherwise, I say: 
accept haecceity presentism. To those who resist or deny the substantivity I attribute to 
emotions for persons, I say: you must transparently and honestly accept that you do not 
have a place for emotions in your theories that treat them with the appropriate level of 
seriousness – they are incapable of being rational or deeply vindicated. This should be 
considered a deeply alienating result.
" Haecceity presentism is, I think, a plausible form of presentism, and I do think that 
my version of haecceity presentism is also the strongest version. It does not diverge from 
the core of presentism, for it is still an ontology composed of only concrete present objects, 
and the addition of haecceities simply gives what presentists serious about singular 
reference, truthmaking, cross-temporal relations etc. must already provide – surrogates for 
non-present entities. The usual murmurs of cheating abound, of course. They tend to in most 
instances of surrogates. But this is a charge the haecceity presentist should completely 
resist. The charge of cheating, in my view, relies on some unexpressed, metametaphysical 
norm that there is an appropriate way to conduct metaphysical inquiry and that those that 
posit surrogates are flouting it. But why? This conviction is rarely articulated in depth: certain 
properties are ‘suspicious’, and that is that. Without any substantial reasons to believe that 
surrogate properties are somehow ontologically inadmissible, I say we reject the charge of 
cheating as a bit of dogma. Of course, this does not mean that surrogate properties are all 
on a par: there are better surrogates than others.
" Indeed, there are a few metametaphysical commitments of my own throughout this 
thesis that are not very popular now. For example, in the chapter on tenseless theories of 
persistence and how this relates to responsibility and blameworthiness, I express sympathy 
towards arguments that Sider deems merely linguistic or conceptual14. I have always been a 
bit puzzled by the hostility towards linguistically or conceptually inclined arguments. The 
metaphysicians that oppose them are insistent that they are solely concerned with what is, 
not how we talk about things. But a number of very important practices are intimately tied to 
the way we talk about things, and the way we identify continuants, engage with them, treat 
them as capable of actions and hold them responsible for those actions is one of them. And 
if a metaphysics threatens a practice like this, then I think it is fine to challenge it on partly 
linguistic or conceptual grounds: if your metaphysic makes obviously true statements about 
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14 Why do I say metametaphysical and not metaphilsophical? Because I am only commenting on the value 
of these sorts of arguments within metaphysics. Their value within ethics, say, or philosophy of science is 
not something I can comment on.
moral responsibility false, then that is a mark against your theory, and this is one of the 
things I argue against stage theory.
" Another metametaphysical commitment that is very important to the thesis is that 
persons – in their broadest sense – need to be robustly accommodated in metaphysical 
theories, and a failure to do so renders a theory alienating. The aspect of persons I press for 
accommodation is their emotional lives. It is very difficult to convince a metaphysician who 
does not share this commitment that they ought to share it. You open yourself up to an 
incredulous stare (and you would already have had a couple for expressing belief in 
presentism and haecceities). But for me, it is very difficult to understand why a 
metaphysician would not share it. Indeed, to me it just seems obvious that a theory being 
alienating is a bad thing. There are some suggestions that a theory having an alienating 
quality is something that has to be addressed, even if it is not explicitly articulated as a 
disadvantage to a theory (mereological nihilism’s denial of composites like us, for example), 
but I have been quite explicit in arguing that a theory having alienating consequences is a 
bad thing. If this thesis has the result of at least drawing people into responding to such 
concerns (and I think the arguments based on emotion compel a response, as an 
explanation of where our emotions stand in a tenseless reality is one that must be given), 
then I think that is also a good result.
" Do I think the tenseless theorists I attack in the second half of the thesis will abandon 
their camps and assent to the truth of haecceity presentism? Maybe. But to reconfigure the 
debate over the reality of tense is also an important contribution. In shifting the grounds of 
the dialectic to emotion, I hope I might have achieved something towards this. 
Of course, there is always the chance that the purported tenseless bases of 
emotions that I have given and argued against throughout this thesis might be of the wrong 
sort, and a tenseless theorist might well come along and give better ones that fend my 
arguments off. That is fine, though, as much like Prior’s arguments helped precipitate 
important changes to the old B-theory, if the arguments contained within the second half 
might contribute or help to inform changes to the new B-theory on grounds of emotions, then 
that has served to demonstrate that the new B-theory is still inadequate and a new new B-
theory might be needed.
Ultimately, perhaps the biggest victory to be had in reconfiguring the dialectic on the 
reality of tense is to give a positive reason for believing in a sort of presentism. Why 
someone should be a presentist is not always very obvious: there are certain intuitions about 
how the past was but no longer is, and that we seem to be subject to experiences of 
passage, and so on. But I have tried to give a clear, definite reason why someone should 
embrace a particular form of presentism, haecceity presentism: because it honours the 
importance and value of our emotions, personally and ethically. Thus, after sometime on the 
dialectical back foot, the haecceity presentist can finally go on the attack.
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